Opinion
No. COA14–637.
03-17-2015
STATE of North Carolina v. Trumaine Jabbar CLARK, Defendant.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Roberta A. Ouellette, for the State. William D. Spence, for Defendant–Appellant.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Roberta A. Ouellette, for the State.
William D. Spence, for Defendant–Appellant.
McGEE, Chief Judge.
Trumaine Jabbar Clark (“Defendant”) appeals from a judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of the Class H felony offense of breaking or entering. We find no error.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
The evidence presented at trial tended to show that Eunetta Nicole Whitaker (“Ms.Whitaker”) left her apartment on Cedar Street in Rocky Mount, North Carolina, to go to work around 6:30 a.m. on 12 June 2012. Ms. Whitaker's three children with whom she shared the apartment had left earlier that morning. Ms. Whitaker's godmother, Tracy L. Thigpen (“Ms.Thigpen”), who also lived with her, had spent the previous night at a friend's house. When Ms. Whitaker left her apartment that morning, she locked the doors behind her.
When Ms. Whitaker returned home from work at about 4:30 p.m. later that same day, she found the back door to her apartment ajar and observed that the window above the sink in her kitchen, which was located at the rear of the apartment, was raised, and the screen covering the window was “out.” According to Ms. Whitaker, the screen had been covering the window when she left the house earlier in the morning and, in the seven years she had been living in the Cedar Street apartment, she had never personally removed the screen from the kitchen window, nor had she seen it being removed from the window. Additionally, Ms. Whitaker “could tell that somebody had been in [her apartment]” and that “[s]omebody had [come] through the window,” because the shelf just below the window and above the sink, that held the dish detergent and sponge, was broken. Upon further inspection, she discovered that two flat screen televisions were missing—a 42–inch television from the downstairs living room that belonged to Ms. Thigpen, and a 32–inch television from the upstairs bedroom. Ms. Whitaker then called Ms. Thigpen and contacted the police.
Senior Officer David Christman (“Officer Christman”) with the Rocky Mount Police Department received a call reporting a residential burglary on the evening of 12 June 2012. When Officer Christman arrived at the scene, he observed that a window screen was laying on the ground below the rear kitchen window. Officer Christman dusted the interior and exterior of the kitchen window for fingerprints and collected four fingerprint samples from the area.
Crime Scene Investigator Scott Dew (“Investigator Dew”) examined the latent prints collected by Officer Christman, and determined that one of the four prints collected was a partial palm print and had sufficient qualities to conduct a comparison against the database in the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (“AFIS”). AFIS returned results indicating that it contained ten possible matches to the partial palm print retrieved by Officer Christman at the scene. After examining the partial palm print collected by Officer Christman against the ten AFIS samples, Investigator Dew determined that the print collected at the scene matched Defendant. Investigator Dew further observed that there were no “little square impressions from the window screen in th[e] latent print,” which would have been present “if the screen was pushed up again[st] the window and ... the hand was on the outside of the screen and pushed up against the window where [Defendant's] print was lifted from.” Thus, Investigator Dew determined that the partial palm print, which was found on the exterior glass of the rear kitchen window, was not made throughthe window screen, but was made directly against the exterior window. Officer Gary Clinton Wester (“Officer Wester”), who had extensive experience analyzing fingerprints and who supervised officers conducting these analyses, also examined the latent print collected at the scene with Defendant's print from AFIS, and concluded that the partial palm print from the scene was “identical” to Defendant's print.
Corporal William Mayfield (“Corporal Mayfield”) with the Rocky Mount Police Department was notified of the results of Investigator Dew's fingerprint analysis. Corporal Mayfield then advised Ms. Whitaker that he “had information about a possible suspect.” Ms. Whitaker told Corporal Mayfield that she did not know Defendant, but that she knew of him. Ms. Whitaker further stated that Defendant “had no reason to be at her residence or [his] fingerprints anywhere near her residence,” but testified that it was possible that Defendant was in Ms. Whitaker's apartment as a guest of one of her family members when she was not at home.
