Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3452-12T4
02-17-2015
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CAMILLE COMBS, Defendant-Appellant.
Daniel F. Gonzalez argued the cause for appellant (Perez, Gonzalez, & Galleno, L.L.C., attorneys; Mr. Gonzalez on the brief). John L. Molinelli, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Jacqueline Choi, Assistant Bergen County Prosecutor, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Fasciale and Whipple. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Municipal Appeal No. 12-80. Daniel F. Gonzalez argued the cause for appellant (Perez, Gonzalez, & Galleno, L.L.C., attorneys; Mr. Gonzalez on the brief). John L. Molinelli, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Jacqueline Choi, Assistant Bergen County Prosecutor, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from her de novo conviction for a petty disorderly persons offense of harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4a. We affirm.
We discern the following facts from the de novo record. The victim, C.S., received a phone call at her Saddle Brook home from defendant, who had a prior relationship with C.S.'s boyfriend (the "boyfriend"). C.S. received additional phone calls from defendant and learned defendant's identity from the boyfriend. C.S. subsequently changed her telephone number to an unlisted number. Defendant obtained C.S.'s new phone number and again called C.S., leaving a series of messages on C.S.'s answering machine. One of the messages contained a sexually explicit profane statement.
C.S. then filed a complaint in Saddle Brook Municipal Court charging defendant with harassment. C.S. testified to the content of the messages at the trial held in Saddle Brook Municipal Court. C.S. stated that the messages were erased due to a power outage at her Saddle Brook home. Defendant testified on her own behalf that she contacted C.S. "a few times," admitted to making a sexually explicit reference but did not consider it to be profane, and admitted leaving several messages on C.S.'s answering machine. Defendant testified that she was not trying to harass C.S., but intended to warn her about then pending sexual assault allegations against the boyfriend.
The Municipal Court judge concluded that "defendant . . . made numerous phone calls" and that "for [defendant] to continually leave messages on the answering machine and then get a phone number after it's been changed appears to be nothing more than harassment . . . ." The Municipal Court judge discredited defendant's testimony by noting that "it's more of harassment than warning. And to go out and get phone numbers after they've been changed . . . [is not] a public service." The Municipal Court judge then found defendant guilty of harassment, imposed fines, and stayed the conviction pending defendant's appeal to the Law Division.
The Law Division judge conducted a trial de novo, where defendant's counsel argued that defendant's conduct could not be considered harassment because there was a legitimate purpose for the phone calls. The State contended that defendant admitted to making numerous attempts to contact C.S., forcing C.S. to change her phone number, and that defendant continued contacting C.S. by leaving lengthy messages on her answering machine.
The Law Division judge concluded that "the numerous phone calls [were] likely to cause annoyance or alarm due to relationship of the parties, [considering] the fact that we have an ex[-girlfriend] making phone calls . . . ." The Law Division judge declined to address defendant's argument that the municipal court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case, found defendant guilty of harassment, and imposed the same fines and penalties as the Municipal Court judge.
On appeal, defendant raises the following points:
POINT I
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE SADDLE BROOK MUNICIPAL COURT AND THE SUPERIOR COURT LAW DIVISION TO FIND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF HARASSMENT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
A. The defendant did not act with the purpose to harass the complainant as required under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4[(a)].
B. The defendant was improperly charged with harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a).
C. The defendant's conduct does not constitute [h]arassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a).
POINT II
THE SADDLE BROOK TOWNSHIP MUNICIPAL COURT FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT IT HAD PROPER AUTHORITY TO HEAR THE ORIGINAL CASE.
A. The trial court erred by refusing to address the defendant's arguments with respect to the complainant's failure to identify the time and place of the underlying offense.
B. The State failed to satisfy the jurisdictional element of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4[(a)] beyond a reasonable doubt.
I.
When a defendant appeals a decision made by a municipal court to the Law Division, the court is required to conduct a de novo review of the record, giving "due regard to the municipal judge's opportunity to view the witnesses and assess credibility." State v. Golin, 363 N.J. Super. 474, 481 (App. Div. 2003) (citing State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 157 (1964)). On appeal from the Law Division's decision, we must determine whether the Law Division judge's findings "'could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record.'" State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999) (quoting Johnson, supra, 42 N.J. at 162). However, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
Harassment is defined as a petty disorderly persons offense when an individual "[m]akes, or causes to be made, a communication or communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm[.]" N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4a (emphasis added). Our Supreme Court has stated that a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4a requires the following elements:
(1) defendant made or caused to be made a communication; (2) defendant's purpose in making or causing the communication to be made was to harass another person; and (3) the communication was in one of the specified manners or any other manner similarly likely to cause annoyance or alarm to its intended recipient.
[State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 576 (1997).]"A finding of a purpose to harass may be inferred from the evidence presented" and "[c]ommon sense and experience may inform that determination." Id. at 577. The phrase "annoyance or alarm" within N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4a has further been interpreted to prohibit conduct designed to "disturb, irritate, or bother." Id. at 579-80.
Here, there was sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the Law Division judge's finding that defendant committed the act of harassment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4a. It is undisputed that defendant is the ex-girlfriend of the boyfriend and the mother of his children. Defendant freely admitted that she called C.S. on multiple occasions. After C.S. changed her phone number, defendant admitted that she procured the new phone number and left a series of messages on C.S.'s answering machine. C.S. testified that she felt "threatened" and that the messages "startled" her. Defendant also admitted that she made a sexually explicit remark in one of the messages.
II.
We similarly reject defendant's argument that the Saddle Brook Municipal Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case.
It is well-established that a municipal court's jurisdiction within its geographical territory is limited to, among other things, "'[d]isorderly persons offenses, petty disorderly persons offenses and other non-indictable offenses except where exclusive jurisdiction is given to the Superior Court[.]'" State v. Still, 330 N.J. Super. 50, 54 (App. Div.) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2B:12-17), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 490 (2000). For the purpose of harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 provides that "[a] communication under [N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4a] may be deemed to have been made either at the place where it originated or at the place where it was received."
Here, even though defendant did not raise this issue before the municipal court, defendant's failure is not fatal to the claim because "an objection based on territorial jurisdiction may be raised at any time." State v. Sylvia, 424 N.J. Super. 151, 156 (App. Div. 2012). The issue was subsequently raised before the Law Division judge who incorrectly stated that he would not consider the argument because "it was not raised below." Nonetheless, the judge found that the identification as to time and place was made because "[w]e have people coming forward, indicating that this was a situation that was received . . . by [C.S] in [Saddle Brook]." We conclude the Law Division judge's finding was supported by credible evidence. C.S.'s address on the complaint lists Saddle Brook as her home address. C.S. testified that defendant "called [her] house" and also testified that the messages were erased because there was "a power outage in Saddle Brook."
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION