If this is true, as the appellants claim, the trial court must be reversed. Christy v. Davis, 71 Wn.2d 81, 426 P.2d 493 (1967); State v. Collins, 72 Wn.2d 741, 435 P.2d 538 (1967).
It has been repeatedly pointed out, however, that such discretion does not give a trial court license to weigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the jury, simply because it may disagree with the verdict. Bunnell v. Barr, supra; Knecht v. Marzano, 65 Wn.2d 290, 292-93, 396 P.2d 782 (1964); accord, State v. Collins, 72 Wn.2d 741, 745, 435 P.2d 538 (1967). In this state a trial judge is not deemed a "thirteenth juror".
Failure to comply with CR 59(f) has resulted in reversal of the order granting a new trial and remand for reinstatement of the jury verdict. See State v. Collins, 72 Wn.2d 741, 435 P.2d 538 (1967); Reiboldt v. Bedient, 17 Wn. App. 339, 562 P.2d 991 (1977); Williams Mauseth Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. Chapple, supra. In the present case, the first four reasons, pertaining to evidentiary admissions, do not satisfy the requirements of CR 59(f).
Disagreement with the jury's verdict is not a ground for awarding a new trial where that verdict is supported by substantial evidence. State v. Collins, 72 Wn.2d 741, 435 P.2d 538 (1967); State v. Marks, 71 Wn.2d 295, 427 P.2d 1008 (1967). Substantial evidence certainly supported the jury's verdict in this case.
[2] Since the order granting the new trial does not comply with CR 59(f), it must be vacated. State v. Collins, 72 Wn.2d 741, 745, 435 P.2d 538 (1967). " (f) Statement of Reasons.
The court upon appeal will not sustain the granting of a motion for new trial if these reasons are not listed. Johnson v. Department of Labor Indus., 46 Wn.2d 463, 466, 281 P.2d 994 (1955); State v. Collins, 72 Wn.2d 741, 745, 435 P.2d 538 (1967). If we give the order of the trial court granting the new trial its broadest interpretation and hold that the language stated reasons for granting a new trial rather than simply conclusions, the reasons stated are still all matters which must be of record inasmuch as the trial court did not indicate that the order is based upon matters outside the record.
Consequently, the trial court did not err by refusing to give plaintiff's proposed instruction, but did err when it later reconsidered and granted a new trial in the belief its initial refusal was erroneous. Plaintiff had the responsibility of proposing a proper instruction; the refusal to give an incorrect instruction is not error. State v. Collins, 72 Wn.2d 741, 435 P.2d 538 (1967). [3] Plaintiff contends that Ulmer granted a new trial on strict liability in a situation where the proposed instruction in the first trial was erroneously drawn. It seems clear the court in Ulmer did not thereby intend to abrogate the rule stated in State v. Collins, supra. Ulmer was the first case in this state adopting as to manufacturers the rule of strict liability and defining the elements thereof; consequently, the court in that situation believed the plaintiff should have the opportunity on new trial to frame a new instruction containing the rules laid down by Ulmer. That is not true in the instant case.
Thus, it seems to us that instruction J was properly not given, since it is a misstatement of the current law. State v. Collins, 72 Wn.2d 741, 435 P.2d 538 (1967). Defendant next contends that the verdict in this matter was arrived at by the quotient method.
Collins was convicted on count 2. Certain aspects of this case have been previously decided in State v. Collins, 72 Wn.2d 741, 435 P.2d 538 (1967). The single issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred in refusing Collins' motion for a new trial on the ground of insufficient evidence.