Corporal Mayfield served Defendant with an arrest warrant for the offenses of felonious breaking or entering and felonious larceny after breaking or entering and, after informing Defendant of his Mirandarights, questioned Defendant about the charges. Defendant informed Corporal Mayfield that “he didn't know where Cedar Street was” and that “he hadn't broken into anybody's house.” The two televisions were never recovered.
Defendant was indicted for the offenses of felonious breaking or entering and felonious larceny after breaking or entering. At trial, Defendant presented no evidence and moved to dismiss the charges at the close of the State's evidence and at the close of all of the evidence. Defendant's motions were denied. Defendant was found guilty by a jury of felonious breaking or entering; the jury found Defendant not guilty of felonious larceny after breaking or entering. The trial court determined that Defendant was a prior record level IV offender and sentenced Defendant to a term of eleven to twenty-three months' imprisonment. Defendant appeals.
II. Analysis
A. Motions to Dismiss
Defendant first contends the trial court erred by denying his motions to dismiss the charge of felonious breaking or entering because Defendant asserts there was insufficient evidence that he was the perpetrator of the offense or that he entered the apartment with the intent to commit a larceny therein. We disagree.
“Upon defendant's motion for dismissal, the question for the Court is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of defendant's being the perpetrator of such offense. If so, the motion is properly denied.” State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78–79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980). “If the evidence is sufficient only to raise a suspicion or conjecture as to either the commission of the offense or the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of it, the motion should be allowed[,] ... even though the suspicion so aroused by the evidence is strong.” Powell, 299 N.C. at 98, 261 S.E.2d at 117. “The trial court in considering such motions is concerned only with the sufficiency of the evidence to carry the case to the jury and not with its weight.” Id.at 99, 261 S.E.2d at 117. “The trial court's function is to test whether a reasonable inferenceof the defendant's guilt of the crime charged may be drawn from the evidence.” Id.“When the motion ... calls into question the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, the question for the Court is whether a reasonable inference of defendant's guilt may be drawn from the circumstances.” Id.(omission in original). “If so, it is for the jury to decide whether the facts, taken singly or in combination, satisfy them beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is actually guilty.” Id.“[A]ll of the evidence, whether competent or incompetent, must be considered in the light most favorable to the [S]tate, and the [S]tate is entitled to every reasonable inference therefrom.” Smith, 300 N.C. at 78, 265 S.E .2d at 169.
1. Identity of Defendant as Perpetrator of the Crime
“[T]he testimony of a fingerprint expert is competent as evidence tending to show that [a] defendant was present when the crime was committed and that he at least participated in its commission.” State v. Irick, 291 N.C. 480, 489, 231 S.E.2d 833, 839 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, in a case involving fingerprint evidence, a motion for dismissal is properly denied “if, in addition to testimony by a qualified expert that the fingerprints at the scene of the crime match those of the accused, there is substantial evidence of circumstances from which a jury could find that the fingerprints were impressed at the time the crime was committed.” State v. Bradley, 65 N.C.App. 359, 362, 309 S.E.2d 510, 512 (1983). “Circumstantial evidence that the fingerprint could only have been impressed at the time the crime was committed comes in several different forms.” State v. Scott, 296 N.C. 519, 523, 251 S.E.2d 414, 417 (1979). “In a number of cases the evidence has consisted in part of denials by the defendant that he was ever on the premises where the crime occurred.” Id.“In others the occupant of the premises, who might reasonably be expected to have seen the defendant had he ever been there lawfully, has been able to testify that he had never given the defendant permission to come on the premises or seen him there before the commission of the crime.” Id.“This kind of evidence is particularly convincing when the scene of the crime is a private residence not accessible to the general public.” Id.“In other cases the circumstantial evidence has consisted of an identification of the defendant, the discovery of the fruits of the crime in his possession, and the establishment of a link between the defendant and the tools used in the commission of the crime” Id.(citations omitted). “The form of the evidence is immaterial so long as it substantially demonstrates that the fingerprint could have been placed at the scene only at the time the crime was committed.” Id.
