The sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the rights to confrontation and a meaningful opportunity to present a defense. See, e.g., State v. Hedge , 297 Conn. 621, 634, 1 A.3d 1051 (2010) (right to present defense); State v. Colton , 227 Conn. 231, 248–49, 630 A.2d 577 (1993) (right to confrontation). Under the sixth amendment, "[c]ross-examination to elicit facts tending to show motive, interest, bias and prejudice is a matter of right and may not be unduly restricted."
” The defendant relies primarily on our decision in State v. Colton, 227 Conn. 231, 630 A.2d 577 (1993), in support of his contention that it was reversible error to deny the defendant the opportunity to impeach Rock by attempting to show that Rock had a motive to murder Michael. In Colton, this court reversed the defendant's conviction because the defendant was prevented from cross-examining the only eyewitness or otherwise introducing evidence about (1) the eyewitness' history of drug use and prostitution, and (2) the fact that the eyewitness was receiving “reward money” from the state.
This could have required the jury to determine whether the victim, in an unrelated incident, had lied to her aunt or to the department on more than one occasion, turning the trial into a referendum on whether a thirteen year old previously had lied. The defendant cites State v. Colton, 227 Conn. 231, 248, 630 A.2d 577 (1993), for the proposition that “[e]vidence tending to show the motive, bias or interest of an important witness is never collateral or irrelevant.” Although this statement on its face appears persuasive, the facts of Colton are starkly different from the present case. In Colton, the defendant was on trial for murder.
State v. Barnes, 232 Conn. 740, 746–47, 657 A.2d 611 (1995).At trial, the defendant made no offer of proof, and, on appeal, he relies on State v. Colton, 227 Conn. 231, 630 A.2d 577 (1993), to argue that the court abused its discretion by “ignoring any possible financial interest [Jalbert may have had] in the outcome.” (Emphasis omitted.)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410-11, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). In its harmless-error analysis, the Connecticut Appellate Court considered the factors deemed pertinent by State v. Colton, 227 Conn. 231, 630 A.2d 577 (1993), which track, verbatim, those identified by the Supreme Court in Delaware v. Van Arsdall: "the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case." 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); Joyce, 696 A.2d at 999; Colton, 630 A.2d at 590.
Undoubtedly our case law permits a party to ask a witness about a collateral matter, with the limitation that the party must accept the witness' response without having the opportunity to impeach that witness with extrinsic evidence. See State v. Jose G., 290 Conn. 331, 344–45, 963 A.2d 42 (2009); State v. Colton, 227 Conn. 231, 247–48, 630 A.2d 577 (1993). This does not mean, however, that the trial court is obligated to permit such questioning.
"Although it is within the trial court's discretion to determine the extent of cross-examination and the admissibility of evidence, the preclusion of sufficient inquiry into a particular matter tending to show motive, bias and interest may result in a violation of the constitutional requirements of the sixth amendment." State v. Colton, 227 Conn. 231, 249, 630 A.2d 577 (1993), on appeal after remand, 234 Conn. 683, 663 A.2d 339 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1140, 116 S. Ct. 972, 133 L. Ed. 2d 892 (1996). "It is . . . generally accepted that the pendency of a civil claim arising out of the same set of circumstances as those that served as the basis for a criminal prosecution is probative of a prosecuting witness' motive to lie because the outcome of the prosecution may be beneficial to the prosecuting witness."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colton, 227 Conn. 231, 255 n. 22, 630 A.2d 577 (1993). Inasmuch as the defendant raises a claim on appeal different from the one that he raised at trial, he is not entitled to review of his claim.
On the defendant's appeal from his conviction, we reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the trial court had violated the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation by precluding certain evidence showing motive and bias on the part of the state's chief witness, Janice Tourangeau. State v. Colton, 227 Conn. 231, 233, 630 A.2d 577 (1993). For a full recitation of the facts related to the murder, see State v. Colton, 227 Conn. 231, 233-35, 630 A.2d 577 (1993).
The state bears the burden of demonstrating that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Colton, 227 Conn. 231, 253-54, 630 A.2d 577 (1993). That determination must be made in light of the entire record.