Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4203-13T3
10-23-2015
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. SAMUEL H. COLLINGWOOD, Defendant-Appellant.
W. James MacNaughton argued the cause for appellant. William A. Guhl, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Geoffrey D. Soriano, Somerset County Prosecutor, attorney; Mr. Guhl, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Leone and Whipple. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County, Municipal Appeal No. 10-14-A. W. James MacNaughton argued the cause for appellant. William A. Guhl, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Geoffrey D. Soriano, Somerset County Prosecutor, attorney; Mr. Guhl, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from the Law Division's April 10, 2014 order entered after a trial de novo on the record, finding him guilty of disorderly conduct in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2a(1) and resisting arrest in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2a(1). We affirm substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Paul Armstrong in his written decision of February 19, 2014.
We discern the following facts from the record. On October 20, 2012, defendant attended the Far Hills Race Meeting at Moorland Farms with two friends, Jeffrey and Chris. The Race Meeting is a popular horseracing event that attracts thousands of people from across the tristate area each year. To maintain order during the event, the municipality of Far Hills appoints a number of special investigators from surrounding municipalities to ensure that automobile and pedestrian traffic flow smoothly in Far Hills for the races.
On the evening of October 20, defendant was at the train station to return home on a train. Defendant freely admits that he was drunk after having consumed significant quantities of alcohol over the course of the day. At the train station, a New Jersey Transit Police officer pulled on Chris's shoulder to take him off of the train. Defendant attempted to speak with the officer which resulted in an altercation during which the New Jersey Transit Officers allegedly ejected defendant from the station and threw him into a bush. Defendant was agitated and angrily insisted that he and his friends return to the train station to ask for the officers' names and badge numbers. Jeffrey attempted to restrain defendant from reentering the train station by holding him in a "bear hug" while defendant pushed and screamed obscenities at him in front of the train station.
During the next fifteen minutes, Officer Antonio Munoz (of the Bound Brook Police Department) observed defendant fighting with his friends and shouting outside the station. Detective Jamie Mankowski of the Somerset County Sheriff's Department also observed defendant "yelling" and "with his shirt off" near the train station. This incident occurred in front of a large number of people, both on the highway and entering and exiting the train station. Munoz approached Jeffrey and defendant and asked them to leave the area.
When defendant refused to comply, Officer Munoz took him by the arm and brought him to Detective Mankowski so that they could arrest defendant. Munoz could not recall at trial whether he specifically directed Mankowski to arrest defendant. Mankowski did testify, however, that Munoz told Mankowski to arrest defendant. Mankowski told defendant to put his hands behind his back, and attempted to handcuff defendant. Defendant "flailed" his arms to avoid being touched or handcuffed. He alleges that he did not understand that he was under arrest because no one told him that he was under arrest. The police gained control of defendant and placed handcuffs on his wrists.
The trial court found that, as defendant was placed in the car, he resisted being placed in the police car and then attempted to kick the door open, although defendant alleges that he was not purposefully blocking the door with his legs. Thereafter, the patrol car took defendant to the processing room at Far Hills, where he continued to be uncooperative during the booking process by yelling and talking and refusing to answer processing questions. Defendant was subsequently charged with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest via complaint-summons on October 25, 2012.
Lieutenant Thomas Kozak of the Far Hills Police Department filed an arrest report explaining the basis for defendant's arrest. The officer of record on the report was Officer Munoz. Lieutenant Kozak then filed and certified a complaint-summons for the same two charges. Detective Mankowski provided his own arrest report on November 27, 2012. The municipal judge found that Detective Mankowski was the arresting officer, despite the fact that Officer Munoz is listed on the arrest report as the arresting officer of record.
On March 7, 2013, defendant filed a motion to quash the complaint-summons. The municipal court denied the motion and took testimony from witnesses. The municipal court issued its judgment and its findings of fact on September 24, 2013, finding defendant guilty of both resisting arrest and disorderly conduct. Defendant was fined $1576 in the aggregate, including mandatory fines and court costs.
Following sentencing, defendant filed a notice of appeal to the Law Division on November 7, 2013. The matter was tried de novo on the record before Judge Armstrong, who issued a written decision dated February 19, 2014 and entered an order dated April 10, 2014, denying defendant's municipal appeal. This appeal followed.
