Opinion
A-3277-20
07-17-2023
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. STANLEY CLAIBORNE, a/k/a STANLEY CLAIBORNE, JR., and STANLEY CLAIRBORN, Defendant-Appellant.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Adalgiza A. Nunez, and Zachary G. Markarian, Assistant Deputy Public Defenders, of counsel and on the briefs). Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Patrick F. Galdieri, II, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
Submitted May 15, 2023
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Indictment Nos. 19-121876 and 19-12-1881.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Adalgiza A. Nunez, and Zachary G. Markarian, Assistant Deputy Public Defenders, of counsel and on the briefs).
Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Patrick F. Galdieri, II, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
Before Judges Mawla and Walcott-Henderson.
PER CURIAM
Defendant Stanley Claiborne, Jr. appeals from a May 24, 2021 judgment of conviction (JOC) for manufacturing and distributing controlled dangerous substances (CDS). We affirm.
Defendant raises the following issues on appeal.
POINT I: EVIDENCE SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE POLICE DECISION TO STOP [DEFENDANT] FOR JAYWALKING WAS IMPERMISSIBLY BASED ON RACE AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE BURDEN SHIFTING TEST FROM STATE V. SEGARS[, 172 N.J. 481 (2002),] AND STATE V. MARYLAND [, 167 N.J. 471 (2001),] TO [DEFENDANT]'S CLAIM OF RACIAL TARGETING BY OFFICER SOTO.
B. IF THE COURT HAD APPLIED THE CORRECT LEGAL STANDARD, IT WOULD HAVE FOUND THE STOP WAS UNLAWFULLY MOTIVATED BY RACE.
C. BECAUSE NO EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE APPLIES,
THE EVIDENCE MUST BE SUPPRESSED.
POINT II: EVIDENCE SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE [DEFENDANT]'S ACTIONS AT THE CONRAIL STATION DID NOT ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST.
There are two separate arrests at issue in this appeal. First, on August 27, 2019, defendant was arrested for jaywalking. There is no dispute Officer Jonathan Soto observed defendant and another male identified as Joshua Jackson crossing a street in Perth Amboy at approximately 9:45 p.m. without using the crosswalk. Officer Soto radioed for backup and other units responded to the scene. At the motion to suppress hearing, Officer Soto testified he called for backup because he was too far away from defendant and Jackson and "did not want to scare them given the distance." Officer Raymond Arce first responded to the scene and attempted to initiate a stop but only Jackson complied with the officer's instructions to stop. Defendant continued walking, crossed the street and proceeded up the driveway of a private residence. Officer Soto observed defendant turn into the driveway and advised the officers of defendant's location. Another officer, Juan Upia-Torres, arrived in front of the driveway where defendant was walking. He testified he saw Officer Soto point at defendant, prompting him to exit his vehicle and yell at defendant to stop. However, defendant continued walking towards the driveway. Officer Upia-Torres followed defendant into the backyard of the residence and observed him throw his backpack into the yard. According to Officer Upia-Torres, defendant became aggressive and was eventually placed in a compliance hold. When Officer Soto arrived shortly thereafter, defendant was placed in handcuffs.
Officer Soto testified he then went to retrieve the backpack, which matched the colors of the backpack defendant was carrying when he observed him earlier that evening. It was at that time that he noticed the strong, distinct odor of marijuana emanating from the bag, which prompted him to search its contents. At the suppression hearing, Officer Soto testified he found a small clear plastic bag with marijuana and several glassine envelopes containing what he believed to be heroin and a pill bottle with what he believed to be Oxycodone pills. Defendant was subsequently issued a summons for failure to use a crosswalk and was arrested and charged by way of complaint-warrant.
Defendant argues this stop was racially motivated because officers do not ordinarily initiate stops or arrests for jaywalking. Both defendant and Jackson are Black.
Approximately one month later, defendant was again arrested after another officer observed him at a train station exchanging an item with another man. On September 26, 2019, Detective David Salazar was patrolling in the downtown area of Perth Amboy and at approximately 10 p.m., he observed an individual, later identified as John Seaman, and defendant meet and walk together to the end of the Conrail Station platform. Detective Salazar testified he observed Seaman hand money to defendant who then retrieved an item from "his crotch area" and handed it to Seaman. The two men then walked in separate directions. Detective Salazar intercepted and arrested defendant. Detective Salazar testified a search of defendant revealed a clear sandwich bag containing decks of heroin and crack cocaine packed in rice.
"'Decks' of heroin refer to the 'little glassine packets' that contain 'the powdery substance.'" State v. McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. 256, 263 n.1 (2019) (quoting State v. Morrison, 188 N.J. 2, 5 (2006)).
