State v. Clowes

29 Citing cases

  1. Downtown Women's Center v. Advocates for Life

    826 P.2d 637 (Or. Ct. App. 1992)

    "(2) The necessity and justiciability of conduct under subsection (1) of this section shall not rest upon considerations pertaining only to the morality and advisability of the statute, either in its general application or with respect to its application to a particular class of cases arising thereunder." In State v. Clowes, 310 Or. 686, 801 P.2d 789 (1990), the Supreme Court considered a case involving similar facts. There, anti-abortionists were charged with criminal trespass after they had entered and blocked access to an abortion clinic in an effort to prevent patients from obtaining legal abortions.

  2. State v. O'Key

    321 Or. 285 (Or. 1995)   Cited 184 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test for possible intoxication is a scientific technique distinguished from other field sobriety tests because science, "rather than common knowledge," provides its legitimacy

    When a court, in determining what the law — statutory, decisional, or constitutional — is or should be, takes judicial notice of certain facts, it is taking judicial notice of legislative facts. State v. Clowes, 310 Or. 686, 692 n 7, 801 P.2d 789 (1990); Brown, 297 Or at 420 n 7. Judicial notice of legislative facts is not governed by the provisions of OEC 201, and the limitations and standards of OEC 201 do not control judicial notice of legislative facts. Clowes, 310 Or at 692 n 7.

  3. Ecumenical Ministries v. Oregon State Lottery Comm

    318 Or. 551 (Or. 1994)   Cited 77 times
    In Ecumenical Ministries of Oregon v. Oregon State Lottery Comm'n, 318 Or. 551, 871 P.2d 106 (1994), the Oregon Supreme Court addressed the scope of Art. V, sec.

    When a court does so, however, the court is taking judicial notice of legislative facts, which are facts utilized in determining what the law — statutory, decisional, or constitutional — is or should be. See State v. Clowes, 310 Or. 686, 692 n 7, 801 P.2d 789 (1990) (defining and discussing legislative facts); Chartrand v. Coos Bay Tavern, 298 Or. 689, 693, 696 P.2d 513 (1985) ("Legislative facts * * * are those which have relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the enactment of a legislative body." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

  4. Columbia River Gorge Comm. v. Hood River Co.

    210 Or. App. 689 (Or. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 5 times
    In Columbia River Gorge Comm'n v. Hood River Cnty., 210 Or.App. 689, 152 P.3d 997, 998 (2007), the Oregon Court of Appeals had before it a challenge to an Oregon ballot measure that required the payment of just compensation to owners if land ordinances restricted development on their land.

    "[I]n determining the meaning of a term in the constitution, or in analyzing the constitutionality of a law, the court may take judicial notice of certain facts. When a court does so, however, the court is taking judicial notice of legislative facts, which are facts utilized in determining what the law — statutory, decisional, or constitutional — is or should be. See State v. Clowes, 310 Or 686, 692 n 7, 801 P2d 789 (1990) (defining and discussing legislative facts); Chartrand v. Coos Bay Tavern, 298 Or 689, 693, 696 P2d 513 (1985) ('Legislative facts * * * are those which have relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the enactment of a legislative body.' (internal quotation marks omitted)). Judicial notice of legislative facts is not subject to the Oregon Evidence Code, State v. Clowes, supra, 310 Or at 692 n 7, and parties are not entitled as a matter of right to present evidence to demonstrate such facts.

  5. State v. Lawson

    352 Or. 724 (Or. 2012)   Cited 123 times
    Holding that witnesses’ identifications were proper because they were based on prior untainted observations and not the result of a later unduly suggestive procedure

    Based on our extensive review of the current scientific research and literature, we conclude that the scientific knowledge and empirical research concerning eyewitness perception and memory has progressed sufficiently to warrant taking judicial notice of the data contained in those various sources as legislative facts that we may consult for assistance in determining the effectiveness of our existing test for the admission of eyewitness identification evidence. See State v. O'Key, 321 Or. 285, 309 n. 35, 899 P.2d 663 (1995) (noting that “[t]he validity of proffered scientific evidence * * * is a question of law” to be determined by judicial notice of legislative facts submitted to the court); see also State v. Clowes, 310 Or. 686, 692 n. 7, 801 P.2d 789 (1990) (“Facts utilized by a court to ‘help [it] to determine the context of the law and policy and to exercise its judgment or discretion in determining what course of action to take’ have been described as judicial notice of legislative facts.” (alteration in original)).

