Coman appealed, and a divided Court of Appeals panel affirmed the district court's registration order. State v. Coman, 42 Kan.App.2d 592, 214 P.3d 1198 (2009). We granted review.

Even the Court of Appeals majority, citing to State v. Valladarez, 288 Kan. 671, 678-79, 206 P.3d 879 (2009), acknowledged that ambiguity can arise because ‘various statutes are in conflict,’ and that in such an event ‘the canons of statutory construction must be applied and legislative history may be consulted for indications of legislative intent.’ [State v.] Coman, 42 Kan. App. 2d [592], 595 [214 P.3d 1198 (2009) ]." State v. Coman , 294 Kan. 84, 93, 273 P.3d 701 (2012).

294 Kan. at 94, 273 P.3d 701. The court cited discussion from Judge Leben's dissenting opinion in State v. Coman, 42 Kan.App.2d 592, 604–07, 214 P.3d 1198 (2009), where he noted the extensive history of the registration statute suggested the catch-all provision may be meant to apply to nonsex crimes. See 294 Kan. at 88, 95, 273 P.3d 701.

The court found that Coman was required to register because his acts of bestiality were sexually motivated. The Court of Appeals had affirmed the trial court in State v. Coman, 42 Kan.App.2d 592, 214 P.3d 1198 (2009). The Kansas Supreme Court reversed both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The Coman court attempted to interpret the legislature's intention in K.S.A. 22–4902 and the fact that misdemeanor criminal sodomy is specifically addressed in the age restricted section of KORA in K.S.A. 22–4902(a)(5)(B) and the other forms of felony criminal sodomy are listed as per se registrable offenses in K.S.A. 22–4902(c).

When there is some reasonable doubt about the meaning of a criminal statute, a narrow interpretation ensures that the courts do not criminalize conduct that the legislature did not intend to make criminal, while leaving the legislature free to amend die statute to clarify its position and to provide notice to future actors that certain conduct is illegal. State v. Coman, 42 Kan. App. 2d 592, 610-11, 214 P.3d 1198 (2009) (Leben, J., dissenting) (citing Jellum, Mastering Statutory Interpretation 238 [2008]). Because the separate crime of attempted possession of cocaine is not explicitly included within K.S.A. 21-4204(a)(4)(A), we determine that such crime cannot be used to convict a defendant of criminal possession of a firearm under K.S.A. 21-4204(a)(4)(A).

Our court has consistently construed the statutory scheme before us to mean any act meeting the requirement of the general definitional subsection for sexually motivated crime ( [c][14] ) will implicate registration without regard to inclusion or exclusion of the crime of conviction within the specific listing provided by other subsections. See, e.g.,State v. Coman, 42 Kan.App.2d 592, 214 P.3d 1198 (2009) (review pending); State v. Lopez, 25 Kan.App.2d 777, 973 P.2d 802 (1998) (affirming attempted aggravated burglary as sexually motivated); State v. Lembke, 2008 WL 1946845 (Kan.App.2008) (unpublished opinion) (affirming as sexually violent a conviction for possession of child pornography); State v. Stenger, 2007 WL 1530118 (Kan.App.2007) (unpublished opinion) (affirming as sexually motivated a conviction for furnishing alcoholic beverages to a minor for illicit purposes). Accordingly, our court has consistently had no difficulty in applying the " catch-all" provision of 22-4902(c)(14) as independent of the express listing of crimes in subsections (c)(1) through (c)(13) of the same statute, and therefore we reject the defendant's first argument.

When there is some reasonable doubt about the meaning of a criminal statute, a narrow interpretation ensures that the courts do not criminalize conduct that the legislature did not intend to make criminal, while leaving the legislature free to amend the statute to clarify its position and to provide notice to future actors that certain conduct is illegal. State v. Coman, 42 Kan. App. 2d 592, 611, 214 P.3d 1198 (2009) (J. Leben, dissenting) (citing Jellum, Mastering Statutory Interpretation 238 [2008]). Because the separate crime of attempted possession of cocaine is not explicitly included within K.S.A. 21-4204(a)(4)(A), we determine that such crime cannot be used to convict a defendant of criminal possession of a firearm under K.S.A. 21-4204(a)(4)(A).