Defendant raises the following issues on appeal:
POINT I:
MR.COLLINGWOOD IS NOT GUILTY OF RESISTING ARREST BECAUSE HIS ARREST WAS UNLAWFUL AND HE WAS NOT TOLD HE WAS UNDER ARREST PRIOR TO HIS RESISTANCE.
POINT II:
MR. COLLINGWOOD'S SPEECH WAS PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT.
POINT III:
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE MR. COLLINGWOOD'S CONDUCT RISKED PUBLIC INCONVENIENCE, ANNOYANCE OR ALARM IN VIOLATION OF N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2a(1).
POINT IV:
MR. COLLINGWOOD'S PHYSICAL ENCOUNTER WITH HIS ROOMMATE WAS NOT FIGHTING OR TUMULTUOUS BEHAVIOR IN VIOLATION OF N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2a(1).
POINT V:
THE SUMMONS FOR DISORDERLY CONDUCT SHOULD BE QUASHED BECAUSE LT. KOZAK DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ISSUE IT.
On appeal from the Law Division's decision of a municipal appeal, the issue for the Appellate Division is whether there is sufficient, credible evidence present in the record to uphold the findings of the Law Division. State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964). Just as the Law Division is not as well situated as the municipal court to determine credibility, neither is the Appellate Division, and thus we do not make new credibility findings. State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470, (1999). Indeed, we do not "weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of the witnesses, or make conclusions about the evidence." State v. Barone, 147 N.J. 599, 615, (1998). Moreover, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan Realty v. Manalapan Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
With this standard in mind, we reject defendant's arguments and affirm his conviction for the reasons expressed by Judge Armstrong. We add the following comments.
Defendant maintains that his conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2a(1) violates his First Amendment rights. Defendant asserts that both his speech and conduct merit First Amendment protection, and accordingly, that his arrest and convictions are invalid. Defendant asserts that because his pushing, fighting, and threatening words were all connected to his desire to criticize police officers (the allegedly protected speech in this case), all of defendant's attendant conduct is protected by the First Amendment.
This argument is without merit. It is well-established law that a criminal defendant may be convicted for activity that is tangentially related to protected speech under the First Amendment, but is criminalized for other reasons. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2544, 120 L. Ed. 2d 305, 319 (1991) (explaining that "nonverbal expressive activity can be banned because of the action it entails . . . so that burning a flag in violation of an ordinance against outdoor fires could be punishable, whereas burning a flag in violation of an ordinance against dishonoring the flag is not").
Our Supreme Court has recognized the distinction between cases where only speech is involved, and cases like this one where both speech and conduct are involved. In State v. Rosenfeld, 62 N.J. 594, 596, 601 (1973), the Supreme Court upheld what was then New Jersey's "breach of the peace" statute in recognition of such a difference, and State v. Brown, 62 N.J. 588, 590 (1973), held a conviction under a disorderly persons statute constitutional when the conduct constituting the disorderly persons offense constituted "fighting words." Id. at 591-92.
The same rule applies in this case. Defendant was disturbing the peace and order independently of his criticism of the New Jersey Transit Police. He went beyond expressing his displeasure with his interactions with the police and into the realm of conduct that may be criminalized on grounds unrelated to the content of his message.
We are also unpersuaded by defendant's argument that his arrest was illegal because Officer Munoz, a Bound Brook Police officer, was not lawfully authorized to act as a Special Investigator and thus lacked the authority to arrest him in Far Hills. We need not address that argument because the Law Division found that Somerset County Sherriff's Detective Mankowski was the arresting officer. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-107(4), county sheriffs have specific power to "enforce . . . [a]ll provisions of Title 2C." This enforcement entails the power to arrest as long as those county sheriffs act inside their jurisdiction. N.J.S.A. 2A:154-3. Detective Mankowski made a valid arrest because he was enforcing provisions of Title 2C, and was acting within his jurisdiction as a sheriff for Somerset County.
Defendant similarly asserts that Officer Munoz was acting as a private citizen, and thus Rule 7:2-2(a)(2) required the complaint-summons to "be issued only by a judge." However, under Rule 7:2-2(a)(2), "[a] summons on a complaint made by a law enforcement officer charging any offense may be issued by a law enforcement officer or by any person authorized to do so by statute without a finding by a judicial officer of probable cause for issuance." In this case, the complaining officer was Lieutenant Kozak, not Munoz. Accordingly, because Lieutenant Kozak is a police officer employed by Far Hills, his ability to issue such a complaint was well within his authority under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-152.
Defendant's other arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION