Numerous states explicitly have applied the same principle of law to revive the language of criminal statutes purportedly superseded by an unconstitutional enactment. E.g., State v. Bloss, 64 Haw. 148, 637 P.2d 117 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 824, 103 S.Ct. 56, 74 L.Ed.2d 60 (1982); State v. Clayton, 233 La. 972, 99 So.2d 312 (1957); State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168 (N.D. 1985); State v. Driver, 598 S.W.2d 774 (Tenn. 1980); see Clark v. State, 287 A.2d 660 (Del.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 812, 93 S.Ct. 139, 34 L.Ed.2d 67 (1972). Other states likewise have applied the same principle in the context of matters directly related to the enforcement of criminal laws, including procedural concerns and forfeiture proceedings.

The effect of an invalid amendment on the prior statute was clearly answered in State v. Reed, 75 S.D. 300, 303, 63 N.W.2d 803, 804 (1954) wherein this Court stated, "[i]f such amendatory act is unconstitutional in its entirety, the law prior to its enactment is still in effect." The basis for this rationale was set forth in State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168, 169 (N.D. 1985) which we cited with approval in Weegar v. Bakeberg, 527 N.W.2d 676, 678 (S.D. 1995). The Clark Court held:

[¶ 19] "[U]nconstitutional legislation is void and is to be treated as if it never were enacted." State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168, 169 (N.D. 1985). When legislation "modify[ing] an existing statute is declared unconstitutional, it is a nullity and cannot affect the existing statute in any manner.

Unconstitutional legislation is void and is to be treated as if it never existed. State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168 (N.D. 1985). An unconstitutional statute is just as inoperative as if it had never been enacted.

[¶ 28] The Legislature is presumed to know the law when enacting legislation. See State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168, 170 (N.D. 1985). When the historical circumstances for additional time after service by mail are considered with the statutes superseded by N.D.R.Civ.P. 6 and the Legislature's reenactment of the mechanic's lien law after the adoption of the rules of civil procedure, we conclude the Legislature intended the provisions for additional time after service by mail under N.D.R.Civ.P. 6(e) to apply when an owner chooses to serve a written demand by registered mail under N.D.C.C. § 35-27-25.

Ryan, 520 N.W.2d 39, 45 (N.D. 1994); State v. Pippen, 496 N.W.2d 50 (N.D. 1993). We presume that the legislature knows the law and is aware of previously enacted statutes, State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168 (N.D. 1985), and thus we attempt to harmonize conflicts among them. BASF Corporation v. Symington, 512 N.W.2d 692 (N.D. 1994).

Theodore Wilt and Duaine C. Altman were convicted of issuing checks without sufficient funds in violation of North Dakota Century Code § 6-08-16. Both Wilt and Altman challenge the validity of their convictions on the very grounds recently rejected by this Court in State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168 (N.D. 1985). These challenges therefore are without merit and warrant no further discussion.

House Standing Committee Minutes, 1989, hearing before the Transportation Committee on HB 1595, February 3, 1989 [Standing Committee Minutes]. Representative Tomac's description of the law accurately explained the result which occurred when a driver refused to submit to testing without having cured the refusal. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168, 170 (N.D. 1985) [recognizing that "the Legislature is presumed to know the law when enacting legislation . . . and so would be chargeable with knowledge of the law established. . . ."]. Representative Tomac testified further that, under House Bill No. 1595, "you can refuse to take a blood alcohol test and not lose your license for one year if you plead guilty to the violation with which you are charged." Standing Committee Minutes. Although the addition of section 39-20-04(2), NDCC, provided a driver with an alternative to revocation under section 39-20-04(1), NDCC, the amendment did not alter our interpretation of when a driver is subject to section 39-20-04, NDCC, i.e., when a driver has refused to submit to testing and has failed to subsequently cure that refusal.

This approach reaches even to striking the enactment clause of the new statute, and the effect is to reinstate the prior statute. In addition to the cases and the annotations cited in the majority opinion, I would call attention to Clark County, By and Through Bd. of City Comm'rs v. City of Las Vegas, By and Through Bd. of City Comm'rs, 97 Nev. 260, 628 P.2d 1120 (1981); Clark v. State, 287 A.2d 660 (Del. 1972), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 812, 93 S.Ct. 139, 34 L.Ed.2d 67 (1972); Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1952); State v. Greenburg, 187 Neb. 149, 187 N.W.2d 751 (1971); State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168 (N.D. 1985); State ex rel. Thornton v. Wannamaker, 248 S.C. 421, 150 S.E.2d 607 (1966); State ex rel. Dieringer v. Bachman, 131 W. Va. 562, 48 S.E.2d 420 (1948). None of these cases, however, address the instance in which an entire codification, such as our workers' compensation act, is purportedly repealed and amended and re-enacted.

A statute found to be unconstitutional is void from its beginning and is to be treated as if it never existed. State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168 (N.D. 1985). McGuire v. C L Restaurant Inc., 346 N.W.2d 605 (Minn. 1984); Briggs v. Campbell, Wyant Cannon Foundry, 379 Mich. 160, 150 N.W.2d 752 (1967).