Opinion
Docket No. 33481.
Filed May 29, 2008.
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, Bonneville County. Hon. Gregory S. Anderson, District Judge.
Order vacating judgment of conviction and sentence for attempted second degree murder with a weapon enhancement, reversed and remanded.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for appellant-cross respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Diane M. Walker, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent-cross appellant. Diane M. Walker argued.
The state appeals from the district court's order vacating Michael Edwin Clements' judgment of conviction and sentence for attempted second degree murder with a weapon enhancement, asserting that the district court did so without jurisdiction. Clements cross-appeals arguing that the district court erred when it failed to conclude that his judgment of conviction and both of his sentences were illegal. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE
In 1994, Clements shot two individuals, and one of those individuals died as a result of the shooting. The state charged Clements with first degree murder with a weapon enhancement, aggravated battery with a weapon enhancement, and burglary. Later, after plea negotiations, the complaint was amended and Clements pled guilty to second degree murder with a weapon enhancement and attempted second degree murder with a weapon enhancement. The district court sentenced Clements to a unified term of life, with a fifteen-year minimum period of confinement, for second degree murder plus a fifteen-year addition for the weapon enhancement and a unified term of fifteen years, with a ten-year minimum period of confinement, for attempted second degree murder plus a five-year addition for the weapon enhancement.
This Court affirmed Clements' judgment of conviction and sentences in an unpublished opinion. State v. Clements, Docket No. 22492 (Ct.App. Oct. 3, 1996). In 2006, Clements filed a pro se I.C.R. 35 motion for correction of illegal sentences. The basis for Clements' Rule 35 motion was that he was illegally sentenced for two weapon enhancements because both shootings arose from the same indivisible course of conduct. Clements was appointed counsel for his motion, and the district court entertained argument. After reviewing underlying transcripts, the district court entered an order granting Clements' Rule 35 motion, vacated his judgment of conviction and sentence for attempted second degree murder with the weapon enhancement, and resentenced Clements. The state appeals and Clements cross-appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
The state asserts that the district court lacked jurisdiction to examine the underlying facts of Clements' case in order to determine whether his original enhanced sentence for attempted second degree murder was illegal. Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law that may be raised at any time, and over which appellate courts exercise free review. State v. Shutz, 143 Idaho 200, 202, 141 P.3d 1069, 1071 (2006).
The question of whether a sentence is illegal is a question of law freely reviewable by the appellate court. State v. Josephson, 124 Idaho 286, 287, 858 P.2d 825, 826 (Ct.App. 1993); State v. Rodriguez, 119 Idaho 895, 897, 811 P.2d 505, 507 (Ct.App. 1991). The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. I.C.R. 35. An illegal sentence under Rule 35 is one in excess of a statutory provision or otherwise contrary to applicable law. State v. Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733, 745, 69 P.3d 153, 165 (Ct.App. 2003).
Clements was originally charged with first degree murder with a weapon enhancement, aggravated battery with a weapon enhancement, and burglary. An amended complaint was then filed and, in 1995, Clements pled guilty to second degree murder with a weapon enhancement and attempted second degree murder with a weapon enhancement. The weapon enhancements Clements pled guilty to provide, in pertinent part, that any person convicted of a specified crime "who displayed, used, threatened, or attempted to use a firearm or other deadly weapon while committing or attempting to commit the crime, shall be sentenced to an extended term of imprisonment." I.C. § 19-2520. The weapon enhancement statute is subject to a limiting statute, which provides, in pertinent part, that "any person convicted of two (2) or more substantive crimes provided for in the above code sections, which crimes arose out of the same indivisible course of conduct, may only be subject to one (1) enhanced penalty." I.C. § 19-2520E; see also State v. Custodio, 136 Idaho 197, 207, 30 P.3d 975, 985 (Ct.App. 2001).
Approximately ten years after pleading guilty, Clements filed a pro se I.C.R. 35 motion for correction of illegal sentences. Clements asserted that his sentences were illegal because the district court imposed two enhancements even though the murder and attempted murder arose out of the same indivisible course of conduct. Clements requested, and was appointed, counsel. The district court entertained argument on Clements' motion, but delayed ruling until it had reviewed the preliminary hearing and change of plea transcripts. The district court issued a decision concluding that Clements' sentence on the attempted second degree murder conviction was illegal because a second enhancement should not have been imposed because the crimes arose out of the same indivisible course of conduct. The district court's decision begins by reviewing the case law discussing multiple enhancements and I.C. § 19-2520E. The district court's decision relied on testimony from the preliminary hearing transcript in reaching the conclusion that both the murder and attempted murder arose out of the same indivisible course of conduct. The district court's decision in this regard was clearly a factual determination.
