Opinion
ID No. 0406018386.
Submitted: August 1, 2006.
Decided: January 31, 2007.
Upon Defendant's Pro Se Motion for Post-Conviction Relief — DENIED IN PART.
Angelo Clark, Delaware Correctional Center, Paddock Road, Smyrna, Delaware 19977, Defendant, pro se.
OPINION
Presently before the Court is the Motion for Postconviction Relief of D efendant, Angelo Clark, who alleges that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when he pled guilty to fourth degree rape on May 26, 2005. Clark complains that he is entitled to have his guilty plea set aside because his counsel failed to inform the Court that he was unable to understand the plea proceeding due to his mental illness. For the reasons that follow, C lark's motion is DENIED in part.
Clark makes additional claims about the sentencing proceeding, which will be addressed in a separate decision by the sentencing judge. Clark's Motion for Appointment of Counsel will be addressed subsequently.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 26, 2004, a Grand Ju ry indicted Clark on three counts of second degree rape. The charges arose from a May 7, 2004 incident at the Rockford Center in Newark, Delaware, where Clark and the victim were patients. On May 26, 2005, Clark accepted a plea agreement for one count of fourth degree rape. The Court sentenced Clark on September 30, 2005, to serve fifteen years at Level 5 incarceration, suspended after ten years for two years at Level 4 at the Plummer Center, suspended after six months for one year and six months at Level 3 probation. On February 10, 2006, this Court denied Clark's Motion for Sentence Modification. Clark filed the instant motions on August 1, 2006.DISCUSSION
When presented with a motion for postconviction relief, this Court must determine whether any of the procedural bars under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 are applicable before considering the merits of the claims. Upon review of the record, Clark's motion, which is his first petition for postconviction relief, is timely. Clark's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, however, were not raised previously, as required by Rule 61(i)(3). In order to raise an issue for the first time in a motion for postconviction relief, a movant must demons trate that there is "[c]ause for relief from the procedural default and [p]rejudice from violation of the movant's rights." When a movant attempts to bypass the procedural bars by claiming that his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel has been violated, he must demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. "[A]ttorney error short of ineffective assistance of counsel does not constitute `cause' for a procedural default."
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
Super. C t. Crim. R. 61 (i)(3). See also State v. Grayson, 1993 WL 1 610479, at *1 (Del.Super.).
Grayson, 1993 W L 1610479, at *1.
Id. ( citing Younger, 580 A.2 d at 556; Flame r v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 747 (D el. 1990)).
To establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant cannot make mere allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, but must provide specific claims of actual prejudice and substantiate them. A movant must demonstrate that "'counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,' and `that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" The two-pronged Strickland test, as it is generally known, has been applied to "guilty plea challenges based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel."
Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996)( citing Younge r, 580 A.2 d at 555 -56; Supe r. Ct. Crim. R. 61(b)(2)).
Albury v . State, 551 A.2d 53, 58 ( quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984)).
Id. ( citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U .S. 52, 58 (1985) ).
Under the first prong of the Strickland standard, the defendant bears the burden of rebutting the "strong presumption that counsel's conduct was professionally reasonable." In order to prove prejudice under the second prong, a movant seeking to challenge a guilty plea must show that "'there is a r easonab le probability that, b ut for coun sel's errors, he w ould not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'"
Id. at 59 ( citing S trickland, 466 U .S. at 689); State v. Slade, 2002 W L 1974 023, at *4 ( Del. Super.) ( citing S trickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Dawson v. State, 673 A.2 d 1186, 1190 (D el. 1996 ); Wright, 671 A.2d at 1356).
Id. at 60 ( quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 58).
In order for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to survive, both prongs of the Strickland test must be established. The Court may choose to begin its analysis with the second prong, showing of prejudice, if it is central to the defendant's claim. "In other words, if the Court finds that there is no possibility of prejudice even if a defendant's allegations regarding counsel's representation were true, the Court may dispose of the claim on this basis alone."
Slade, 2002 WL 1974023, at *4 ( citing S trickland, 466 A.2d at 687).
Id. ( citing S trickland, 466 A.2d at 697)("If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.").
Id. ( citing State v. Gattis, 1995 WL 790961, at *4 (Del.Super.).
Clark claims that he was unable to understand the plea proceedings due to his mental illness; therefore, he was not competent to plead guilty. Clark argues that his counsel's failure to inform the Court that he was incompetent denied him the opportunity to undergo a mental health examination to determine if he had the mens rea to commit the rape. Clark's argument is unpersuasive. During the course of the proceedings, Clark underwent two psychiatric evaluations. The Court ordered the first evaluation on September 20, 2004, to determine whether Clark was competent to stand trial. The court ordered the second evaluation on May 26, 2005, to establish whether a plea of guilty but mentally ill was appropriate.
Pursuant to the Court's orders, Clark was evaluated by psychiatrist, David E. Raskin, M.D ., on November 8, 2 004, and p sychologist, Kathryn Shene man, P sy.D., J.D ., on June 27, 2005. The experts' reports indicated that although Clark suffered brain damage in an automobile accident in 1977 and was being treated with medication for bipolar disorder, Clark understoo d the charg es against h im and the legal proce ss in genera l. According to Dr. Raskin:
Mr. Clark understands the way the legal system operates, the role of Judge, jury, prosecutor, and defense attorney, charges, possible sentences, etc. Mr. Clark in addition appears to be treated with Depakote for what sounds like a bipolar disorder. At the time of my interview he did not demonstrate any evidence for mental illness.
Report of David E. Raskin, M.D., dated November 8, 2004, D.I. 9.
Dr. Raskin further opined that Clark did not require any additional psychiatric treatment to supplement the treatment he was already receiving. Additionally, Dr. Sheneman found that at the time of the incident, Clark was able to exercise the will power to refrain from acting, despite his mental impairment, which affected his ability to appreciate proper boundaries.
Id.
Report of Kathryn M. Sheneman, Psy.D., J.D., dated June 27, 2005, D.I. 20.
Clark has not established that his counsel failed to inform the Court that Clark was unable to understand the plea proceedings because of his mental illness. At the time of Clark's guilty plea, the Court had the benefit of Dr. Raskin's report, which detailed Clark's mental illness and opined that Clark understood the charges and the legal process. Mo rever, the Court's awareness of Clark's history of mental illness was evidenced by the subsequent order for a psychological evaluation to determine whether a plea of guilty but mentally ill was appropriate. Therefore, the conduct of Clark's counsel at the plea proceeding was reasonable and did not rise to the level of professional error.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, the Motion for Postconviction Relief of Defendant, Angelo Clark, is DENIED in part. Clark has failed to demonstrate that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his guilty plea. Clark's additional ground for relief related to the sentencing proceeding will be addressed in a subsequent decision by the sentencing judge.