The effect of an invalid amendment on the prior statute was clearly answered in State v. Reed, 75 S.D. 300, 303, 63 N.W.2d 803, 804 (1954) wherein this Court stated, "[i]f such amendatory act is unconstitutional in its entirety, the law prior to its enactment is still in effect." The basis for this rationale was set forth in State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168, 169 (N.D. 1985) which we cited with approval in Weegar v. Bakeberg, 527 N.W.2d 676, 678 (S.D. 1995). The Clark Court held:

[¶ 19] "[U]nconstitutional legislation is void and is to be treated as if it never were enacted." State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168, 169 (N.D. 1985). When legislation "modify[ing] an existing statute is declared unconstitutional, it is a nullity and cannot affect the existing statute in any manner.

Numerous states explicitly have applied the same principle of law to revive the language of criminal statutes purportedly superseded by an unconstitutional enactment. E.g., State v. Bloss, 64 Haw. 148, 637 P.2d 117 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 824, 103 S.Ct. 56, 74 L.Ed.2d 60 (1982); State v. Clayton, 233 La. 972, 99 So.2d 312 (1957); State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168 (N.D. 1985); State v. Driver, 598 S.W.2d 774 (Tenn. 1980); see Clark v. State, 287 A.2d 660 (Del.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 812, 93 S.Ct. 139, 34 L.Ed.2d 67 (1972). Other states likewise have applied the same principle in the context of matters directly related to the enforcement of criminal laws, including procedural concerns and forfeiture proceedings.

Unconstitutional legislation is void and is to be treated as if it never existed. State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168 (N.D. 1985). An unconstitutional statute is just as inoperative as if it had never been enacted.

Numerous states have explicitly applied the same rule of law to revive criminal statutes temporarily superceded by unconstitutional language. See, e.g., State v. Bloss, 637 P.2d 1117, 1130 (Haw. 1981) (unconstitutional criminal ordinance regulating commercial speech reinstated predecessor ordinance), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 824, 103 S.Ct. 56 (1982); B.H. v. State, 645 So.2d 987, 996 (Fla. 1994) (juvenile criminal conviction under a revived statute is not violative of due process), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1132, 115 S.Ct. 2559 (1995); State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168, 169 (N.D. 1985) (unconstitutional amendment to a "bad check" statute revived the predecessor statute); State v. Driver, 598 S.W.2d 774, 776 (Tenn. 1980) (unconstitutional amendment to a securities fraud statute left the former act in "full force and effect"); Clark v. State, 287 A.2d 660, 664 (Del. 1972) (conviction under a valid predecessor statute affirmed where a subsequent amendment was declared unconstitutional), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 812, 93 S.Ct. 139 (1972); State v. Clayton, 99 So.2d 312, 315 (La. 1957) (unconstitutional penalty provision pertaining to the issuance of worthless checks revived the predecessor penalty provision).