State v. City of Del Rio

7 Citing cases

  1. Ohmes v. General Tel. Co. of Southwest

    384 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964)   Cited 3 times

    The ordinance having been passed without authority on the part of the City of Perryton is void, and the attempted enforcement of such ordinance is an invasion of the property rights of the telephone company and can be enjoined. Goar v. City of Rosenberg, 53 Tex.Civ.App. 218, 115 S.W. 653; City of Brownwood v. Brown Telegraph & Telephone Co., 106 Tex. 114, 157 S.W. 1163; State ex rel. Brauer v. City of Del Rio, (Tex.Civ.App.), 92 S.W.2d 287. Being of the opinion the record reveals no reversible error and that the judgment entered by the trial court was correct under the pleadings and evidence, such judgment is affirmed.

  2. Ellis v. State

    383 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964)   Cited 10 times

    Gray County Production Co. v. Christian, Tex.Civ.App., 231 S.W.2d 901, no wr. hist.; Ewing v. State, 81 Tex. 172, 16 S.W. 872; State ex rel. Thornhill v. Huntsaker, Tex.Civ.App., 17 S.W.2d 63, no wr. hist.; State ex rel. Brauer v. City of Del Rio, Tex.Civ.App., 92 S.W.2d 287, no wr. hist.; State ex rel. Perrin v. Hoard, 94 Tex. 527, 62 S.W. 1054; Thompson v. State ex rel. Donley, 23 Tex.Civ.App. 370, 56 S.W. 603, no wr. hist.

  3. Hill v. Brockman

    351 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961)   Cited 2 times

    Since the instrument did not, because of such mistake, represent the real agreement of the parties, there was such a mutual mistake as to entitle appellee to reformation. Bates v. Lefforge, Tex.Com.App., 63 S.W.2d 360; Williams v. Hooks, Tex.Civ.App., 333 S.W.2d 184; State ex rel. Brauer v. City of Del Rio, Tex.Civ.App., 92 S.W.2d 287; Turner v. Montgomery, Tex.Com.App., 293 S.W. 815; 76 C.J.S. Reformation of Instruments § 25, p. 352. Believing the evidence sufficient to uphold the trial court's findings and judgment, the judgment reforming the deed in question is affirmed.

  4. Williams v. Hooks

    333 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960)   Cited 5 times

    In such circumstances it seems settled that a scrivener or draftsman's failure to embody the true agreement of the parties in an instrument affords grounds for its reformation. State v. Wales, Tex.Civ.App., 271 S.W.2d 728; State ex rel. Brauer v. City of Del Rio, Tex.Civ.App., 92 S.W.2d 287; Temple Electric Supply, Inc. v. Simmons, Tex.Civ.App., 328 S.W.2d 931. The appellants say there is no evidence to support the jury's answer to the third special issue above noted, and they urge that the following letter and transfer order signed by the appellee Lemuel Hooks constituted a ratification by him of his royalty deed to appellant Hattie Pearl Williams as a matter of law and that an identical letter and transfer order signed by appellee Raymond Hooks, Sr., likewise constituted a ratification of his royalty deed to appellant Ruby Mae Taylor: 'Beaumont, Texas

  5. Dillon v. San Antonio

    282 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955)

    See State ex rel. Winn v. City of San Antonio, Tex.Civ.App., 259 S.W.2d 248. Annexation, under the charter, is the exercise of a charter power, but it is not, as appellants contend, an alteration or amendment of the charter. State ex rel. Bauer v. City of Del Rio, Tex.Civ.App., 92 S.W.2d 287, 290, decided this same point, saying: 'the boundaries of a city are in no proper sense a part of the charter. If they are, then the boundaries could not be changed oftener than every two (2) years. There is no such limitation on the powers of a city to change its boundary lines.

  6. Gray Cty. Prod. v. Christian

    231 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950)   Cited 2 times

    The appellants made the general allegation that the area incorporated within the alleged incorporated City of Stinnett 'was in excess of that necessary for present occupancy of its citizenry and that reasonably necessary for future expansion of the allegedly incorporated city,' but they did not allege in so many words that the City of Stinnett included territory not intended to be used for strictly town purposes. Nevertheless, in our opinion, appellants' allegations, which must be taken as true, State ex rel. Brauer et al. v. City of Del Rio, Tex.Civ.App., 92 S.W.2d 287, reveal a violation of Article 1134. Whether the alleged excess territory included in the city boundaries was intended for strictly town purposes is a question of fact.

  7. Richardson v. State

    199 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947)   Cited 6 times

    "Acts curing defects in the incorporation of municipalities under the general law apply where a legal incorporation was sought to be established — that is, where the law was attempted to be followed, but in some particulars was not followed, and where, if the forms of law had not been omitted, the incorporation would have been valid. They do not apply where it was sought to incorporate in violation of law * * *." 30 Tex.Jur., Sec. 22, p. 50; Foster v. Hare, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 177, 62 S.W. 541; Judd v. State, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 418, 62 S.W. 543 (writ ref.); and, as pointed out in State v. City of Del Rio, Tex. Civ. App. 92 S.W.2d 287, 288, 290, "A validating statute having reference to the validation of city charters is not a validation of boundary lines unless expressly so." Without further discussion we hold that Art. 1134c constitutes no defense to the vice inherent in appellants' 1937 Act of incorporation; i. e., its prohibited inclusion of more then two square miles of territory.