The phrase "out of wedlock" is defined by Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged (1961), to mean, "with the natural parents not legally married to each other" (emphasis supplied), and the phrase "born out of wedlock" has been construed on numerous occasions to include a child born to a married woman by a man other than her husband. See Uniform Act on Paternity, § 1, 9A U.L.A. 626 (1979) (withdrawn 1973, upon promulgation of Uniform Parentage Act); State v. Coliton, 17 N.W.2d 546, 549 (N.D. 1945); Pursley v. Hisch, 85 N.E.2d 270 (Ind.App. 1949); Estey v. Mawdsley, 217 A.2d 493, 494 (Conn. 1966); Martin v. Lane, 291 N.Y.S 2d 135, 138 (1968), affirmed in relevant part, 308 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1970); Smith v. Robbins, 283 N.W.2d 725 (Mich.App. 1979); R. D. S. v. S. L. S., 402 N.E.2d 30, 31, fn. 2 (Ind.App. 1980); In the Matter of the Legitimation of Locklear by Jones, (N.C. 1985) (hereinafter, Locklear).

A child born to a married woman, but begotten by one other than her husband, is a child `born out of wedlock' . . . Id. citing State v. Coliton, 73 N.D. 582, 17 N.W.2d 546 (1945). This same interpretation of the phrase is also consistent with the position taken by the Uniform Act on Paternity, § 1, 9A U.L.A. 626 (1979) (act withdrawn 1973), which states, `A child born out of wedlock includes a child born to a married woman by a man other than her husband.' Finally, the Uniform Illegitimacy Act of 1922, § 1, 9 U.L.A. 391 (1942) (act withdrawn 1960) interprets the term `wedlock' as referring `to the status of the parents of the child in relation to one another.' S. Schatkin, I. Disputed Paternity Proceedings § 1.01, at 1-2 (rev. ed. 1984).

Thus, under these general statutes, Barry clearly has no standing to rebut the presumption of Anna's legitimacy, and in turn, Dean's paternity of Anna. Barry attempts to negate the effect of the above statutes by relying on State v. Coliton, 73 N.D. 582, 17 N.W.2d 546 (1945). In Coliton, we held that the term "wedlock" referred to the state of marriage or status between the husband and wife, but did not include the status of the wife and her "paramour."

In this connection we cite the following Mississippi cases: Herring v. Goodson, 43 Miss. 392; Adams v. Adams, 59 So. 84; Moore v. Smith, 172 So. 317, 178 Miss. 383. In the case of State v. Coliton, 17 N.W.2d 546, 156 A.L.R. 1403, the court held that a child born to a married woman, but not begotten by her husband is a child "born out of wedlock," and is, therefore, illegitimate. We also cite generally Smith v. Hawkins, 93 Miss. 588, 47 So. 429; Mahaffey v. Mahaffey, 170 So. 289.

Thus, phrases such as "child born out of lawful wedlock" have been consistently construed to include not only children born to unmarried women but also children whose biological parents are not married to each other.K.S. v. R.S., No. 55S04-9602-CV-00162, 1996 WL 420400, at *3 (Ind. July 29, 1996); Pursley v. Hisch, 85 N.E.2d 270, 271 (Ind. App. Ct. 1949); Smith v. Robbins, 283 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Mich.Ct.App. 1979); In re Legitimation of Locklear, 334 S.E.2d 46, 50-51 (N.C. 1985); State v. Coliton, 17 N.W.2d 546, 551 (N.D. 1945); In re Estate of Marriott, 515 P.2d 571, 573 (Okla. 1973); see also Unif. Act on Paternity § 1, 9B U.L.A. 350 (1987); but see Weidenbacher v. Duclos, 661 A.2d 988, 992 n. 11 (Conn.

