Opinion
No. 2-621 / 01-1642
Filed September 11, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, James L. Beeghly and Thomas N. Bower, Judges.
The defendant appeals his sentence alleging in substance that the trial court failed to state its reason for the sentence imposed. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Dennis Hendrickson, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sheryl Soich, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas Ferguson, County Attorney, and Linda Myers, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Miller, P.J., and Hayden and Habhab, S.J.
Senior judges assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2001).
The appellant seeks to have his sentence vacated and asks that this case be remanded for resentencing with directions to the trial court to state its reasons for the sentence imposed. For the reasons that follow, we decline to do so and affirm.
We review for abuse of discretion.
The defendant was charged with and pleaded guilty to one count of eluding, in violation of Iowa Code section 321.279(2) (2001). The charge stemmed from allegations that the defendant, the subject of an outstanding arrest warrant, sped away from a pursuing police car on his motorcycle.
Pursuant to a negotiated plea, the defendant was sentenced to a two-year suspended sentence. He had agreed to waive use of a presentence investigation report. He later filed a motion to reconsider his sentence. The trial court denied that request.
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor noted the agreement between the parties regarding the expected sentence. The defendant, in his appellate briefs, concedes this along with the following:
Statements by the prosecutor at the guilty plea proceeding outlined a plea agreement which specifically included terms of probation and a suspended sentence. Those terms specifically included placement for one year in a Residential Treatment Facility and placement in the county jail pending available space in the R.T.F. Everyone understood this agreement. The trial court ultimately sentenced Cooper precisely as the agreement contemplated.
Even though the trial court sentenced the defendant precisely as the plea agreement provided, he now complains that because the judge failed to state his sentencing reasons the sentence should be vacated. The State resists and argues the defendant suffered no harm, his sentence was in accordance with the plea agreement, and in its Record of Plea Change, Order Presentence Report, and Scheduling Sentencing, the trial court specifically stated that it "accepts the plea agreement and will embody the plea agreement in its judgment and sentence the disposition provided for in the plea agreement. . . ."
The defendant relies upon Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(3)(d), which provides:
Judgment entered. If no sufficient cause is shown why judgment should not be pronounced, and none appears to the court upon the record, judgment shall be rendered. Prior to such rendition, counsel for the defendant, and the defendant personally, shall be allowed to address the court where either wishes to make a statement in mitigation of punishment. In every case the court shall include in the judgment entry the number of the particular section of the Code under which the defendant is sentenced. The court shall state on the record its reason for selecting the particular sentence.
He emphasizes the last sentence of that Code section.
The "record" referred to in the last sentence of the above rule, insofar as it concerns criminal appeals, consists of "[t]he original papers and exhibits filed in the trial court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, and a certified copy of the docket and court calendar entries. . . ." Iowa R. App. P. 10(a). Again referring to that section, our supreme court has stated on a number of occasions that the better practice is for the court to state reasons for its sentence, even those in which it has no discretion. State v. Matlock, 304 N.W.2d 226 (1981).
As our supreme court stated in Matlock:
The main purpose of the requirement in rule 22(3)(d) that a court state its reason for a particular sentence is to allow us to review the sentence to determine if there has been an abuse of discretion.304 N.W.2d at 228.
In Matlock, the defendant was convicted after trial to the court of second-degree robbery in violation of Iowa Code section 711.3 (Supp. 1977). 304 N.W.2d at 227. His sentence included a mandatory minimum term of confinement. Id. When sentencing the defendant, the court did not comply with Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(3)(d) by stating its reasons for the sentence. Id. In affirming, the supreme court stated:
In the present case, there could be no abuse of discretion since the court lacked the power to enter a less severe sentence. The error of the court in failing to state its reason did not harm defendant. A remand for resentencing could not change the sentence required under the relevant statutes.Id.
Like in State v. Snyder, 336 N.W.2d 728, 729 (Iowa 1983), the defendant and the State entered into a plea agreement which was outlined to the court. The trial court agreed to be bound by the plea agreement. Id. Everyone understood the agreement and the trial court sentenced the defendant precisely as the agreement contemplated. Id. As was stated in Snyder:
In the present case, the plea agreement contemplated that the defendant would be imprisoned for the offense. The court approved the plea agreement and incorporated it in the sentence. The sentence of imprisonment was therefore not the product of the exercise of trial court discretion but of the process of giving effect to the parties' agreement. Under these circumstances, the purpose of a statement of reasons for imposition of the sentence would serve no practical purpose. The rationale of rule 22(3)(d) is inapposite, and any failure by the court to furnish reasons for the sentence was harmless. See Matlock, 304 N.W.2d 228. We say again, as we did in Matlock, however, that the better practice is for the court to state reasons in every case, even those in which it has no discretion. Id.
The defendant does not claim the State breached the plea agreement. Nor does he assert the guilty plea was defective. The trial court imposed a term of incarceration not to exceed two years, suspended, and ordered the sentence to run concurrently with other suspended sentences imposed for stalking, two counts of harassments, and interference with official acts.
We affirm the trial court. The sentence imposed was not the product of the exercise of the court's discretion but the process of giving effect to the parties' agreement. Snyder, 336 N.W.2d at 729. The court's failure to state its reasons did not harm the defendant. From the record before us, we have been able to review the sentence and clearly find no abuse of discretion. A remand, under the circumstances here, for resentencing with stated reasons would not change the sentence imposed.
AFFIRMED.