The state argues that, because adjudication of a Rule 35 motion is a legal question, the district court had no jurisdiction to review the underlying facts of Clements' case. Clements responds by arguing that the district court always retains jurisdiction to correct an illegal sentence and, because multiple enhancements for crimes arising out of the same indivisible course of conduct are prohibited by the statute, the district court retained jurisdiction to review the underlying facts of his case and determine whether Clements' sentences were illegal.
For the purposes of I.C. § 19-2520E, whether multiple convictions arose out of the same indivisible course of conduct is a factual question that requires the court to review the record. State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 882, 736 P.2d 1327, 1336 (1987). Idaho Code Section 19-2520E does not prohibit charging more than one enhanced penalty even if the crimes charged all arose out of the same indivisible course of conduct. State v. McLeskey, 138 Idaho 691, 697, 69 P.3d 111, 117 (2003).
Several jurisdictions have concluded that the determination of whether a sentence is illegal for the purpose of a motion for correction of an illegal sentence is a legal question and does not permit an evidentiary inquiry. See, e.g., Burgess v. State, 831 So. 2d 137, 140 (Fla. 2002) (holding that a motion for correction of an illegal sentence "is limited to those sentencing issues that can be resolved as a matter of law without an evidentiary determination"); Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 787 (Ind. 2004) (concluding that a motion to correct an illegal sentence is appropriate only where the sentence is illegal on its face); Brown v. State, 99 P.3d 489, 491 (Wyo. 2004) (noting that "the determination of whether a sentence is illegal is made by reference to the authorizing statute or applicable constitutional provisions and is, therefore, a matter of statutory interpretation").
The Indiana Supreme Court concluded:
When claims of sentencing errors require consideration of matters outside the face of the sentencing judgment, they are best addressed promptly on direct appeal and thereafter via post-conviction relief proceedings where applicable. Use of the statutory motion to correct sentence should thus be narrowly confined to claims apparent from the face of the sentencing judgment. . . . We therefore hold that a motion to correct sentence may only be used to correct sentencing errors that are clear from the face of the judgment imposing the sentence in light of the statutory authority. Claims that require consideration of the proceedings before, during, or after trial may not be presented by way of a motion to correct sentence.
Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 787.
We approve of the approach taken by these jurisdictions and conclude that a limited scope of review approach to a Rule 35 motion is congruous with current Idaho law. In State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 735, 170 P.3d 397, 400 (2007), the Idaho Supreme Court noted that "Rule 35 is a narrow rule." We conclude that, in this case, Clements' Rule 35 motion did not grant the district court jurisdiction to review the underlying facts of Clements' case, especially given that Clements pled guilty instead of going to trial. Compare Custodio, 136 Idaho at 207-08, 30 P.3d at 985-86 (factual issue of divisibility of conduct for purposes of weapon enhancement was litigated at a jury trial following plea of not guilty). Indeed, the approach of the district court in this case could lead to a circumstance where the defendant waives his or her preliminary hearing, pleads guilty, and some ten years later demands an evidentiary hearing on the facts of the case to contest the applicability of an enhancement. Such an approach is not contemplated by Rule 35 nor condoned by the finality of judgments.
Clements argues that the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Kerrigan, 143 Idaho 185, 141 P.3d 1054 (2006), justifies the district court's assessment of the underlying facts in his case. In Kerrigan, the defendant pled guilty to aggravated battery for shooting a police officer. Kerrigan was sentenced to a forty-five-year sentence, with forty years determinate and five years indeterminate. The forty-five-year sentence was comprised of fifteen years for aggravated battery pursuant to I.C. § 18-907, plus a fifteen-year enhancement pursuant to I.C. § 18-915 because the battery was upon a law enforcement officer, plus an additional fifteen-year enhancement pursuant to I.C. § 19-2520 because of the use of a firearm in the commission of the crime. Id. at 186-87, 141 P.3d at 1055-56. Kerrigan filed a Rule 35 motion, which was denied by the district court. On appeal, Kerrigan argued that his sentence was illegal because the district court lacked authority to impose more than one enhancement on a single substantive offense. Although the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the merits of Kerrigan's appeal, neither it nor the district court had to make a factual determination or review anything beyond Kerrigan's judgment of conviction and the statutory language of the enhancements to do so.
In this case, the district court went beyond the judgment of conviction and the statutory language in evaluating the underlying facts of Clements' case and determining that his sentence was illegal. We conclude that the district court lacked the jurisdiction to examine the underlying facts in Clements' case before concluding that his sentence was illegal.
Because we conclude that the district court erred in examining the underlying facts of Clements' case in determining his sentence was illegal, we decline to address Clements' argument that the district court erred by failing to vacate both of his sentences.
III. CONCLUSION
The district court lacked jurisdiction to examine the underlying facts of Clements' case before concluding that Clements' sentence was illegal. Therefore, the district court's order vacating Clements' judgment of conviction and sentence for attempted second degree murder with a weapon enhancement is reversed and this matter is remanded to the district court to reinstate the judgment of conviction and sentence vacated by the district court.
Chief Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge PERRY, CONCUR.