In the present case, although Ms. Whitaker testified that she had never invited Defendant to her apartment and had never seen Defendant in her home, she conceded that it could have been possible that Defendant was invited into her home by a member of her family on some occasion. Nonetheless, the partial palm print recovered by Officer Christman from the exterior glass of the rear kitchen window, which print belonged to Defendant, did not contain any “voids” or “little square impressions” that would have been present if, at the time Defendant left the print, the screen was affixed to the exterior of the house. Ms. Whitaker testified that, in the seven years she had lived in the Cedar Street apartment, she had never removed the screen from the window, and had never seen it being removed from the window. She testified that the public housing complex in which her apartment was located was “very strict about—it's their apartments. It's [public] housing, so we can't do things and we do have to have a reason why or they'll ride by and see and come and question us and so forth or whatever.” Ms. Whitaker also testified that, on one occasion, her son tried to remove the screen from the rear kitchen window but “said he couldn't get the screen off.” Ms. Whitaker's godmother, Ms. Thigpen, then testified that, during the seven years that Ms. Whitaker had been living in the Cedar Street apartment, “[t]he screens [we]re always in the window.” Thus, the evidence established that Defendant left his palm print directly on the exterior of Ms. Whitaker's rear kitchen window between the hours of 6:30 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. on 12 June 2012, which is the only day in seven years that the window screen had been removed from Ms. Whitaker's kitchen window, and is the same day that two flat screen televisions were taken from Ms. Whitaker's home. Therefore, we conclude that “there is substantial evidence of circumstances from which a jury could find that [Defendant's palm print was] ... impressed at the time the crime was committed,” see Bradley, 65 N.C.App. at 362, 309 S.E.2d at 512, and that Defendant was the perpetrator of the offense of felonious breaking or entering.
2. Intent to Commit Larceny
“To support a conviction for felonious breaking and entering under G.S. § 14–54(a), there must exist substantial evidence of each of the following elements: (1) the breaking or entering, (2) of any building, (3) with the intent to commit any felony or larceny therein.” State v. Walton, 90 N.C.App. 532, 533, 369 S.E.2d 101, 103 (1988). “An essential element of the crime is that the intent exist at the time of the breaking or entering.” State v. Hill, 38 N.C.App. 75, 78, 247 S.E.2d 295, 297 (1978). “ ‘Intent ... is a mental attitude, which seldom can be proved by direct evidence, but must ordinarily be proved by circumstances from which it may be inferred[.]” Id.at 79, 247 S.E.2d at 297 (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, “[t]he fact that the evidence is circumstantial does not make it insufficient.” Id.(“The test for going to the jury on circumstantial evidence is whether there is substantial evidence against the accused of every essential element that goes to make up the offense charged.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Moreover, “[e]vidence of missing items after a breaking or entering can be sufficient to prove intent to commit a larceny and dispose of the necessity to instruct on misdemeanor breaking and entering.” State v. Northington,–––N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 749 S.E.2d 925, 928 (2013), appeal dismissed,367 N.C. 331, 755 S.E.2d 622 (2014). Additionally, even when “all the evidence show[s is that] a television set ha[s only] been moved from the den to the front door” of a house, this Court has determined that such evidence is sufficient to demonstrate “that whoever broke into [the] house intended to take the television set” and, thus, to establish intent and support an instruction on felonious breaking or entering. State v. Berry, 58 N.C.App. 355, 358, 293 S.E.2d 650, 652 (1982), aff'd per curiam,307 N.C. 463, 298 S.E.2d 386 (1983).
In the present case, Defendant asserts there was insufficient evidence that he entered Ms. Whitaker's apartment with an intent to take anything, particularly because no evidence was presented to establish a connection between Defendant and the flat screen televisions that were taken. Nevertheless, we conclude that the evidence discussed above of Defendant's palm print on Ms. Whitaker's rear kitchen window, along with the evidence that two flat screen televisions had been removed from Ms. Whitaker's home on the day that Defendant left the print, was sufficient to establish that Defendant intended to commit a larceny at the time of the breaking or entering into Ms. Whitaker's apartment and, thus, sufficient to submit the charge of felonious breaking or entering to the jury. Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err when it denied Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of felonious breaking or entering.
