"[W]hen legislation that is enacted to repeal, amend or otherwise modify an existing statute, is declared unconstitutional, it is a nullity and . . . the extant statute remains operative without regard to the unsuccessful and invalid legislation." State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168, 169 (N.D. 1985).

The Legislature is presumed to know the law when enacting legislation. See State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168, 170 (N.D. 1985). When the historical circumstances for additional time after service by mail are considered with the statutes superseded by N.D.R.Civ.P. 6 and the Legislature's reenactment of the mechanic's lien law after the adoption of the rules of civil procedure, we conclude the Legislature intended the provisions for additional time after service by mail under N.D.R.Civ.P. 6(e) to apply when an owner chooses to serve a written demand by registered mail under N.D.C.C. § 35-27-25.

E.g., Sedlak v. Dick, 256 Kan. 779, 804-05, 886 P.2d 1119, 1136 (1995); Pickens County v. Pickens County Water and Sewer Authority, 312 S.C. 218, 220, 439 S.E.2d 840, 842 (1994); American Independent Party in Idaho, Inc. v. Cenarrusa, 92 Idaho 356, 359, 442 P.2d 766, 769 (1968); Selective Life Insurance Co. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of the U.S., 101 Ariz. 594, 601, 422 P.2d 710, 717 (1967); Talbott v. City of Des Moines, 218 Iowa 1397, 257 N.W. 393, 394-95 (1934). Another formulation of the same rule is set forth in State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168, 169 (N.D. 1985): It is well established that unconstitutional legislation is void and is to be treated as if it never were enacted.

[¶ 8] Bartch does not deny violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-04-11; he contends, however, the portion of the statute requiring placement of the current registration tab "in the area designated by the department" is unconstitutional and, as such, may not be used to establish the basis to conduct a traffic stop. See Hoff v. Berg, 1999 ND 115, ¶ 19, 595 N.W.2d 285 (quoting State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168, 169 (N.D. 1985)) ("[U]nconstitutional legislation is void and is to be treated as if it never were enacted."). Bartch attacks the constitutionality of N.D.C.C. § 39-04-11 by arguing it improperly delegates Legislative authority to the Department and it is unconstitutionally vague.

[¶ 28] The Legislature is presumed to know the law when enacting legislation. See State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168, 170 (N.D. 1985). When the historical circumstances for additional time after service by mail are considered with the statutes superseded by N.D.R.Civ.P. 6 and the Legislature's reenactment of the mechanic's lien law after the adoption of the rules of civil procedure, we conclude the Legislature intended the provisions for additional time after service by mail under N.D.R.Civ.P. 6(e) to apply when an owner chooses to serve a written demand by registered mail under N.D.C.C. § 35-27-25.

Numerous states have explicitly applied the same rule of law to revive criminal statutes temporarily superceded by unconstitutional language. See, e.g., State v. Bloss, 637 P.2d 1117, 1130 (Haw. 1981) (unconstitutional criminal ordinance regulating commercial speech reinstated predecessor ordinance), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 824, 103 S.Ct. 56 (1982); B.H. v. State, 645 So.2d 987, 996 (Fla. 1994) (juvenile criminal conviction under a revived statute is not violative of due process), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1132, 115 S.Ct. 2559 (1995); State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168, 169 (N.D. 1985) (unconstitutional amendment to a "bad check" statute revived the predecessor statute); State v. Driver, 598 S.W.2d 774, 776 (Tenn. 1980) (unconstitutional amendment to a securities fraud statute left the former act in "full force and effect"); Clark v. State, 287 A.2d 660, 664 (Del. 1972) (conviction under a valid predecessor statute affirmed where a subsequent amendment was declared unconstitutional), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 812, 93 S.Ct. 139 (1972); State v. Clayton, 99 So.2d 312, 315 (La. 1957) (unconstitutional penalty provision pertaining to the issuance of worthless checks revived the predecessor penalty provision).

[¶ 19] "[U]nconstitutional legislation is void and is to be treated as if it never were enacted." State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168, 169 (N.D. 1985). When legislation "modify[ing] an existing statute is declared unconstitutional, it is a nullity and cannot affect the existing statute in any manner.

The effect of an invalid amendment on the prior statute was clearly answered in State v. Reed, 75 S.D. 300, 303, 63 N.W.2d 803, 804 (1954) wherein this Court stated, "[i]f such amendatory act is unconstitutional in its entirety, the law prior to its enactment is still in effect." The basis for this rationale was set forth in State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168, 169 (N.D. 1985) which we cited with approval in Weegar v. Bakeberg, 527 N.W.2d 676, 678 (S.D. 1995). The Clark Court held:

House Standing Committee Minutes, 1989, hearing before the Transportation Committee on HB 1595, February 3, 1989 [Standing Committee Minutes]. Representative Tomac's description of the law accurately explained the result which occurred when a driver refused to submit to testing without having cured the refusal. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168, 170 (N.D. 1985) [recognizing that "the Legislature is presumed to know the law when enacting legislation . . . and so would be chargeable with knowledge of the law established. . . ."]. Representative Tomac testified further that, under House Bill No. 1595, "you can refuse to take a blood alcohol test and not lose your license for one year if you plead guilty to the violation with which you are charged." Standing Committee Minutes. Although the addition of section 39-20-04(2), NDCC, provided a driver with an alternative to revocation under section 39-20-04(1), NDCC, the amendment did not alter our interpretation of when a driver is subject to section 39-20-04, NDCC, i.e., when a driver has refused to submit to testing and has failed to subsequently cure that refusal.

A statute found to be unconstitutional is void from its beginning and is to be treated as if it never existed. State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168 (N.D. 1985). McGuire v. C L Restaurant Inc., 346 N.W.2d 605 (Minn. 1984); Briggs v. Campbell, Wyant Cannon Foundry, 379 Mich. 160, 150 N.W.2d 752 (1967).