It should be noted that Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines illegitimate as being "born of parents not married to each other". In State v Coliton, 73 N.D. 582, 586; 17 N.W.2d 546 (1945), the Supreme Court of North Dakota embarked upon a detailed analysis of the common-law concepts of illegitimacy and construction of the nature of wedlock in light of common-law notions. The court concluded that, since a married woman may have an illegitimate child:

“Other jurisdictions have interpreted the phrase to refer both to a child born to an unmarried woman and also to one born to a married woman but having a father other than the mother's husband. Estey v. Mawdsley, 3 Conn.Cir.Ct. 491, 217 A.2d 493 (1966); Wilkins v. Georgia Department of Human Resources, 255 Ga. 230, 337 S.E.2d 20 (1985); Johnson v. Studley–Preston, 119 Idaho 1055, 812 P.2d 1216 (1991); Pursley v. Hisch, 119 Ind.App. 232, 85 N.E.2d 270 (1949); Smith v. Robbins, 91 Mich.App. 284, 283 N.W.2d 725 (1979); Martin v. Lane, 57 Misc.2d 4, 291 N.Y.S.2d 135 (N.Y.Fam.Ct.1968), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, Mannain v. Lay, 33 A.D.2d 1024, 308 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1968[1970] ), aff'd,27 N.Y.2d 690, 262 N.E.2d 216, 314 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1970); In re Legitimation of Locklear by Jones, 314 N.C. 412, 334 S.E.2d 46 (1985); State v. Coliton, 73 N.D. 582, 17 N.W.2d 546 (1945).”Id. at 149–50.

Other jurisdictions have interpreted the phrase to refer both to a child born to an unmarried woman and also to one born to a married woman but having a father other than the mother's husband. Estey v. Mawdsley, 3 Conn. Cir.Ct. 491, 217 A.2d 493 (1966); *150 Wilkins v. Georgia Department of Human Resources, 255 Ga. 230, 337 S.E.2d 20 (1985); Johnson v. Studley-Preston, 119 Idaho 1055, 812 P.2d 1216 (1991); Pursley v. Hisch, 119 Ind.App. 232, 85 N.E.2d 270 (1949); Smith v. Robbins, 91 Mich.App. 284, 283 N.W.2d 725 (1979); Martin v. Lane, 57 Misc.2d 4, 291 N.Y.S.2d 135 (N.Y.Fam. Ct. 1968), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, Mannain v. Lay, 33 A.D.2d 1024, 308 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1970), aff'd, 27 N.Y.2d 690, 314 N.Y.S.2d 9, 262 N.E.2d 216 (1970); In re Legitimation of Locklear by Jones, 314 N.C. 412, 334 S.E.2d 46 (1985); State v. Coliton, 73 N.D. 582, 17 N.W.2d 546 (1945). We adopt this definition of `born out of wedlock.'

While the paternity statute does not define "child born out of wedlock," Indiana common law is clear that the term wedlock refers to the status of the biological parents of the child in relation to each other. A child born to a married woman, but fathered by a man other than her husband, is a "child born out of wedlock" for purposes of the statute. R.D.S v. S.L.S., 402 N.E.2d 30, 38 n. 2 (Ind.Ct.App. 1980); Pursley v. Hisch, 119 Ind. App. 232, 235-36, 85 N.E.2d 270, 271 (1949) (citing State of North Dakota v. Coliton, 73 N.D. 582, 17 N.W.2d 546, 156 A.L.R. 1403 (1945)). Once again, In re Paternity of S.R.I. is instructive.

This interpretation is consistent with the great weight of authority. See, e.g., Wilkins v. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources, 255 Ga. 230, 337 S.E.2d 20, 22 (1985); Johnson v. Studley-Preston, 119 Idaho 1055, 812 P.2d 1216, 1219 (1991); Pursley v. Hisch, 119 Ind. App. 232, 85 N.E.2d 270, 271 (1949); Smith v. Robbins, 91 Mich. App. 284, 283 N.W.2d 725, 729 (1979); Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc.2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 409 (N.Y.Sup. 1963); In re Legitimation of Locklear by Jones, 314 N.C. 412, 334 S.E.2d 46 (1985); State v. Coliton, 73 N.D. 582, 17 N.W.2d 546, 549 (1945); In re Marriott's Estate, 515 P.2d 571, 573 (Okl. 1973). We disagree. A.H. and D.H. each filed affidavits that D.J. is not D.H.'s child. There is no evidence of collusion on their part. For the limited purpose of construing AS 25.27.040(a) — i.e., whether a paternity action is "contested" — we hold that these unimpeached affidavits constitute clear and convincing evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of D.H.'s paternity and to require CSED to pay for paternity testing.