B. Challenge to Failure to Instruct on Misdemeanor Breaking or Entering
Defendant next asserts the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the offense of misdemeanor breaking or entering. We disagree.
“An instruction on a lesser included offense must be given, even without a request from defendant, only if there is evidence to support his conviction of the less grievous offense.” State v. Hamilton, 132 N.C.App. 316, 321, 512 S.E.2d 80, 84 (1999) ; see also State v. Millsaps, 356 N.C. 556, 561, 572 S.E.2d 767, 771 (2002) (“An instruction on a lesser-included offense must be given only if the evidence would permit the jury rationally to find defendant guilty of the lesser offense and to acquit him of the greater.”). “The trial court is not, however, obligated to give a lesser included instruction if there is no evidence giving rise to a reasonable inference to dispute the State's contention.” Hamilton, 132 N.C.App. at 321, 512 S.E.2d at 84 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The mere possibility that a jury might reject part of the prosecution's evidence does not require submission of a lesser included offense.” Id.Additionally, “[t]he lesser included offense of misdemeanor breaking and entering must be submitted to the jury if there is substantial evidence the defendant broke and entered for some non-felonious reason other than that alleged in the indictment.” State v. Merritt, 120 N.C.App. 732, 743, 463 S.E.2d 590, 596 (1995), disc. review denied, 342 N.C. 897, 467 S.E.2d 738 (1996).
In the present case, “Defendant did not testify or present any evidence that he broke or entered [into Ms. Whitaker's apartment] for any non-felonious purpose.” See Hamilton, 132 N.C.App. at 321, 512 S.E.2d at 85. “The indictment alleges larceny, and no other explanation was given for the unauthorized entry into [Ms. Whitaker's residence].” See id.at 321–22, 512 S.E.2d at 85. Thus, the trial court “need not submit misdemeanor breaking or entering instructions on these facts.” See id.at 322, 512 S.E.2d at 85. Furthermore, as we determined above, two flat screen televisions were missing from Ms. Whitaker's apartment, which is “sufficient [evidence] to prove intent to commit a larceny[,] and dispose[d] of the necessity to instruct on misdemeanor breaking and entering.” See Northington,––– N.C.App. at ––––, 749 S.E.2d at 928. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court was not required to instruct the jury on the offense of misdemeanor breaking or entering.
C. Challenge to Consistency of Jury Verdicts
Defendant next contends the trial court should have set aside the jury's guilty verdict on the charge of felonious breaking or entering because it was inconsistent with, andcontradictory to, the jury's not guilty verdict on the charge of felonious larceny after breaking or entering. We disagree.
Inconsistent verdicts “present a situation where error, in the sense that the jury has not followed the court's instructions [as a result of the jury's mistake, compromise, or lenity], most certainly has occurred, but it is unclear whose ox has been gored.”State v.. Mumford, 364 N.C. 394, 399–400, 699 S.E.2d 911, 915 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Inconsistent verdicts “[ar]e permissible, and not found to be legally contradictory, as long as there [i]s sufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict.” Id .at 398, 400, 699 S.E.2d at 914–15 (“It is firmly established that when there is sufficient evidence to support a verdict, mere inconsistency will not invalidate the verdict.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The outcome is “different when a jury returns a mutually exclusive verdict. Verdicts are mutually exclusive when a verdict purports to establish that the [defendant] is guilty of two separate and distinct criminal offenses, the nature of which is such that guilt of one necessarily excludes guilt of the other.” Id.at 400, 699 S.E.2d at 915 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “when a verdict is inconsistent andcontradictory, a defendant is entitled to relief.” Id.at 398, 699 S.E.2d at 914 (emphasis added). However, “[i]f two statutes are violated, even by a single act, and each offense requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the one statute.” State v. Brown, 308 N.C. 181, 184, 301 S.E.2d 89, 91 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled on other grounds by State v. Parker, 315 N.C. 222, 337 S.E.2d 487 (1985).
