Opinion
2012 KA 2048
2013-09-13
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. MOHAMMED COLLINS
Hillar C. Moore, III William Morris Jaclyn C. Chapman Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for Appellee, State of Louisiana Lieu T. Vo Clark Mandeville, LA Counsel for Defendant/Appellant, Mohammed Collins
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appealed from the
Nineteenth Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, State of Louisiana
Trial Court Number 06-11-0189
Honorable Donald Johnson, Judge Presiding
Hillar C. Moore, III
William Morris
Jaclyn C. Chapman
Baton Rouge, LA
Counsel for Appellee,
State of Louisiana
Lieu T. Vo Clark
Mandeville, LA
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant,
Mohammed Collins
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., WELCH AND CRAIN, JJ.
WHIPPLE, C.J.
The defendant, Mohammed Collins, was charged by grand jury indictment with one count of second degree murder (count 1), a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:30.1, and three counts of armed robbery (counts 2-4), violations of LSA-R.S. 14:64. He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged. He filed motions for postverdict judgment of acquittal and new trial, both of which were denied. On count one, the defendant was sentenced to the mandatory term of life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. On counts two, three, and four, on each count, he was sentenced to ten years at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The defendant's sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. The defendant now appeals, challenging the ruling made by the district court on the State's Batson challenge. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences.
Although the minute entry reflects that defendant was sentenced to ten years imprisonment on counts one, two, and three, and life imprisonment on count four, we note that where there is a discrepancy between the minutes and the transcript, the transcript prevails. See State v. Lynch, 441 So. 2d 732, 734 (La. 1983).
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986).
FACTS
On May 4, 2011, the victim, Jonathan Calvert, and several of his friends were "hanging out" at the home of Joseph Price on Aster Street in Baton Rouge. The victim and his girlfriend were inside his recently purchased recreational vehicle ("RV"), parked next to Price's home, while some of his friends were sitting outside under the carport and others were inside the home. Two black men walked up to the house, and one of the men, later identified as the defendant, pointed a gun toward the group sitting outside and told them to empty their pockets and put their money on the ground. He then walked toward the door of the house, told the occupants to come outside, and ordered them to empty their pockets. The defendant's accomplice forced one of the friends, Charles Gunter, at gunpoint to go into the RV. Once inside, the accomplice had Gunter get onto his hands and knees. The accomplice started arguing with the victim and the two began struggling.
Price, who was in the group being held at gunpoint outside of his home, heard the accomplice say, "Help, he's got me down." The defendant then grabbed the items the group had put on the ground, ran toward the RV, and fired shots into its open door. The shots struck and killed the victim and wounded the defendant's accomplice. The defendant and his accomplice immediately ran away.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 1 AND 2
In two related assignments of error, the defendant argues that the district court erred in granting the State's reverse-Batson objection and reseating jurors who had been excused pursuant to the defendant's peremptory challenges. Specifically, the defendant contends that the district court erred in its application of Batson by failing to rule whether the State met the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination and, after defense counsel gave race-neutral reasons, by failing to determine whether the State met its burden of proving purposeful discrimination.
In Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S. Ct. at 1723-24, the United States Supreme Court held that the use of peremptory challenges to exclude persons from a jury based on their race violates the Equal Protection Clause. The holding in Batson was initially adopted by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Collier, 553 So. 2d 815 (La. 1989), and has been codified by the legislature in Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 795(C) & (D.) While Batson discussed a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges, its holding is equally applicable to criminal defendants. "[T]he Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges." Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359, 120 L. Ed. 2d 33 (1992). Further, the State may invoke Batson where a black criminal defendant exercises peremptory challenges against white prospective jurors. State v. Knox, 609 So. 2d 803, 806 (La. 1992) (per curiam). An accusation by the State that defense counsel has engaged in such discriminatory conduct has come to be known as a "reverse-Batson" challenge. State v. Nelson, 2010-1724 (La. 3/13/12), 85 So. 3d 21, 28.
In Batson, the court outlined a three-step test for determining whether a peremptory challenge was based on race. Under Batson and its progeny, the opponent of a peremptory strike must first establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. Second, if a prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the proponent of the strike to articulate a race-neutral explanation for the challenge. Third, the district court then must determine if the opponent of the strike has carried the ultimate burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-98, 106 S. Ct. at 1721-24.
