State v. Coburn

6 Citing cases

  1. State v. Schiebout

    944 N.W.2d 666 (Iowa 2020)   Cited 42 times

    "Knowledge ... may be proved by circumstantial evidence, and in a case like this that is usually necessary." State v. Coburn , 244 N.W.2d 560, 563 (Iowa 1976) (quoting People v. Adams , 171 Cal.App.2d 483, 340 P.2d 677, 679 (1959) ) (addressing "[k]nowledge of lack of sufficient funds and intent to defraud" under predecessor statute to section 714.1(6) and concluding "[t]he combined effect of the checks placed in evidence and the other testimony was to show inferentially the existence of such knowledge and intent" (quoting Adams , 340 P.2d at 679 )).Using these standards to measure the evidence against the instructions provided to the jury, the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to make the fair inference that Schiebout knew she was not an authorized signer on the Ducks Unlimited account and that she had a conscious awareness when she wrote the checks that the bank would not cover the checks because of that fact.

  2. State v. Rojas-Cardona

    503 N.W.2d 591 (Iowa 1993)   Cited 6 times

    In short, there is substantial evidence from which a jury could find that Pepe deceived Shaugun at the time Pepe tendered the check to him. Cf. State v. Johnson, 196 N.W.2d 563, 567 (Iowa 1972) (act of drawing check on bank and delivering it to payee carried with it representation that drawer had funds or credit with bank to meet check; defendant convicted of false uttering after drawing check on bank with which he had no account); State v. Mathias, 216 N.W.2d 319, 321 (Iowa 1974) (check written on nonexisting account; intent to defraud could be inferred from evidence that defendant knew at time he gave check he would not have funds in bank to pay check when it was presented); State v. Coburn, 244 N.W.2d 560, 563 (Iowa 1976) (check written on account defendant knew had been closed and defendant received statutory ten day notice that check had not been honored or paid; held this evidence constituted prima facie evidence of intent to defraud). B. Contemporaneous exchange.

  3. STATE v. CRAN

    281 N.W.2d 81 (S.D. 1979)   Cited 3 times
    In State v. Cran, 281 N.W.2d 81 (S.D. 1979), we upheld the use of suspended impositions of sentence as prior felonies for the purpose of applying the habitual offender statute.

    We conclude that the trial court properly weighed the probative value of the bank records evidence against the prejudicial effect of this evidence and did not err in allowing the records to be introduced. See State v. Coburn, 244 N.W.2d 560 (Iowa 1976), and cases cited therein. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss and in refusing to enter a judgment of acquittal, relying upon State v. Mauck, 270 N.W.2d 56 (S.D. 1978), in support of his contention that the element of fraudulent intent or inducement of present consideration through deceit was not present.

  4. State v. Thomas

    275 N.W.2d 211 (Iowa 1979)   Cited 13 times
    In Thomas, the court stated that the speedy trial provision under Article IV of the statute was not applicable where the prosecutor chose not to act under the statute and instead brought the defendant to Iowa subsequent to his term of imprisonment.

    Although evidence of criminal activity other than that charged is generally inadmissible, we have acknowledged that evidence of similar crimes is admissible, noting relevance to issues of intent, motive, common scheme and identity. State v. Coburn, 244 N.W.2d 560, 563 (Iowa 1976); State v. Johnson, 237 N.W.2d 819, 821 (Iowa 1976); State v. Agee, 257 Iowa 1345, 136 N.W.2d 419, 421 (1965). In this case the attempted passing of a similar check is definitely relevant and material to the questions of intent and common scheme, the likelihood of knowledge of the forged nature of the check increasing with the number of checks of a similar nature.

  5. State v. Fowler

    248 N.W.2d 511 (Iowa 1976)   Cited 22 times

    Moreover, it would appear any conjectural homicide intention-related probative force which may have attended Patricia's remote expressions to attorney McCarthy were substantially outweighed by the inherent unfair prejudice, danger and confusion of the trial issues. See United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d at 764-775; State v. Cassady, 243 N.W.2d 581, 583 (Iowa 1976); People v. Ireland, 70 Cal.2d 522, 75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 191-194, 450 P.2d 580, 585-586 (1969); People v. Purvis, 56 Cal.2d 93, 13 Cal.Rptr. 801, 804, 362 P.2d 713, 716 (1961); 9 U.Calif. (Davis) L.Rev. at 230-231; cf. State v. Coburn, 244 N.W.2d 560, 562 (Iowa 1976). Mindful of the foregoing, we now conclude trial court erroneously overruled defendant's hearsay objection to attorney McCarthy's testimony.

  6. State v. Johnson

    244 N.W.2d 809 (Iowa 1976)   Cited 1 times

    The State does not contend Kasper's testimony concerning defendant's prior incarceration falls within any of the well-established exceptions to the above rule. See State v. Coburn, 244 N.W.2d 560 (Iowa, 1976); State v. Garren, 220 N.W.2d 898, 900 (Iowa 1974); State v. Fetters, 202 N.W.2d 84, 91-92 (Iowa 1972). The State argues this evidence was properly injected into the case as a "quasi-admission", admissible because inconsistent with defendant's not-guilty plea.