Our Supreme Court has held that a “not guilty verdict on [a] felonious larceny charge is not inconsistent with [a] guilty verdict on felonious breaking or entering ... because [these verdicts] involve two separate and distinct crimes.” Id.(citation omitted). “The crime of larceny has an element not present in the crime of felonious breaking or entering, to wit a wrongful taking and carrying away of the personal property of another.” Id.“As a result[,] it is not inconsistent for the jury to determine that [a] defendant entered ... [a] home with the intent to commit larceny[,] yet find that no larceny was in fact committed.” Id.; see also State v. Sawyer, 283 N.C. 289, 298, 196 S.E.2d 250, 255 (1973) (“[A defendant's] criminal conduct is not determinable on the basis of the success of his felonious venture.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In the present case, as we discussed above, the State presented sufficient evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict on the charge of felonious breaking or entering. Because the jury's guilty verdict on the charge of felonious breaking or entering is neither inconsistent with, nor contradictory to, the jury's not guilty verdict on the charge of felonious larceny after breaking or entering, we overrule this issue on appeal.
D. Challenge to Prosecutor's Closing Argument as “Grossly Improper”
Finally, Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to intervene ex mero motuwhen the prosecutor made the following statement at the end of his closing argument:
I think finally I just want to remind you that people are tired of homes and business being broken into. And they have a right to be. And you have a right to be tired of it too. And today, you have an opportunity to do just a little something about it. Want [sic] you? Thank you.
Defendant argues that the prosecutor's remarks were “grossly improper” and “so infected the trial with unfairness that they rendered the conviction fundamentally unfair.”
“The power and effectiveness of a closing argument is a vital part of the adversarial process that forms the basis of our justice system.”State v. Jones, 355 N.C. 117, 135, 558 S.E.2d 97, 108 (2002). However, such argument, no matter how effective, “must: (1) be devoid of counsel's personal opinion; (2) avoid name-calling and/or references to matters beyond the record; (3) be premised on logical deductions, not on appeals to passion or prejudice; and (4) be constructed from fair inferences drawn only from evidence properly admitted at trial.” Id.
Thus, while “prosecutors are given wide latitude in the scope of their argument,” State v. Alston, 341 N.C. 198, 239, 461 S.E.2d 687, 709 (1995), cert. denied,516 U.S. 1148, 134 L.Ed.2d 100 (1996), “counsel may not place before the jury incompetent and prejudicial matters by injecting his own knowledge, beliefs and personal opinions not supported by the evidence.” Id.(internal quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, “only an extreme impropriety on the part of the prosecutor will compel this Court to hold that the trial judge abused his discretion in not recognizing and correcting ex mero motuan argument that defense counsel apparently did not believe was prejudicial when originally spoken.” State v. Richardson, 342 N.C. 772, 786, 467 S.E.2d 685, 693, cert. denied,519 U.S. 890, 136 L.Ed.2d 160 (1996). “In order to determine whether [a] prosecutor's remarks are grossly improper, the remarks must be viewed in context and in light of the overall factual circumstances to which they refer.” Alston, 341 N.C. at 239, 461 S.E.2d at 709. A defendant “must show that the prosecutor's comments so infected the trial with unfairness that they rendered the conviction fundamentally unfair.” State v. Davis, 349 N.C. 1, 23, 506 S.E.2d 455, 467 (1998), cert. denied,526 U.S. 1161, 144 L.Ed.2d 219 (1999).
Additionally, “[i]t is not ... improper [for a prosecutor] to remind the jurors that they are the voice and conscience of the community.” State v. McNeil, 350 N.C. 657, 687–88, 518 S.E.2d 486, 505 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied,529 U.S. 1024, 146 L.Ed.2d 321 (2000). “Permitting the jury to act as the voice and conscience of the community is required because the very reason for the jury system is to temper the harshness of the law with the commonsense judgment of the community.” State v. Scott, 314 N.C. 309, 311–12, 333 S.E.2d 296, 298 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, “a prosecutor may argue that the jury should use its verdict to ‘send a message’ to the community.” State v. Harris,–––N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 763 S.E.2d 302, 311–12 (2014). However, a prosecutor “cannot encourage the jury to lend an ear to the community. In other words, the jury may speak for the community, but the community cannot speak to the jury.” State v. Barden, 356 N.C. 316, 367, 572 S.E.2d 108, 140 (2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied,538 U.S. 1040, 155 L.Ed.2d 1074 (2003).
