City of Sarasota v. Skillin et al., 130 Fla. 724, 178 So. 837. State ex rel. Landis v. Haines City, 126 Fla. 561, 169 So. 383; State ex rel. Landis v. Coral Gables, 120 Fla. 492, 163 So. 308, 101 A.L.R. 578; Haines City Heights, Inc., v. Haines City, 127 Fla. 86, 172 So. 484; Town of Lake Maitland v. State ex rel. Landis, 127 Fla. 653, 173 So. 677; City of Auburndale v. State ex rel. Landis, 135 Fla. 172, 184 So. 787; City of Winter Haven v. State, 125 Fla. 392, 170 So. 100. Certain Lands v. City of Stuart, 137 Fla. 784, 188 So. 605; State ex rel. Davis v. City of Stuart, 97 Fla. 69, 120 So. 335, 338, 64 A.L.R. 1307; State ex rel. Johnson v. City of Sarasota, 92 Fla. 563, 109 So. 473; West v. Town of Lake Placid, 97 Fla. 127, 120 So. 361; Town of Enterprise v. State, 29 Fla. 128, 10 So. 740; City of Winter Haven v. State, 125 Fla. 392, 170 So. 100; State v. City of Pompano, 136 Fla. 730, 188 So. 610; City of Winter Haven v. A.M. Klemm Son, Fla., 192 So. 646.
We agree with them, too, that, while the judgment in that proceeding prevented the town from imposing any new obligations on and from exercising any further general jurisdiction over it, as a judgment it was without effect upon obligations already fixed and existing against that territory. State ex rel. Fidelity Life Association v. Cedar Keys, 122 Fla. 454, 165 So. 672; State v. Coral Gables, 120 Fla. 492, 163 So. 308, 101 A.L.R. 578; Sparks v. Ewing, 120 Fla. 520, 163 So. 112; City of Winter Park v. Dunblaine, Inc., 121 Fla. 600, 164 So. 366; Payne v. First National Bank (Tex.Com.App.) 291 S.W. 209; Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289, 6 S.Ct. 398, 29 L.Ed. 620; Shapleigh v. San Angelo, 167 U.S. 646, 17 S.Ct. 957, 42 L.Ed. 310; City of Winter Haven v. Gillespie (C.C.A.) 84 F.2d 285. We particularly agree with appellees that it is for this court to determine whether the whole facts in evidence, the acts creating the town, the issuance of the bonds, their validation by court decree under the Florida statute, the conduct of persons in the affected territory, and of the officers of the town toward that territory, support the findings of the court below, that, as to the bonds and the territory in question, a case was made out of a town existing de facto, which was authorized to, and did, issue bonds under circumstances which made them binding obligations on that territory.
Whiting stood silent for between ten and twenty years while Youngstown made expensive improvements (sewers and water mains) to receive East Chicago services, and while East Chicago borrowed money in reliance on tax revenue expected from Youngstown's property. LaPorto v. Philmont, supra (45-80 years); Elberta v. Frankfort, supra (50 years); Alameda v. Oakland, supra (15-50 years); Starry v. Lake, supra (60 years); But c.f. State ex rel. Landis v. Coral Gables, (1935) 120 Fla. 492, 163 So. 308, 101 A.L.R. 578 (6-8 years sufficient). Whiting notes that territory in dispute is used entirely for industrial purposes; that municipal services provided to industrial facilities vary widely; and argues that absent any request for municipal services by Youngstown, Whiting's failure to provide such services does not amount to acquiescence in East Chicago's exercise of control over the disputed territory.
