Opinion
ID No. 1405010510
08-29-2017
STATE OF DELAWARE v. JAMES COLEMAN, Defendant.
Jason C. Cohee, Esq., Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. James Coleman, Pro se.
RK-14-05-0666-01
Escape after Conv. (F) Jason C. Cohee, Esq., Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. James Coleman, Pro se.
COMMISSIONER'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Upon Defendant's Motion For Postconviction Relief Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61
FREUD, Commissioner
August 29, 2017
The Defendant, James Coleman ("Coleman"), pled guilty on September 10, 2014 to one count of Escape After Conviction, 11 Del. C. § 4214. As part of the plea Coleman agreed that he was a habitual offender. The parties recommended a sentence of eight years at level V pursuant to 11 Del C. § 4214(a) followed by probation and recommend [requested?] that he serve his time at Sussex Correctional Institution. The Court agreed with the parties' recommendation and sentenced Coleman accordingly and "recommended" to the Department of Correction that Coleman be held at Sussex Correctional Institution.
The charges stemmed from Coleman's escape from the custody of Department of Corrections while being held at Level IV Crest - specifically Coleman ran from correctional officers while on an approved leave from the facility. Had he gone to trial and been found guilty he would have faced substantial jail time as a result of his habitual status. Clearly given the circumstances of his crime Coleman's plea was beneficial to him.
Coleman did not appeal his conviction or sentence to the Delaware Supreme Court. Coleman instead filed a motion for reduction of sentence on November 14, 2014 which the Court denied on November 25, 2014. Next on September 10, 2015 he filed a motion to correct his sentence which the court denied on October 15, 2015. Coleman appealed the denial to the Supreme Court arguing that he should not have been declared an habitual offender. On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed stating Coleman's claims lacked merit. The mandate issued on February 23, 2016. Finally Coleman filed the pending motion pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 on May 29, 2016. In his motion, he raises one ground for relief, in which he essentially claims that his plea agreement was breached because he is not being held at Sussex Correctional Institution. However the record reflects that it was the parties and the Court's intention to "recommend" that he be held at Sussex Correctional Institution not to mandate that outcome.
Under Delaware law, the court must first determine whether Coleman has met the strict procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i) before it may consider the merits of the postconviction relief claims. The pending motion was filed more than one year after his sentencing, and the time to file a direct appeal, and is therefore procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(1), unless he asserts a retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after the judgment of conviction. Coleman has not alleged such a right. Coleman does not argue that the time bar was tolled by his motions for sentence reduction and correction or the subsequent appeal of those two motions to the Supreme Court. Additionally the claim raised in his postconviction motion is separate from the claims raised in the earlier motions. Therefore Coleman's motion ultimately filed in April 2016 is clearly time-barred and thus procedurally barred and I recommend his motion be denied.
However even if it was determined that Coleman's earlier filing tolled the time limit, his motion would still be procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(3) because he failed to raise any of his claims at the plea, at sentencing or on direct appeal. Coleman's claim was not raised at the plea or sentencing. Therefore, it is barred by Rule 61(i)(3), absent a demonstration of cause for the default and prejudice. Coleman does not give any cause for his failure to have raised time issue as sooner nor has he alleged any prejudice as a result of his not being held at Sussex Correctional Institution.
I find Coleman's motion was untimely filed and is barred by Rule 61 (i)(1). I also find that Coleman's motion is procedurally barred for failing to have demonstrated cause for him not claiming the issue sooner. Additionally the claim is meritless. Consequently, I recommend that the Court deny Coleman's motion for postconviction relief as procedurally-barred and meritless.
/s/ Andrea M. Freud
Commissioner AMF/dsc
Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991).