On December 19, 2019, defendant was charged by a Middlesex County grand jury in two separate multi-count indictments. The first indictment charged defendant with third-degree possession of heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1), (count one); third-degree possession of heroin with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(3), (count two); third-degree possession of heroin with intent to distribute in a school zone, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7, (count three); third-degree possession of oxycodone, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1), (count four); and fourth-degree resisting arrest by flight, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(2), (count five).
The second indictment charged defendant with six third-degree offenses, including: possession of heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1), (count one); distribution of heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(3), (count two); possession of heroin with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(3), (count three); possession of cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1), (count four); possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(3), (count five); and financial facilitation of criminal activity, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25(a), (count six).
On February 25, 2020, defendant filed two motions-one in each case- to suppress evidence seized at the time of these arrests. The trial court conducted separate evidentiary hearings on these motions. Judge Pedro J. Jimenez, Jr. rendered an oral opinion denying the motion to suppress as to the second indictment, finding Detective Salazar's testimony, that he believed a narcotics transaction occurred between defendant and Mr. Seaman credible. On February 9, 2021, the judge issued an order and thirteen-page written opinion denying the suppression motion as to the first indictment.
Regarding the first indictment, the judge concluded defendant's refusal to comply with police commands and subsequent attempt to discard his backpack were sufficient to raise police suspicion. The judge found significant that "Claiborne did not merely stand his ground in protesting the officer's commands, he became irate and excitable ...." It was this behavior in which defendant attempted to obstruct a legal stop and discard evidence, which created an intervening circumstance that led to the discovery of drugs within defendant's possession. While the trial court noted the officer's reason for stopping defendant was "imprudent," it was ultimately defendant's noncompliance and aggression, which led to his arrest. Furthermore, the judge concluded defendant's abandonment of his backpack "relinquished his interest in the property in question, [and] he can no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy about it at the time of the search."
State v. Farinich, 179 N.J.Super. 1, 6 (App. Div. 1981), affd o.b., 89 N.J. 378 (1982) (holding, where defendants dropped their suitcases and fled from police officers, "[i]t would . . . be unreasonable to infer anything other than . . . defendants intended to place as much distance between themselves and the suitcases as possible"). Whether property was abandoned "must be deferred to on appellate review if the finding could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record." Ibid.
Defendant pled guilty pursuant to a negotiated agreement with the State, to third-degree possession of heroin with intent to distribute on or within a school zone, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7, and third-degree distribution of heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(3), as charged in count three of the first indictment and count two of the second indictment.
On May 20, 2021, the judge sentenced defendant consistent with the negotiated plea agreement to an aggregate five-year flat prison term and dismissed the remaining counts. Under the second indictment, the judge sentenced defendant to four years imprisonment and ordered the sentence to run concurrent with the first indictment. The municipal violation, N.J.S.A. 39:4-3, for jaywalking was dismissed. Conforming JOCs were entered on May 24, 2021. Defendant appealed from the JOCs and denial of his suppression motions in accordance with Rule 3:5-7(d).
When reviewing a court's grant or denial of a motion to suppress, we "must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Lamb, 218 N.J. 300, 313 (2014). "We accord deference to those factual findings because they 'are substantially influenced by [an] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007)). "Thus, appellate courts should reverse only when the trial court's determination is 'so clearly mistaken "that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction...... Ibid. (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 244). "A trial court's interpretation of the law, however, and the consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference and are reviewed de novo." Ibid.
I.
Defendant contends the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in its analysis of whether Officer Soto engaged in unconstitutional racially targeted enforcement. Specifically, defendant asserts the trial court should not have applied the standard in State v. Smith, 306 N.J.Super. 370 (App. Div. 1997), and State v. Kennedy, 247 N.J.Super. 21 (App. Div. 1991). Instead, defendant argues the trial court should have applied the burden shifting standard in Segars, 172 N.J. at 481. Further, he argues because this standard would have been satisfied, any evidence discovered should have been suppressed. Defendant also sought to bolster his arguments by citing our opinion in State v. Scott, pursuant to Rule 2:6-11(d).
474 N.J.Super. 388 (App. Div. 2023).
We discern no error in the trial court's analysis and remain unpersuaded that Scott commands a reversal. In Scott, we first addressed whether a defendant can establish a prima facie case of discrimination through evidence and inferences that a police dispatcher engaged in impermissible racial targeting. Id. at 406. Scott involved a robbery investigation that began with a description of a perpetrator from a witness, which did not include any reference to race. Id. at 398. However, when the police dispatcher relayed the be-on-the-lookout description to officers, the dispatcher specifically described the robber as a "Black male wearing a dark raincoat." Ibid. Defendant argued the dispatcher's use of race was prejudicial, thus constituting prohibited discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and our State constitutional analogue, Article One, Paragraphs One and Five of the New Jersey Constitution. Id. at 399.
