In such appeals, an appellate court will not consider whether the sentence was excessive when originally pronounced in the judgment of conviction; our review is limited to whether the sentence was excessive in light of the circumstances existing when the court revoked probation. State v. Jensen, 138 Idaho 941, 944, 71 P.3d 1088, 1091 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Coffin, 122 Idaho 392, 393-94, 834 P.2d 909, 910-11 (Ct. App. 1992). When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence on an appeal from a probation revocation order, we do not base our review only upon events that occurred after the original pronouncement of sentence, but will examine the entire record, encompassing events before and after the original judgment, including, but not limited to, events that occurred during the probationary period.
In such appeals, an appellate court will not consider whether the sentence was excessive when originally pronounced in the judgment of conviction; our review is limited to whether the sentence was excessive in light of the circumstances existing when the court revoked probation. State v. Jensen, 138 Idaho 941, 944, 71 P.3d 1088, 1091 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Coffin, 122 Idaho 392, 393-94, 834 P.2d 909, 910-11 (Ct. App. 1992). When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence on an appeal from a probation revocation order, we do not base our review only upon events that occurred after the original pronouncement of sentence, but will examine the entire record, encompassing events before and after the original judgment, including, but not limited to, events that occurred during the probationary period.
(Emphasis added.) This standard has been expressed in numerous unpublished decisions as well. The State also cites State v. Coffin, 122 Idaho 392, 834 P.2d 909 (Ct.App. 1992), as further support for its view. In Coffin, we noted, just as in the instant matter, that the defendant had not challenged the district court's finding that he violated the terms of his probation or the district court's decision to revoke his probation.
Accordingly, we have made it clear in such appeals that an appellate court will not consider whether the sentence was excessive when originally pronounced in the judgment of conviction and that our review is limited to whether the sentence was excessive in light of the circumstances existing when the court revoked probation. State v. Coffin, 122 Idaho 392, 393-94, 834 P.2d 909, 910-11 (Ct.App. 1992); State v. Paramore, 119 Idaho 235, 236, 804 P.2d 1366, 1367 (Ct.App. 1991); State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852, 673 P.2d 809, 813 (Ct.App. 1983); Tucker, 103 Idaho at 888, 655 P.2d at 95. When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence on an appeal from a probation revocation order, we do not base our review only upon events that occurred after the original pronouncement of sentence. Rather, we examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment, including but not limited to events that occurred during the probationary period.
In our review of a sentence pronounced after revocation of probation, we will consider whether the sentence was excessive in light of the circumstances existing when the court revoked probation. State v. Jensen, 138 Idaho 941, 944, 71 P.3d 1088, 1091 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Coffin, 122 Idaho 392, 393-94, 834 P.2d 909, 910-11 (Ct. App. 1992). Hall argues the district court abused its discretion in failing to grant the motion because he presented new and additional information to the district court.
The decision to revoke a defendant's probation on a suspended sentence is within the discretion of the district court. I.C. § 20-222. State v. Corder, 115 Idaho 1137, 1138, 772 P.2d 1231, 1232 (Ct.App. 1989); State v. Coffin, 122 Idaho 392, 393, 834 P.2d 909, 910 (Ct.App. 1992). On appeal, we review this decision for an abuse of discretion.
We note that Drennen has appealed solely the district court's order revoking probation and executing the original sentences, and thus the issues on appeal are restricted to that order. State v. Coffin, 122 Idaho 392, 834 P.2d 909 (App. 1992); State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 673 P.2d 809 (App. 1983). Accordingly, any prejudice resulting from the alleged conflict of interest is relevant only insofar as it bears upon that order.