"[W]hen legislation that is enacted to repeal, amend or otherwise modify an existing statute, is declared unconstitutional, it is a nullity and . . . the extant statute remains operative without regard to the unsuccessful and invalid legislation." State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168, 169 (N.D. 1985).
Numerous states explicitly have applied the same principle of law to revive the language of criminal statutes purportedly superseded by an unconstitutional enactment. E.g., State v. Bloss, 64 Haw. 148, 637 P.2d 117 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 824, 103 S.Ct. 56, 74 L.Ed.2d 60 (1982); State v. Clayton, 233 La. 972, 99 So.2d 312 (1957); State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168 (N.D. 1985); State v. Driver, 598 S.W.2d 774 (Tenn. 1980); see Clark v. State, 287 A.2d 660 (Del.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 812, 93 S.Ct. 139, 34 L.Ed.2d 67 (1972). Other states likewise have applied the same principle in the context of matters directly related to the enforcement of criminal laws, including procedural concerns and forfeiture proceedings.
Unconstitutional legislation is void and is to be treated as if it never existed. State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168 (N.D. 1985). An unconstitutional statute is just as inoperative as if it had never been enacted.
Theodore Wilt and Duaine C. Altman were convicted of issuing checks without sufficient funds in violation of North Dakota Century Code ยง 6-08-16. Both Wilt and Altman challenge the validity of their convictions on the very grounds recently rejected by this Court in State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168 (N.D. 1985). These challenges therefore are without merit and warrant no further discussion.
Numerous states have explicitly applied the same rule of law to revive criminal statutes temporarily superceded by unconstitutional language. See, e.g., State v. Bloss, 637 P.2d 1117, 1130 (Haw. 1981) (unconstitutional criminal ordinance regulating commercial speech reinstated predecessor ordinance), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 824, 103 S.Ct. 56 (1982); B.H. v. State, 645 So.2d 987, 996 (Fla. 1994) (juvenile criminal conviction under a revived statute is not violative of due process), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1132, 115 S.Ct. 2559 (1995); State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168, 169 (N.D. 1985) (unconstitutional amendment to a "bad check" statute revived the predecessor statute); State v. Driver, 598 S.W.2d 774, 776 (Tenn. 1980) (unconstitutional amendment to a securities fraud statute left the former act in "full force and effect"); Clark v. State, 287 A.2d 660, 664 (Del. 1972) (conviction under a valid predecessor statute affirmed where a subsequent amendment was declared unconstitutional), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 812, 93 S.Ct. 139 (1972); State v. Clayton, 99 So.2d 312, 315 (La. 1957) (unconstitutional penalty provision pertaining to the issuance of worthless checks revived the predecessor penalty provision).