State v. Colonese

19 Citing cases

  1. State v. Schiappa

    248 Conn. 132 (Conn. 1999)   Cited 112 times
    Recognizing fact-bound nature of unavailability inquiry

    ve concluded repeatedly that such language, when considered in light of the charge as a whole, could not possibly have confused the jury regarding the state's burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Faust, supra, 477-78; State v. Cassidy, 236 Conn. 112, 145, 672 A.2d 899, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 910, 117 S.Ct. 273, 136 L.Ed.2d 196 (1996); State v. Palmer, 196 Conn. 157, 168-69, 491 A.2d 1075 (1985); see State v. Ellis, 232 Conn. 691, 705-706, 657 A.2d 1099 (1995); State v. Francis, supra, 135; State v. Walton, supra, 227 Conn. 66-67; State v. Tucker, 226 Conn. 618, 651-52, 629 A.2d 1067 (1993); State v. Stanley, 223 Conn. 674, 695-96, 613 A.2d 788 (1992); State v. Thomas, 214 Conn. 118, 119-21 n. 1, 570 A.2d 1123 (1990); State v. Just, 185 Conn. 339, 352-53, 441 A.2d 98 (1981); State v. Guthridge, 164 Conn. 145, 154, 318 A.2d 87 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 988, 93 S.Ct. 1519, 36 L.Ed.2d 186 (1973); State v. Cari, 163 Conn. 174, 180-81, 303 A.2d 7 (1972); cf. State v. Colonese, 108 Conn. 454, 460, 143 A. 561 (1928). In State v. Francis, 228 Conn. 118, 635 A.2d 762 (1993), we indicated that if a trial court were to give such a charge, it should be modified as follows: "But the law is made to protect society and persons whose guilt has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt, and not to protect those whose guilt has been so established."

  2. State v. Just

    185 Conn. 339 (Conn. 1981)   Cited 56 times
    In Just, this court suggested that the failure to give the instruction is more problematic if the defense had requested one or had objected to the testimony.

    "[T]he charge as given was proper and correct since it was used in conjunction with clear instruction both as to the presumption of innocence and as to the duty of the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's guilt of the crimes with which he is charged. State v. Colonese, 108 Conn. 454, 459, 143 A. 561." State v. Cari, supra, 181.

  3. Swenson v. Dittner

    183 Conn. 289 (Conn. 1981)   Cited 50 times
    In Swenson, our Supreme Court stated: “An action to quiet title is a statutory action instituted under the provisions of... § 47–31.

    Lawrence v. Abrams, 121 Conn. 48.0, 482, 185 A. 414." McWilliams v. American Fidelity Co., 140 Conn. 572, 580-81, 102 A.2d 345 (1954); see Hutchinson v. Plante, 175 Conn. 1, 3, 392 A.2d 488 (1978); State v. Colonese, 108 Conn. 454, 457, 143 A. 561 (1928). Moreover, the defendants had the opportunity to make their own inquiry at trial but failed to do so.

  4. State v. Burke

    182 Conn. 330 (Conn. 1980)   Cited 53 times
    Holding that trial court must give no unfavorable inference instruction unless defendant requests otherwise

    General Statutes 54-84 (b) reversed prior case law which held that a defendant who did not testify at trial was not entitled to have the jury instructed that his failure to testify should not be considered as an inference against him. State v. Lane, 179 Conn. 327, 426 A.2d 297 (1979); State v. Branham, 171 Conn. 12, 368 A.2d 63 (1976); State v. Ford, 109 Conn. 490, 146 A. 828 (1929); State v. Colonese, 108 Conn. 454, 143 A. 561 (1928). The present statute clearly requires that the court instruct the jury that no unfavorable inferences may be drawn from the defendant's failure to testify.

  5. State v. Branham

    171 Conn. 12 (Conn. 1976)   Cited 14 times
    In State v. Branham, 171 Conn. 12, 368 A.2d 63 (1976), we held that in the absence of controlling statutory provisions an accused is not entitled to an instruction to the jury that no adverse inferences are to be drawn from his failure to testify in his own defense.

    This court has in the past had occasion to consider whether a charge such as that requested by the defendant should be given. In State v. Colonese, 108 Conn. 454, 463, 143 A. 561, overruled in part in State v. Hayes, 127 Conn. 543, 592, 18 A.2d 895, even in the absence of an assignment of error the court expressly disapproved of the court's instruction that where a defendant chooses not to testify "no opinion prejudicial to him can be drawn from such failure to testify." The court observed that "[t]here is nothing in the statutory provision or in our rules of law which requires the jury to disregard the fact that the accused did not testify, nor does it forbid the jury to draw its own conclusion from this circumstance.