In addition to the substantive question of whether a defendant has presented a prima facie case of discrimination.
In that case, we held "[t]he problem of implicit bias in the context of policing is both real and intolerable." Ibid. And evidence that permits an inference of implicit bias can satisfy a defendant's preliminary obligation to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Segars. Id. at 408. When, as in this case, the evidence supports such an inference, "the burden of production [shifts] onto the [State] to provide a race-neutral explanation ...." Id. at 411.
Here, defendant contends his arrest for jaywalking was impermissibly based upon race and akin to the dispatcher's unsupported racially biased description of the suspect in Scott. He maintains jaywalking would ordinarily be addressed by a "customary warning" from officers, but Officer Soto's response, both in calling for back-up and eventually placing him under arrest, was racially motivated because he saw two Black men walking in the street late at night. He is essentially arguing the court erred by not finding he satisfied the first prong of Segars and shifting the burden to the State to prove otherwise.
The facts here are distinguishable from those in Scott where the dispatcher inexplicably, and without any support from the witness, described the suspect as a Black male. 474 N.J. Super at 401. Here, defendant's sole argument is Officer Soto observed him with another Black male and initiated an unlawful stop. This belies the fact that during the initial stop, defendant was jaywalking in violation of the law, and in the second instance, Detective Salazar observed what he believed to be a drug transaction, which the trial judge found credible.
In Segars, Officer Williams issued defendant "a summons for operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license." 172 N.J. at 484. Throughout the proceedings, defendant maintained the officer "checked his license plates on a Mobile Data Terminal (MDT) because of his race." Ibid. Defendant and Officer Williams stated "radically different" versions of the event. Ibid. However, following testimony, defendant submitted evidence, which supported his version of events and contradicted Officer Williams's testimony. Id. at 487. Despite Officer Williams's testimony being in question, the trial court was satisfied Officer Williams "used the MDT . . . for other than racial purposes." Ibid. Our Supreme Court held:
When a defendant claims that an MDT check was based on his race, he bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case by producing relevant evidence that would support an inference of discriminatory enforcement. If defendant does so, the burden shifts to the State to produce evidence of a race-neutral reason for the check. Ultimately, the defendant bears the burden of proving discriminatory treatment by a preponderance or greater weight of the credible evidence.[Id. at 496 (emphasis added).]
The Court found defendant met his burden of establishing a prima facie case of selective enforcement because:
[defendant]'s additional proof (the Bank of New York records) established that Officer Williams did, in fact, use the automated teller machine one minute before [defendant], checked [defendant]'s plates two minutes after he saw him, and then did not testify accurately about those occurrences. From that evidence, a trier of fact could infer that Officer Williams checked [defendant]'s plates because of his race and testified falsely about what he did because he knew that racial targeting is wrong. Put another way, [defendant] met
his burden of establishing a prima facie case of selective enforcement.
[Id. at 496-97.]Consequently, in Segars, the officer's testimony lacked credibility because it ran counter to actual evidence from the Bank of New York records. Ibid.
After reviewing this record, we concur with the Judge Jimenez's findings that this record lacks evidence to show Officer Soto's actions were based on race. It is well-settled that all persons must obey a police officer's commands to stop even if the stop is unlawful. State v. Crawley, 187 N.J. 440, 458-60 (2006). Indeed, "a standard of objective reasonableness governs the validity of searches and seizures under both our Federal and State Constitutions." State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 104 (2016).
Applying the analysis used in Segars, defendant must first establish a prima facie case of selective enforcement as discussed above. However, on this issue, defendant's arguments about the rarity of arrest for jaywalking, Officer Soto's proffered reasons for the stop, and his supposition that the stop was based upon observations of two Black men are insufficient to meet this burden particularly where, as here, the judge noted "there was little evidence, direct or circumstantial, offered to compel this [c]ourt to find a colorable claim of selective enforcement."
Defendant emphasizes the court's finding that Officer Soto's testimony "could very well be that the alleged jaywalking violation was a pretext to stop two black men for whatever, suspicion the officer may have had . . . Officer Soto's reason for pursuing the matter was unconvincing." However, after hearing the evidence, the judge determined, "[e]ven if imprudent, Officer Soto had a lawful basis for his actions as did Officer Upia-Torres." Essentially, the judge found defendant's actions: jaywalking, ignoring the officers' commands to stop walking, and discarding his backpack in a neighborhood yard established probable cause for his arrest.