Property owners are estopped by reason of continued acquiescence to question directly the validity of the extension of the boundaries of a municipality. 1 McQuillin-Municipal Corporations, second edition, p. 844; 101 A.L.R. 581; Black v. Brinkley, 64 Ark. 372, 15 S.W. 1030; Village of Lynbrook v. Cadoo, 252 N.Y. 308, 169 N.E. 394; State ex rel. Landis v. City of Coral Gables, 120 Fla. 492, 163 So. 308, 101 A.L.R. 578; State ex rel. Hallgarth v. School District No. 23, 179 Or. 441, 172 P.2d 655; State ex rel. Teegarden v. Union High School Dist. No. 1, 152 Or. 412, 53 P.2d 1047; State ex rel. Weatherford v. Hayworth, 152 Or. 416, 53 P.2d 1048. Payment of taxes constitutes acquiescence amounting to estoppel and laches.
" (1937) State, ex rel, v. Town of Boca Raton, 129 Fla. 673, 177 So. 293, (per Justice TERRELL), in quo warranto, this Court reaffirmed State v. Boynton Beach, 129 Fla. 528, 177 So. 327, and construed this Court's holding concerning estoppel as contained in State v. Coral gables, 120 Fla. 492, 163 So. 308, and held, in respect to estoppel and laches, that: "This rule would also control in cases where delay had wrought changes in the circumstances of the parties in such a way that to grant the prayer of the writ would be inequitable, but mere delay without damage will generally not be considered as laches.
State, ex rel. Davis, v. City of Pompano, 113 Fla. 246, 151 So. 485. Such judgment of ouster not merely cover described parcels of land owned by the co-relator in the quo warranto case, as being incorporated, in the city in violation of the organic property rights of the owners of such illegally incorporated lands. See State, ex rel., v. City of Avon Park, 108 Fla. 641, 149 So. 409; State, ex rel., v. Town of Boca Raton, 129 Fla. 673, 177 So. 293; City of Coral Gables v. State, 129 Fla. 834, 177 So. 290; State, ex rel., v. Town of Boynton Beach, 129 Fla. 528, 177 So. 327; State, ex rel., v. City of Coral Gables, 120 Fla. 492, 163 So. 308. Where asserted organic rights of municipal bondholders conflict with asserted organic rights of property owners to resist alleged illegal or unjust taxation to pay municipal bonds, courts of competent jurisdiction may determine which party has the better claim to enforce its asserted organic rights.
" See also State, ex rel. Landis, et al., v. Town of Boca Raton, 129 Fla. 673, 177 So. 293; State, ex rel., v. City of Eau Gallie, 99 Fla. 579; State, ex rel. Landis, v. City of Coral Gables, 120 Fla. 492, 163 So. 308. The Information in the case at bar alleged that no benefit had been received from the City. This was admitted by the demurrer and, not having been expressly denied, it was also admitted by the plea.
Judgment was entered for the respondent, Town of Boca Raton, to which the instant writ of error was prosecuted. Many questions are pressed for answer, but it appears that in entering judgment for respondent the trial court was controlled by State, ex rel. Landis, Attorney General, et al., v. City of Coral Gables, 120 Fla. 492, 163 So. 308, in which we held that an owner of lands located within the city who stood by and said nothing for six or eight years was estopped to question the validity of proceedings establishing the city boundaries. In other words, relying on the decision in the last cited case, the decision of the court below in the instant case was based on laches or estoppel by acquiescence.
A final judgment was entered and the instant writ of error was prosecuted. The trial court instructed a verdict for the defendant on the theory that corelators were estopped by laches to challenge the jurisdiction of the Town of Boynton Beach over their lands as described in the information and predicated his judgment squarely on State, ex rel. Landis, et al., v. City of Coral Gables, 120 Fla. 492, 163 So. 308. This holding presents the only question with which we are now concerned. In the case last cited and relied on by the trial court, the judgment of this Court was predicated on the fact that the boundaries of the City of Coral Gables were extended by Acts of the Legislature to include corelators' lands.
We held in a former case coming up from Coral Gables that where relators had acquiesced in the act of the Legislature establishing the boundaries for six or eight years, they were estopped to question it. I think that decision is applicable here. See State v. Coral Gables, 120 Fla. 492, 163 So. 308.