  6. State v. Dubina

    164 Conn. 95 (Conn. 1972)   Cited 39 times
    In State v. Dubina, 164 Conn. 95., 318 A.2d 95 (1972), this court stated (p. 100) that whether the detention was merely incidental to another crime was, under appropriate instructions from the court, a question for the jury.

    State v. Smith, 156 Conn. 378, 382, 242 A.2d 763. Evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, which convinces the jury beyond a reasonable doubt is all that is required. State v. Colonese, 108 Conn. 454, 460, 143 A. 561. There was ample evidence here to support the conclusion of the jury that the defendant committed acts which for a sane person would constitute the crime of rape beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant was also convicted on a charge of kidnapping in violation of 53-27 of the General Statutes in that he "did fraudulently or forcibly restrain a person of her liberty, with intent to demand a concession or other valuable thing for her release, or who, with such intent, used force or violence and threatened to harm or injure such person, and did fraudulently or forcibly restrain" the victim.

  7. State v. Cari

    163 Conn. 174 (Conn. 1972)   Cited 71 times

    We continue to be in accord with the majority, view that the charge as given was proper and correct since it was used in conjunction with clear instruction both as to the presumption of innocence and as to the duty of the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's guilt of the crimes with which he is charged. State v. Colonese, 108 Conn. 454, 459, 143 A. 561. The defendant's third assignment of error is that, the trial court erred in instructing the jury that "[f]requently, evidence relating to a claimed alibi will consist in part at least of the testimony of witnesses who are related to or are friends or associates of the accused and who may therefore be held to be in a greater or less degree interested.

  8. State v. Benton

    161 Conn. 404 (Conn. 1971)   Cited 51 times

    This does not necessarily mean that the state's case was weak since there is no legal distinction between direct or circumstantial evidence so far as its probative force is concerned. State v. Smith, supra, 200; State v. Colonese, 108 Conn. 454, 460, 143 A. 561. A verdict of guilty must stand if the jury could reasonably have concluded that the cumulative effect of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Kreske, 130 Conn. 558, 563, 36 A.2d 389; State v. Hayes, 127 Conn. 543, 554, 18 A.2d 895.

  9. State v. McGinnis

    256 A.2d 241 (Conn. 1969)   Cited 29 times
    Upholding use of lay witness opinion testimony about a person's appearance and noting that "the foundation upon which such an opinion rests can be tested by cross-examination"

    This does not necessarily mean that the state did not have a strong case against the defendants because there is no legal distinction between direct or circumstantial evidence so far as its probative force is concerned. State v. Smith, supra, 200; State v. Colonese, 108 Conn. 454, 460, 143 A. 561; State v. Rome, 64 Conn. 329, 334, 30 A. 57. Although the evidence was wholly circumstantial, a verdict of guilty must stand if the jury could reasonably have concluded that the cumulative effect of the evidence established the guilt of a defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Kreske, 130 Conn. 558, 563, 36 A.2d 389; State v. Hayes, 127 Conn. 543, 554, 18 A.2d 895; State v. Olavieri, 123 Conn. 678, 679, 195 A. 181.

  10. State v. Smith

    156 Conn. 378 (Conn. 1968)   Cited 31 times
    Seizing mud-stained shoes to compare with plaster cast of footprint

    "The law recognizes no distinction between circumstantial evidence and direct evidence so far as probative force is concerned. If evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, should convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that an accused is guilty, that is all that is required for a conviction. State v. Colonese, 108 Conn. 454, 460, 143 A. 561; State v. Rome, 64 Conn. 329, 334, 30 A. 57. As has been said so often, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is such proof as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it tends to support and is consistent with the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with any other rational conclusion. The requirement that evidence must be such as satisfies beyond a reasonable doubt `does not mean that the proof must be beyond a possible doubt, and a possible supposition of innocence is a far different thing from a reasonable hypothesis.' State v. McDonough, 129 Conn. 483, 485, 29 A.2d 582; State v. Santoro, 128 Conn. 297, 299, 22 A.2d 793; State v. Guilfoyle, 109 Conn. 124, 139, 145 A. 761; State v. Block, 87 Conn. 573, 577, 89 A. 167.