  6. State v. Hampton

    317 Or. 251 (Or. 1993)   Cited 77 times
    Holding that, so long as the inference from a fact in evidence proposed by the proponent of the admissibility of the evidence is reasonable, the evidence is admissible under OEC 401

    The trial judge must decide, pursuant to OEC 104(1), whether the proffered evidence satisfies the minimum threshold of logical relevancy required by OEC 401. State v. Clowes, 310 Or. 686, 692, 801 P.2d 789 (1990). The possibility that an inconsistent or contradictory inference may reasonably be drawn from the offered item of evidence does not destroy that item's relevancy so long as the inference desired by the proponent is also a reasonable one.

  7. State v. Busby

    844 P.2d 897 (Or. 1993)   Cited 21 times
    Holding that an adequate offer of proof is normally required to preserve error when a trial court excludes evidence

    State v. Olmstead, 310 Or. 455, 459-60, 800 P.2d 277 (1990). Compare with State v. Clowes, 310 Or. 686, 692, 801 P.2d 789 (1990) (trial court may require offer of proof to make a relevancy determination, under OEC 104(1) and 401, as to whether a proffered defense is available as a matter of law). Adequate offers of proof are required to ensure that appellate courts are able to determine (1) whether it was error to exclude the evidence, and (2) whether any error was likely to have affected the result of the case.

  8. State v. Phillips

    317 Or. App. 169 (Or. Ct. App. 2022)   Cited 3 times

    There is no provision of law that precludes the availability of a choice-of-law defense in these circumstances. See State v. Clowes , 310 Or. 686, 697-98, 801 P.2d 789 (1990) (explaining that the statutory text, "inconsistent with some other provision," means that "specific value choices" made by the legislature via statutory law prevail over an otherwise available justification defense). On the contrary, as defendant points out, the legislative history of ORS 167.320 indicates that the legislature was told that the law would "[a]llow[ ] for [a] defense of ending an animal's life to alleviate its suffering," i.e. , the choice-of-evils defense.

  9. State v. Moreno

    287 Or. App. 205 (Or. Ct. App. 2017)   Cited 4 times

    To determine whether defendant's requested instruction was a complete statement of the law in these circumstances, we first consider the choice of evils statute, ORS 161.200. It begins: "(1) Unless inconsistent with other provisions of chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, defining justifiable use of physical force, or with some other provision of law, conduct that would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal[.]" In State v. Clowes, 310 Or. 686, 698, 801 P.2d 789 (1990), the court explained that "inconsistent with some other provision" means that "the legislature's decision prevails if and when it makes specific value choices," and "competing values which have been fore-closed by deliberate legislative choice are excluded from the general defense of justification." (Internal quotation marks and brackets omitted.)

  10. Clark v. Nooth

    284 Or. App. 762 (Or. Ct. App. 2017)   Cited 3 times
    Noting that, "[g]iven state of the law, all counsel exercising reasonable professional skill and judgment would have recognized that petitioner could not be required to wear the leg restraint without a factual basis to justify it"

    See Black's Law Dictionary 1124 (10th ed. 2014) (as applicable, defining "material" to mean "[h]aving some logical connection with the consequential facts," and "[o]f such a nature that knowledge of the item would affect a person's decision-making; significant; essential"); Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1392 (unabridged ed. 2002) (as applicable, defining "material" to mean "relevant, pertinent," and "requiring serious consideration by having a certain or probable bearing on the proper determination of a law case * * * or on some similar unsettled matter"); see also Mize v. Comcast Corp-AT & T Broadband , 208 Or.App. 563, 569, 145 P.3d 315 (2006) (emphasizing that there are "multiple definitions of the adjective ‘material’ "). Case law defining the term "material" reflects that same range of meaning. For example, the concept of "materiality" is subsumed in the definition of "relevant" evidence, OEC 401. State v. Clowes , 310 Or. 686, 691 n. 6, 801 P.2d 789 (1990). Evidence meets that test if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."