Opinion
NO. 2017 KA 1715
06-04-2018
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. EARL COLEMAN
HILLAR C. MOORE, III DISTRICT ATTORNEY ALLISON MILLER RUTZEN ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY BATON ROUGE, LA ATTORNEYS FOR STATE OF LOUISIANA PRENTICE L. WHITE BATON ROUGE, LA ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT EARL COLEMAN
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION Appealed from the 19th Judicial District Court in and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 06-13-0237
Honorable Trudy White, Judge HILLAR C. MOORE, III
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
ALLISON MILLER RUTZEN
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
BATON ROUGE, LA ATTORNEYS FOR
STATE OF LOUISIANA PRENTICE L. WHITE
BATON ROUGE, LA ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
EARL COLEMAN BEFORE: GUIDRY, PETTIGREW, AND CRAIN, JJ. PETTIGREW, J.
The defendant, Earl Coleman, was charged by grand jury indictment with aggravated rape (of a victim under the age of thirteen years), a violation of La. R.S. 14:42 (prior to amendment, which redesignated aggravated rape as first degree rape). He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The defendant now appeals, designating one assignment of error. We affirm the conviction and sentence.
FACTS
In 2012, eight-year-old R.C. lived on Fairfields Avenue in Baton Rouge with her mother, brothers, and the defendant, R.C.'s mother's boyfriend. According to R.C., on several occasions, the defendant raped her while her mother was at work. R.C. testified at trial that the defendant performed oral sex on her, and inserted his fingers and penis into her vagina. R.C. told no one of the incidents for some time. R.C. finally told her cousin (whom R.C. referred to as her aunt). R.C. then told her mother what the defendant had done to her, and in February 2013, R.C.'s mother called the police. R.C. indicated she did not disclose the rape sooner because she was afraid of the defendant. R.C. was taken to the Children's Advocacy Center where she was interviewed by Detective Christopher Wheat. R.C. revealed the incidents of rape to Detective Wheat. Detective Wheat then interviewed the defendant, who denied he raped or even touched R.C.
The victims are referred to by their initials. See La. R.S. 46:1844(W). --------
The defendant did not testify at trial.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
In his sole assignment of error, the defendant argues that the verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence, and the trial court erred in accepting the jury's verdict.
A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand as it violates Due Process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a conviction is whether or not, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 LEd.2d 560 (1979). See La. Code Crim. P. art. 821(B); State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207, p. 10 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 660; State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1308-09 (La. 1988). The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in Article 821, is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438 provides that the fact finder must be satisfied that the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See State v. Patorno, 2001-2585, p. 5 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 141, 144.
At the time of the offense(s), La. R.S. 14:42 provided, in pertinent part:
A. Aggravated rape is a rape committed upon a person sixty-five years of age or older or where the anal, oral, or vaginal sexual intercourse is deemed to be without lawful consent of the victim because it is committed under any one or more of the following circumstances:
* * * *
(4) When the victim is under the age of thirteen years. Lack of knowledge of the victim's age shall not be a defense.
La. R.S. 14:41 provides:
A. Rape is the act of anal, oral, or vaginal sexual intercourse with a male or female person committed without the person's lawful consent.
B. Emission is not necessary, and any sexual penetration, when the rape involves vaginal or anal intercourse, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime.
C. For purposes of this Subpart, "oral sexual intercourse" means the intentional engaging in any of the following acts with another person:
(1) The touching of the anus or genitals of the victim by the offender using the mouth or tongue of the victim.
(2) The touching of the anus or genitals of the offender by the victim using the mouth or tongue of the offender.
In his appellate brief, the defendant suggests that the evidence at trial did not prove that he raped R.C., or had any sexual contact with her. According to the defendant, he and his girlfriend, R.C.'s mother, had "an extremely chaotic relationship." As such, R.C. concocted the story of being raped by the defendant as a means of freeing her mother from being in a relationship with an emotionally abusive man. The defendant avers that without any corroborating evidence, the jury was swayed not by evidence, but by an emotional and sympathetic connection with R.C., who held strong reservations against the verbally abusive defendant. Further, according to the defendant, the jury "may have also been moved" by R.C.'s testimony that she was telling the truth because she did not want to go to hell for lying.
