Opinion
No. 60052-4-I.
April 21, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 06-8-02834-3, Philip G. Hubbard, Jr., J., entered May 21, 2007.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
C.I. and a friend, N.T., went to R.R.'s house and started a verbal argument over an iPod. C.I. punched R.R. in the face and threw a candle holder at a glass table in the living room, causing it to break. N.T. also attempted to hit R.R., but did not succeed. However, N.T. did throw a large rock through a living room window. C.I. was charged with residential burglary and assault in the fourth degree. The State also established that it had probable cause to believe that N.T. committed malicious mischief. The trial court granted C.I. a deferred disposition. C.I. appeals a court order requiring her to pay restitution for the broken living room window. Because the juvenile restitution statute requires participants who participated in the crime to be jointly and severally responsible for the payment of restitution, we affirm. See RCW 13.40.190(1).
Both parties contend in their briefing that N.T. was charged with malicious mischief, but do not cite to any supporting documents in the record establishing that such a charge was actually filed. The record does include the certification of probable cause.
C.I. does not challenge her requirement to pay restitution for other damages.
RCW 13.40.190(1) provides that:
In its dispositional order, the court shall require the respondent to make restitution to any persons who have suffered loss or damage as a result of the offense committed by the respondent. In addition, restitution may be ordered for loss or damage if the offender pleads guilty to a lesser offense or fewer offenses and agrees with the prosecutor's recommendation that the offender be required to pay restitution to a victim of an offense or offenses which, pursuant to a plea agreement, are not prosecuted. . . . If the respondent participated in the crime with another person or other persons, all such participants shall be jointly and severally responsible for the payment of restitution.
An order of restitution is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. S.T., 139 Wn. App. 915, 918, 163 P.3d 796 (2007). Discretion is abused only when exercised in a manifestly unreasonable manner or on untenable grounds. S.T., 139 Wn. App. at 918. A juvenile court's restitution order is authorized "`if a causal connection exists between the crime as a whole and the property loss and damage.'" S.T., 139 Wn. App. at 918 (quoting State v. Hiett, 154 Wn.2d 560, 565, 115 P.3d 274 (2005)). "When others have participated in the crime along with the respondent, `all such participants shall be jointly and severally responsible for the payment of restitution.'" S.T., 139 Wn. App. at 918 (quoting RCW 13.40.190(1)).
"The statutory provision for joint and several responsibility demonstrates the legislature's intent: an individual's actual conduct does not determine the extent of his responsibility for restitution; instead, all acts which form the crime are imputed, for restitution purposes, to any participant."
S.T., 139 Wn. App. at 918 (quoting Hiett, 154 Wn.2d at 565). "A sufficient causal connection exists if, `but for the criminal acts of the defendant, the victim would not have suffered the damages for which restitution is sought.'" S.T., 139 Wn. App. at 919 (quoting State v. Landrum, 66 Wn. App. 791, 799, 832 P.2d 1359 (1992)).
C.I. contends that she should not have to pay for restitution because she was not charged with malicious mischief. She is wrong. "The court looks to the underlying facts of the charged offense, not the name of the crime to which the defendant entered a plea." S.T., 139 Wn. App. at 919 (citing Landrum, 66 Wn. App. at 799).
The State opposed C.I.'s motion for deferred disposition and noted in its disposition recommendation that it might add to or amend the charges for trial to those of burglary in the first degree and malicious mischief.
C.I., quoting her counsel's oral argument at the restitution hearing, also contends that no "but for" causation exists because if she "had not been there or not entered the house, [N.T.] still would have threw the rock and the damage to the window would still have occurred." Counsel's oral argument at the restitution hearing is not evidence. See Voicelink Data Servs., Inc. v. Datapulse, Inc., 86 Wn. App. 613, 619, 937 P.2d 1158 (1997). In any event, the record does not support C.I.'s contention.
C.I. argues that Hiett is distinguishable because it concerned ordering restitution to be paid by a passenger of a stolen car who was charged with taking a motor vehicle without permission. See Hiett, 154 Wn.2d at 563. Hiett and others were picked up by an acquaintance who had stolen a vehicle. The passengers jumped out of the moving vehicle while it was being followed by a marked patrol car. After the police siren was activated, the stolen car's driver drove increasingly faster and more erratically, eventually colliding with a truck and crashing into a storefront. Hiett, 154 Wn.2d at 562-63. Hiett was charged under former RCW 9A.56.070(1) (1975) which defined the crime as intentionally taking or driving away any automobile or motor vehicle without permission, or "`voluntarily riding in or upon said automobile or motor vehicle with knowledge of the fact that [it] was unlawfully taken.'" Hiett, 154 Wn.2d at 565 (quoting former RCW 9A.56.070(a)). At a joint restitution hearing, Hiett, the other passengers, and the driver were found jointly and severally responsible for missing property from the stolen vehicle, damage to that vehicle, damage to the truck, and damage to the store. Hiett, 154 Wn.2d at 563.
Our Supreme Court upheld the restitution order and noted that "[t]aking the vehicle is an act which is necessary to commit the crime and is thus imputed to a knowing and voluntary rider who is, by statute, equally guilty with the person taking or driving the vehicle." Hiett, 154 Wn.2d at 565 (citing former RCW 9A.56.070(1)).
C.I. argues that the holding from Hiett applies only to taking-motor-vehicle cases. C.I. asks us to, instead, follow prior case law, including State v. Dauenhauer, 103 Wn. App. 373, 12 P.3d 661 (2000). The appellate court in Dauenhauer, decided before our Supreme Court decided Hiett, held that "restitution cannot be imposed based on a defendant's `general scheme' or acts `connected with' the crime charged, when those acts are not part of the charge." Dauenhauer, 103 Wn. App at 378 (quoting State v. Woods, 90 Wn. App. 904, 907-08, 953 P.2d 834 (1998)).
The appellant in S.T., which cited to Hiett, pleaded guilty to an amended charge of attempted taking a motor vehicle without permission. S.T., 139 Wn. App. at 917.
C.I.'s argument is similar to that of the dissent in Hiett, 154 Wn.2d at 567-71 (Sanders, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing to the holding in Dauenhauer, 103 Wn. App. at 378, and encouraging the majority to follow "prior case law"). However, the majority in Hiett did not state that its holding was to be limited to taking-motor-vehicle cases. Instead, the majority recognized that
Landrum clarified that a court may also look at the underlying facts of the charged crime rather than only the generally defined elements of the crime. Rather than limiting the search for a causal connection, Landrum instead broadened the test to include the underlying actual conduct. This accords with the legislature's broad imposition on offenders of responsibility for restitution.
Hiett, 154 Wn.2d at 565 (citing to Landrum, 66 Wn App. at 799). The Supreme Court noted that
The legislature chose to make all participants responsible for the damages caused by their crime and not to limit responsibility to those damages which occur while individuals are actively participating. In doing so, it has used broad, but clear, language to ensure that victims are fully compensated. To read an implied limitation into the statute would leave victims undercompensated and thwart the will of the legislature.
Hiett, 154 Wn.2d at 566-67. Hiett is dispositive.
C.I., together with N.T., went to R.R.'s house. Both C.I. and N.T. attempted to assault R.R., although only one succeeded. Both C.I. and N.T. damaged R.R.'s property. C.I. unlawfully entered and remained in R.R.'s house. But for C.I.'s underlying actual conduct, which includes her decision to, in concert with N.T., confront R.R., the window would not have been broken. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering C.I. to pay restitution for the broken window.
Affirmed.