State v. Clay

10 Citing cases

  1. State v. Mercado

    787 S.W.2d 848 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 6 times

    Exceptions to this general exclusionary rule exist, however, when the evidence of the other crime tends to establish: (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) the absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other; or (5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial. State v. Merritt, 734 S.W.2d 926, 933[13] (Mo.App. 1987); State v. Clay, 686 S.W.2d 516, 518[1, 2] (Mo.App. 1985). These exceptions permit the introduction of evidence for some purpose other than to show a greater likelihood that appellant, by virtue of his criminal nature as evidenced by proof of another crime, committed the crime currently charged. If the evidence falls within one of these recognized exceptions, it is admissible, and the determination of whether the relevance of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.

  2. State v. Bernard

    849 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. 1993)   Cited 263 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that evidence of repeated acts of sexual abuse of children is not admissible to show a propensity to commit such crimes

    The cases required that the sexual misconduct be similar in nature but did not require a showing that the prior sexual misconduct is so "unusual and distinct" as to be a signature of the defendant and his activities. See Erickson, 793 S.W.2d at 383; see also State v. Clay, 686 S.W.2d 516, 517 (Mo.App. 1985). As the court of appeals noted in State v. Brooks, 810 S.W.2d 627 (Mo.App. 1991), the result has been that "the common scheme or plan exception [is] being conflated or mixed with the identity exception; the definitional lines separating these two exceptions [has] become blurred; and the trial court admits evidence of other crimes without a clear rationale for doing so."

  3. State v. Brooks

    810 S.W.2d 627 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 16 times
    Discussing state courts' adoption of so-called "spurious plan" theory

    Id. In Missouri, our courts have, in effect, adopted this so-called "spurious plan" theory of submissibility and, thus, have admitted other crimes of limited as well as striking similarity as sufficient evidence of the existence of a scheme or plan. See, e.g. State v. Clay, 686 S.W.2d 516 (Mo.App. 1985) and cases collected therein. Quite often, this results in the common scheme or plan exception being conflated or mixed with the identity exception; the definitional lines separating these two exceptions become blurred; and the trial court admits evidence of other crimes without a clear rationale for doing so. This is especially prevalent in prosecution of an adult's sexual misconduct against minors.

  4. State v. Courter

    793 S.W.2d 386 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 19 times
    Holding evidence of prior sex crimes only admissible under specific exception categories in Rule 404(B)

    It is appropriate to note that the common scheme or plan exception embraces not only crimes which are sequentially linked, but also to crimes which are committed in such a similar fashion that the inference follows they were the work of the same individual. These are the "modus operandi" type cases where identical methodology earmarks separate crimes as the handiwork of the accused because the acts bear a striking similarity. State v. Clay, 686 S.W.2d 516, 518 (Mo.App. 1985). Returning now to the present case, no argument may be made that evidence of appellant's prior sexual misconduct was admissible to prove identity, to establish motive or that the events separated by more than two decades were so related to each other and so inseparably connected that proof of one necessarily involved proving the other.

  5. State v. Wilson

    755 S.W.2d 707 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 23 times
    In Wilson, the defendant did not argue that subterfuge in the form of a false statement regarding whether the interrogation was being recorded violated Miranda.

    Thus, the investigation of one crime may involve an inquiry into another crime, to such an extent that the two become so inseparably connected that proof of one necessarily involves proving the other. State v. Clay, 686 S.W.2d 516, 518 (Mo.App. 1985). The clear connection between defendant's arrest for burglary and his identification as a participant in the Harmon murder is sufficient to establish the relevance of the evidence relating to that arrest.

  6. State v. Jordan

    751 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 33 times
    In Jordan, a police officer and a lay witness testified that the photocopies seized from the defendant fairly and accurately depicted the actual bills which were seized. Because a fact to be proven (whether the defendant stole the money) existed independently of a writing (the photocopies of the money), and there was also some evidence of the fact in the writing (the denominations of the money in the photocopy), both sources, oral and written, became primary evidence, and the best evidence rule was not applicable.

    The rule against admissibility of hearsay statements is inapplicable where testimony is offered in explanation of conduct rather than as proof of the matters or facts asserted therein. Mallett, 723 S.W.2d at 536; State v. Clay, 686 S.W.2d 516, 518 (Mo.App. 1985). Viewed in its relevant context, Cheryl Noack testified to the following as a witness for the state on direct examination:

  7. State v. Walker

    736 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 1 times

    The testimony as to the batteries and the attache case was relevant to show defendant's common scheme or plan in stealing the items in a continuous course of conduct in one day. State v. Campbell, 689 S.W.2d 696, 698[2] (Mo.App. 1985); State v. Clay, 686 S.W.2d 516, 518[2] (Mo.App. 1985). Moreover, defendant argued he gave a false confession in return for the police not arresting him on outstanding warrants and not prosecuting him for the thefts to which he was confessing.

  8. State v. Alexander

    729 S.W.2d 486 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 5 times
    Holding the rules regarding whether a spouse is allowed to testify under section 546.260 to be procedural

    First, the state made no argument drawing the attenuated inference Alexander suggests. Second, even if the statement would be hearsay if offered to prove the facts stated, the same statement could nevertheless be admissible for the purpose of explaining why Officer Boyd went to the house to investigate. State v. Brooks, 618 S.W.2d 22, 25[6, 7] (Mo. banc 1981); State v. Clay, 686 S.W.2d 516, 518[6] (Mo.App. 1985). Silvey's statement presents no hearsay problems.

  9. State v. Pettit

    719 S.W.2d 474 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 25 times
    Finding that the reliability of identification is greatly enhanced by returning a freshly apprehended suspect to the scene of an offense for prompt identification by eyewitnesses

    The testimony at issue was not offered to prove the truth of the statement, but rather to explain the officer's subsequent conduct, his investigation of the basement windowsill where he found broken glass stained with blood. It is well established that testimony offered to explain conduct, rather than to prove the truth of the facts testified to is not inadmissible hearsay. State v. Brooks, 618 S.W.2d 22, 25 (Mo. banc 1981); State v. Clay, 686 S.W.2d 516, 518 (Mo.App. 1985). We perceive defendant's third point to contend he was subjected to double jeopardy by being convicted of both first degree robbery and burglary in the first degree in that the convictions were based on identical evidence.

  10. State v. Nolan

    717 S.W.2d 573 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 11 times
    In State v. Nolan, 717 S.W.2d 573, 575 (Mo.App.S.D. 1986), a prosecution for first degree sexual abuse, the state introduced a book containing sexually explicit photographs of children which the defendant had shown the victim (the daughter of a woman with whom defendant was residing) and her sister.

    The testimony was directly relevant to establish how the caseworker became involved in the 1984 investigation which led to defendant's further confession. Compare State v. Clay, 686 S.W.2d 516 (Mo. App. 1985) (Testimony offered in explanation of conduct rather than as proof of facts testified to is not inadmissible hearsay.) It was relevant on the contested issue of identity, State v. Ford, 677 S.W.2d 352, 355 (Mo.App. 1984), and showed a common scheme or plan by defendant to sexually molest young girls.