Additionally, defendant incorrectly argues the court found the officers' actions were motived by race and the State did not meet its burden of showing an exception to the exclusionary rule. The court made no such finding. Rather, the court found "Officer Soto's reasons for pursuing the matter . . . unconvincing[,] "but went on to say, based on the totality of the circumstances, there was a lawful basis for the officers' actions and "there was sufficient evidence to raise police suspicion." "We 'must uphold the trial court's factual findings . . . so long as those findings are "supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record...... Scott, 474 N.J.Super. at 402-03 (quoting State v. Evans, 235 N.J. 125, 133 (2018)).
In reply, defendant argues, quoting State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 477 (2001), "[a]n officer's action that would be objectively lawful 'is impermissible if it is race based.'" Again, the trial court made no determination the officers' actions were race based, but further context would be beneficial to understand the Court's holding in Maryland. Our Supreme Court held "although a field inquiry may be conducted when the police have not observed the individual approached for questioning in any suspicious activities, such an inquiry is impermissible if it is race based." Ibid. (emphasis added). Here, Officer Soto observed defendant jaywalking, which is not disputed, and the court found this behavior created a reasonable suspicion defendant violated N.J.S.A. 39:4-34.
[P]edestrians shall cross the roadway within a crosswalk or, in the absence of a crosswalk, and where not otherwise prohibited, at right angles to the roadway. . . . [W] here there are no sidewalks or paths provided for pedestrian use, pedestrians shall, when practicable, walk only on the extreme left side of the roadway or its shoulder facing approaching traffic. [N.J.S.A. 39:4-34.]
Based upon these facts, which are adequately supported in the record, we discern no error in the denial of the motion to suppress evidence. Since we have concluded that there was no Segars violation and the initial stop was valid, we need not address defendant's arguments relative to excluding evidence found in his discarded backpack.
II.
Similarly, defendant's arguments with respect to his second arrest and prosecution related to the events at the Conrail Station are unavailing. Defendant was the subject of a narcotics investigation and was observed engaging in a hand-to-hand exchange of CDS. Following the motion hearing, the judge determined that:
[t]he area was well lit that night, and from his location, utilizing binoculars [Detective Salazar] was able to see at some point in time . . . defendant and a gentleman he recognized as . . . Seaman . . . meet up. He watched the two of them proceed to walk away, about a hundred to 150 feet from where they had originally met up, and observed the two of them engage in what Detective Salazar described as a hand[-]to-hand transaction between the two, where specifically . . . Seaman provided . . . defendant with an unidentified amount of U.S. currency, at which point . . . defendant took the currency in his hand, then looked around briefly, reached into his crotch area, and retrieved a bag, manipulated the bag, and retrieved a small item from that bag which he then turned over to . . . Seaman, at which point then they parted ways.
....
. . . The officer had probable cause to believe he witnessed a hand-to-hand transaction, went in to make the arrest, searched the individual incident to the arrest,
found the drugs. Plain and simple. Based on his experience, credible assessment, such that this [c]ourt finds, . . . there was probable cause to arrest the defendant. There was a basis to search . . . defendant incident to the arrest. The CDS found is valid and in a constitutionally permissible fashion, leading me to conclude that . . . defendant's motion to suppress the evidence is denied.
We similarly reject defendant's argument the judge erred by finding Detective Salazar had probable cause to arrest him. "Although probable cause 'eludes [a] precise definition,' it is generally understood to mean 'less than legal evidence necessary to convict though more than mere naked suspicion.'" State v. Gathers, 234 N.J. 208, 220 (2018) (quoting State v. Keyes, 184 N.J. 541, 553 (2005)). It is this "flexible nature of probable cause and . . . the deference shown to issuing courts[,]" State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 217 (2001), which guides us to "balanc[e] 'the governmental need for enforcement of the criminal law against the citizens' constitutionally protected right of privacy.'" Keyes, 184 N.J. at 553-54 (quoting State v. Kasabucki, 52 N.J. 110, 116 (1968)). "Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within . . . [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed." State v. Moore, 181 N.J. 40, 46 (2004) (alterations in original) (quoting Schneider v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 336, 361 (2000), certif. denied, 531 U.S. 1146 (2001)). Upon review, "we need decide only whether the facts found by the trial court provided probable cause to arrest defendant." Id. at 45.
Based on our review of the record, Detective Salazar's extensive experience as a narcotics officer and his observations of a hand-to-hand exchange of money for suspected drugs was sufficient to establish probable cause. Thus, the judge correctly found, "[b]ased upon these facts, the police then had the proper level of suspicion to approach and search defendant as incident to his ensuing arrest pursuant to probable cause."
Because our review of a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress is limited, we discern no error in the court's denial of defendant's motion. We therefore conclude Judge Jimenez's factual findings are fully supported by the record, and his legal conclusions are unassailable for the reasons expressed in his well-reasoned opinion.
Affirm.