R.C.'s mother testified that she and her family and the defendant lived on Fairfields Avenue from 2009 to 2013. R.C. testified that she was younger than ten years old at this time. In their house on Fairfields Avenue, R.C. slept on the floor of the bedroom where her brothers slept. R.C. recalled an incident where she woke up one morning and went to the defendant's bedroom to see if he could get breakfast for her. According to R.C., the defendant picked her up and put her on his bed. He pulled down his pants and pulled down her pants. The defendant performed oral sex on R.C. and placed his fingers in her vagina. The defendant then placed his penis in her vagina. R.C. pushed the defendant off of her and went back to her brothers' room. R.C. testified that it was painful when she was vaginally raped. R.C. recalled three times when the defendant raped her in this way.
R.C.'s mother testified she and the defendant had an abusive relationship, and that he beat her in front of her children. According to R.C.'s mother, she began noticing that R.C. never wanted to be alone with the defendant, and that she would stay with her brothers. R.C. began "withdrawing" and wanting to stay at her father's house. On the weekends, R.C. would stay with her aunt, her maternal grandmother, or her father. During the time period when the rapes allegedly occurred, March to June of 2012, R.C.'s mother was working at the Dow plant in Saint Gabriel, from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., fourteen days on and one day off. In August 2012, the defendant moved out of the house.
Based on the lack of forensic evidence and corroboration that R.C. had been raped, the defendant points out that R.C.'s testimony alone was used to prove the elements of aggravated rape. Since the plausibility of R.C.'s testimony was at issue, according to the defendant, the State failed to prove its case. That is, as noted by the defendant, R.C. lied about the defendant raping her in order to protect her mother from any further abuse. The singular issue raised by the defendant is one of credibility. The jury heard all of the testimony and chose to believe R.C.'s account. In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with the physical evidence, one witness's testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to support a factual conclusion. State v. Higgins, 2003-1980, p. 6 (La. 4/1/05), 898 So.2d 1219, 1226, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 883, 126 S.Ct. 182, 163 LEd.2d 187 (2005).
The trier of fact is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. Moreover, when there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. The trier of fact's determination of the weight to be given evidence is not subject to appellate review. An appellate court will not reweigh the evidence to overturn a fact finder's determination of guilt. State v. Taylor, 97-2261 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/25/98), 721 So.2d 929, 932. We are constitutionally precluded from acting as a "thirteenth juror" in assessing what weight to give evidence in criminal cases. See State v. Mitchell, 99-3342, p. 8 (La. 10/17/00), 772 So.2d 78, 83. The fact that the record contains evidence that conflicts with the testimony accepted by a trier of fact does not render the evidence accepted by the trier of fact insufficient. State v. Quinn, 479 So.2d 592, 596 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985).
When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the trier of fact reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Moten, 510 So.2d 55, 61 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 514 So.2d 126 (La. 1987). The jury's guilty verdict reflected the reasonable conclusion that, based on the testimonial evidence, the defendant committed aggravated rape upon R.C. In finding the defendant guilty, the jury clearly rejected the defendant's theory of innocence. See Moten, 510 So.2d at 61. The defendant complains of a lack of corroboration to the sexual abuse, but the testimony of the victim alone is sufficient to prove the elements of the offense. See State v. Orgeron, 512 So.2d 467, 469 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987), writ denied, 519 So.2d 113 (La. 1988). See also State v. Rives, 407 So.2d 1195, 1197 (La. 1981).
After a thorough review of the record, we find the evidence supports the jury's verdict. We are convinced that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, that the defendant was guilty of the aggravated rape of R.C. See State v. Calloway, 2007-2306, pp. 1-2 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam).
The assignment of error is without merit. The defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.