In the present case, Defendant asserts that the prosecutor improperly invited the jury “to convict [D]efendant based on public sentiment against crime in general and unlawful break-ins specifically, rather than on the evidence properly presented to [it] at trial.” Defendant urges that the prosecutor's remarks in this case were like those of the prosecutor in State v. Scott, 314 N.C. 309, 333 S.E.2d 296 (1985), in which a defendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter and driving under the influence of alcohol and the prosecutor made the following remarks to the jury during his closing argument:
Now, we often hear, we often read in the paper or hear on television or anything else, something that happens, there's a lot of public sentiment at this point against driving and drinking, causing accidents on the highway. And, you know, you read these things and you hear these things and you think to yourself, “My God, they ought to do something about that.”
....
Well, ladies and gentlemen, the buck stops here. You twelve judges in Cumberland County have become the “they”.
Scott, 314 N.C. at 310–11, 333 S.E.2d at 296–97 (omission in original). Upon review, our Supreme Court determined that “[t]he impropriety of the prosecutor's argument ... d[id] not arise from his having told the jury that ‘the buck stops here’ or that the jurors had become ‘judges' in the case or had ‘become the ‘they,” “ id.at 311, 333 S.E.2d at 297, because “[t]hese statements correctly informed the jury that for purposes of the defendant's trial, the jury had become the representatives of the community.” Id.Instead, the Court determined that the prosecutor “fell into improper argument” when he “emphasized to the jury that ‘there's a lot of public sentiment at this point against driving and drinking, causing accidents on the highway [,]’ ... because [such argument] went outside the record and appealed to the jury to convict the defendant because impaired drivers had caused other accidents.” Id.at 312, 333 S.E.2d at 298. The Court concluded that “such statements could only be construed as telling the jury that the citizens of the community sought and demanded conviction and punishment of the defendant,” id.,and were thus improper because “such statements amount[ed] to an invitation to ignore the evidence and to hark to a pack already hot on the trail and in full cry.” Id.Since the case “was hotly contested at trial” and the defendant “offered evidence through his own testimony and that of others tending to rebut almost every element of the crimes for which he was tried,” id.at 313–14, 333 S.E.2d at 299, the Court concluded that it was “entirely possible that the improper argument of the prosecutor made a difference in the result reached by the jury,” and so ordered that the defendant be granted a new trial. Id.at 314, 333 S.E.2d at 299.
In the present case, we agree that the prosecutor “would have been better advised to have refrained from making some of the comments to which [Defendant] has directed our attention.” See State v. Privette, 218 N.C.App. 459, 470, 721 S.E.2d 299, 308, disc. review denied,365 N.C. 566, 724 S.E.2d 532 (2012). However, we conclude that the remarks at issue in the present case are analogous to the “the buck stops here” remarks by the prosecutor in Scott,which our Supreme Court determined “correctly informed the jury that ... the jury had become the representatives of the community.” See Scott, 314 N.C. at 311, 333 S.E.2d at 297 ; see also Harris,––– N.C.App. at ––––, 763 S .E.2d at 311–12 (“[A] prosecutor may argue that the jury should use its verdict to ‘send a message’ to the community.”). Moreover, even if we were to determine that such comments were improper, unlike the record in Scott,the record before us contains sufficient, uncontested evidence that Defendant entered Ms. Whitaker's apartment with the intent to commit a larceny therein. Accordingly, we conclude that “any impropriety in the challenged portion[ ] of the prosecutor's closing argument did not render [Defendant's] trial fundamentally unfair.” See Privette, 218 N.C.App. at 470, 721 S.E.2d at 308.
No error.
Judges STEPHENS and DIETZ concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
Opinion
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 15 November 2013 by Judge Quentin T. Sumner in Superior Court, Nash County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 October 2014.