During voir dire, the State asserted a reverse-Batson objection and argued that all of the defendant's peremptory challenges, ten in total, were used on white jurors. Defense counsel responded by giving specific reasons for challenging certain jurors and by pointing out that the second panel of jurors included a majority of white members. The State acknowledged that there were race-neutral reasons for some of the jury panel members stricken by the defendant's peremptory challenges and limited its objection to six of the challenged jurors. After the defendant gave race-neutral reasons for challenging those six jurors, the district court asked the State to respond. The district court then granted the State's motion as to three of the six challenged jurors and reseated them. With regard to the other three challenged jurors, the court denied the State's motion on two and did not rule on one, who was ultimately excused because the jury panel had been completed.
The defendant argues that the district court erred in failing to address step one of the Batson analysis. However, because the defendant offered race-neutral reasons for his use of peremptory challenges, the preliminary issue of whether the State made a prima facie showing is moot. The district court may "effectively collapse the first two stages of the Batson procedure, whether or not the [State] established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, and may then perform the critical third step of weighing the [State's] proof and the [defendant's] race-neutral reasons to determine discriminatory intent." State v. Jacobs, 99-0991 (La. 5/15/01), 803 So. 2d 933, 941, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1087, 122 S. Ct. 826, 151 L. Ed. 2d 707 (2002).
The defendant also contends that the district court "skipped over" step three and "effectively refused to accept" the defendant's race-neutral reasons for excluding the three reseated jurors, William Campbell, Linda LeBlanc, and Karen Roe. In step three of the Batson analysis, the court must determine whether the objecting party has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S. Ct. at 1724. This final step involves evaluating "the persuasiveness of the justification" proffered by the striking party, but "the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike." Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1995) (per curiam).
William Campbell was challenged by the defense because he "was very analytical" and "generally [respected] all authority." The defendant also argued that Campbell was not paying attention during voir dire. The State responded by pointing out that Campbell was fully engaged in the entire process. Although the court reseated Campbell, he was ultimately excused after informing the court that he read a news article related to the instant offense after being excused on the first day of voir dire.
LeBlanc was challenged by the defendant because she asked a question regarding the defense's responsibilities. The defendant argued that based on her question, LeBlanc would expect him to take the stand. The State clarified that LeBlanc's statement was in response to a question posed by defense counsel and that it did not indicate that she was shouldering the defense with a burden. Notably, the transcript of the voir dire proceedings indicates that LeBlanc understood that the burden of proof was on the State and that the defendant was not required to take the stand.
Roe was challenged because she gave an explanation of reasonable doubt that the defense counsel did not "concur with." When asked how she would define "beyond a reasonable doubt[,]" Roe stated, "[s]omething that I'm pretty sure that is true." The State opined that Roe answered all of her questions honestly during voir dire and that it did not find any of Roe's responses to be "troubling" to either side. The court found that Roe gave "a very reasonable explanation of reasonable doubt."
Contrary to the defendant's assertions, the district court did not end its inquiry at step two. After the defense provided race-neutral reasons, the district court requested that the State make its "last response." The court then considered the defendant's proffered explanations and rejected those explanations with regard to three of the six challenged jurors. Finding "no basis to strike" Campbell or LeBlanc, the court reseated them. It also reseated Roe.
Herein, the district court's denial of the State's motion on two of the challenged jurors indicates that it did more than "simply [refuse] to accept the [race-neutral] reasons" proffered by the defendant. Instead, it is clear that the district court carefully considered the jurors' responses and the arguments advanced by each side in determining whether the reasons given by the defense were supported by the record and whether the State carried its burden of proving purposeful discrimination on each challenged juror.
A reviewing court owes the district court's evaluations of discriminatory intent great deference and should not reverse them unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Handon, 2006-0131 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/28/06), 952 So. 2d 53, 58. Considering the record before us in its entirety and the deference to be accorded to the findings of the district court judge in this context, we conclude that the district court correctly applied the Batson test and did not abuse its discretion in granting the State's reverse-Batson challenge with respect to the reseated jurors. Accordingly, the defendant's assignments of error are without merit.
CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.