Opinion
No. 3-095 / 02-1448
Filed March 26, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Thomas M. Horan, Judge.
Steven Cooley appeals from the district court's order denying his motion for readjustment of restitution. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and David Adams, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Martha Boesen, Assistant Attorney General, Harold Denton, County Attorney, and Brian Claney and Jerry Vander Sanden, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Hecht, JJ.
Defendant Steven Cooley was tried and convicted of third-degree burglary, habitual offender. He appealed, and our supreme court reversed the conviction because the district court failed to inquire and advise Cooley of the dangers of proceeding to trial pro se. State v. Cooley, 608 N.W.2d 9, 18 (Iowa 2000). On remand, Cooley pled guilty to third-degree burglary and was ordered to pay restitution on July 7, 2000. In February 2002, Cooley filed a petition for restitution hearing, seeking clarification of the court costs he was required to pay. The district court did not grant a hearing, but ordered the clerk of court provide Cooley with a case financial summary. This summary listed the costs, services, victim restitution and attorney fees Cooley was ordered to pay and disclosed that in addition to the costs and fees incurred for his guilty plea, Cooley was required to pay the costs and fees associated with the original prosecution that had been reversed on appeal.
Cooley filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence and readjust restitution. He challenged the amount of restitution he was required to pay on several grounds, including an allegation that he should not be required to pay the fees and costs associated with the first prosecution. The district court "overruled and denied [Cooley's motion] as to each and every paragraph thereof." Cooley appeals. His only argument in this appeal is that the district court erred by requiring him to pay the costs and fees associated with the first prosecution.
Our review of restitution decisions is for errors at law, Iowa R.App.P. 4, and we reverse only if an abuse of discretion is demonstrated. State v. Bradley, 637 N.W.2d 206, 210 (Iowa Ct.App. 2001).
The State contends this appeal is inappropriate for our consideration because the timing of Cooley's petition for restitution hearing renders it a civil, rather than criminal, action. We agree that because Cooley did not challenge the amount of his restitution until nearly two years after it was ordered, he is limited to the civil remedies authorized by Iowa Code section 910.7 (2001), State v. Blank, 570 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Iowa 1997), but disagree that this limitation precludes our review of his appeal.
Because the judgment following his trial was reversed by the supreme court, Cooley contends the district court erred by including the costs incurred as a result of the trial in the restitution order. He notes that defendants who have been acquitted or have had the charges against them dropped are not required to pay trial costs. Cooley insists his situation is analogous, because the reversal by the supreme court had the same legal effect as an acquittal or withdrawal of charges. He contends requiring a defendant to pay for the State's unsuccessful attempt at conviction violates public policy and discourages defendants from accepting plea agreements.
The question of whether restitution is warranted is a legal one. Clearly this is a case in which restitution must be ordered. "In all criminal cases in which there is a plea of guilty, verdict of guilty, or special verdict upon which a judgment of conviction is rendered, the sentencing court shall order that restitution be made by each offender . . ." Iowa Code § 910.2 (2001). Cooley ultimately pled guilty to third-degree burglary, and the district court therefore committed no legal error by ordering restitution. We must, however review Cooley's claim that the district court abused its discretion in its determination of the amount of restitution.
Cooley pled guilty to third-degree burglary based upon the same set of transactions and occurrences that had supported his initial conviction for third degree burglary, habitual offender. By pleading guilty to burglary after his conviction was reversed, Cooley admitted guilt. Although we assume without deciding that the district court, in its discretion, could have chosen to require Cooley pay only the costs associated with his guilty plea, under the circumstances presented in this case, we find no abuse of discretion by the district court in ordering restitution which included the costs of Cooley's initial conviction that was reversed.