Opinion
No. 7083.
March 31, 1952.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT, DOUGLAS COUNTY, TOM R. MOORE, J.
John M. Bragg, Ava, for appellant.
James E. Curry, Ava, for respondent.
This is an action in equity to enjoin defendants from interfering with the holding of religious services in the church building known as the Northside Church of God and to enjoin and restrain defendants from selling and disposing of the real estate used by said church congregation and the Court is asked to order and direct defendants to open the doors of said church building for religious services therein and to restrain them from interfering with the conducting of services in said church building. The cause was tried in the Circuit Court of Douglas County and the Court sustained defendants' motion to dismiss, from which judgment plaintiffs appealed.
Plaintiffs' amended petition, in substance, is as follows: It states that the Northside Church of God is a voluntary religious association made up of persons who believe in and have faith in the creed and doctrine taught and adhered to by the General Ministerial Assembly of the Church of God of Anderson, Indiana; that the church has been supported and maintained by the congregation since 1926, worshiping God in the manner prescribed by said General Ministerial Assembly.
That plaintiffs, E. J. Cull, Allen Yandell and Otis Graham, are members of this congregation and that the action is brought for and in behalf of the Northside Church of God and plaintiffs, E. J. Cull, Yandell and Graham, and other members of said church, situated as these plaintiffs, who are not made parties because of the great number, but whose rights and interest are the same as plaintiffs.
The petition states that the defendant Church of God, Anderson, Indiana, is a non-profit organization, organized and functioning under the laws of the State of Indiana; that defendant, the Board of Extensions and Home Missions of the Church of God of Anderson, Indiana, is associated with the defendant, Church of God, Anderson, Indiana, and is a nonprofit organization, organized under that state; that defendants, Earnest Hart and F. J. Light, are ministers, associated with the Church of God and defendant, Mrs. John Newville, is a member of said church and that these three defendants claim the authority and right to act as trustees of the Northside Church of God.
The petition alleges that on the 17th day of January, 1928, Martha E. Laurie conveyed, by warranty deed, lots 40-41-42 43, Block 2, Central Subdivision, City of Ava, Missouri, to Church of God, with T. M. Harmon, John Newville and M. E. Laurie, trustees and their continuous successors in trust, which deed is recorded in Douglas County; that Earnest Hart, F. J. Light and Mrs. John Newville claim to be the elected successors in trust under said deed, and as such, to have control over the real estate in question.
The petition alleges that it can neither deny or admit the claim of said defendants to be trustees but that the Northside Church of God and the persons for whom this suit is brought have no elected trustees, unless such defendants are such trustees.
The petition then alleges that a church building and dwelling house have been erected on said real estate and that the congregation, constituting the Northside Church of God, has expended great sums of money in erecting said buildings and keeping the same in repair, which was all done with the knowledge of defendants; that no funds have ever been expended by the Church of God, Anderson, Indiana, or the Board of Church Extensions and Home Missions or any person in their behalf.
Plaintiffs say their worship services and Sunday School have followed and maintained fellowship and doctrinal unity with the General Ministerial Assembly of the Church of God and have adhered to the faith, creed and doctrine of said assembly, and that, in their religious worship and fellowship and in the use of the real estate in question, they have, to the best of their ability and understanding, followed the mandates as set out in the warranty deed, conveying said lands, and have worshiped God and used said real estate in the manner and form taught them by the duly ordained ministers of the gospel of the Church of God, Anderson, Indiana, and as these plaintiffs have understood the Holy Writ, as explained and expounded by said ministers and have kept doctrinal unity and fellowship with the General Ministerial Assembly of Anderson, Indiana.
That defendants, Earnest Hart, E. J. Light and Mrs. John Newville, acting as trustees for plaintiffs, have closed the doors of said church building, placing a lock thereon, have forbidden the use of the same by plaintiffs; have publicly announced that said real estate was for sale and are now seeking purchasers for the same, claiming they have been directed by defendant, the Board of Extensions and Home Missions, to close said church building and sell the same.
That plaintiffs have never given their consent to said trustees to close said church building or directed them to sell the real estate, but have petitioned and requested them to open the doors for the use of said church building and to not offer the same for sale, which requests have been refused.
That plaintiffs have never had notice from defendants, or any of them, that they, as a congregation, have been charged with the violation of the terms of the warranty deed and that they have no notice of any charge or complaint being made against them and that they have never had a hearing or been represented at any such a hearing; that if their rights and interests have been forfeited by the General Ministerial Assembly or any other body affiliated with the Church of God, the same has not been done in accordance with the provisions set forth in the Holy Writ upon which the creed and doctrines of the Church of God is founded and based and the rules, laws and orders adopted by the constituted authority of the Church of God and the affiliated associates.
That there is no ecclesiastical body to which plaintiffs can appeal from the decision made by the defendants; that if defendants are permitted to keep the church building closed and prevent religious worship therein, all the members of the congregation will suffer irreparable injury and said injury will result if the property is permitted to be sold and that plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law.
The prayer of plaintiffs' petition is that the defendants, their agents, servants and representatives be restrained and enjoined from preventing religious worship in said church and from selling the real estate thereof and that a mandatory order be made directing defendants to unlock the doors of the church and restrain the defendants from further interfering with the use of said buildings for the purposes herein stated.
Defendants filed the following motion to dismiss plaintiffs' amended petition:
"Come now the above captioned defendants and move the Court to dismiss plaintiffs' amended petition heretofore filed in this cause for the reason that the cause of action which the plaintiffs are attempting to plead is not equitable in nature, but instead, if there is any cause of action at all, it is in law, and for that reason this court is without jurisdiction to grant mandatory injunction as requested; and for the further reason that the amended petition does not state a claim upon which relief could be granted."
The trial court sustained defendants' motion to dismiss on the 18th day of September, 1950.
There is but one issue in this case and that is, does plaintiffs' petition state a cause of action?
Section 509.300 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., provides:
"The objections of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted * * * may be raised by motion when these objections appear on the face of the pleadings." Carr Missouri Civil Procedure, Vol. I, Sec. 193, pages 453-454.
Section 509.050 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., provides:
"A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, * * * shall contain a short and plain statement of the facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled."
In determining whether a petition states a claim we consider only the well pleaded facts of the petition. State v. Taul, 228 Mo.App. 204, 65 S.W.2d 1049, 1051; State ex rel. Uthoff v. Russell, Mo. App., 210 S.W.2d 1017.
In Harger v. Barrett, 319 Mo. 633, 5 S.W.2d 1100, 1102, the court lays down the following rule:
"* * * Thus classified, the well-established rule in equity pleading may be invoked that one or more members of a voluntary association, whether organized for private or public purposes, may sue for or in behalf of all of the members. We so ruled in Lilly v. Tobbein, 103 Mo. loc. cit. [477,] 488, 15 S.W. 618, 23 Am.St.Rep. 887. This was a suit to establish a rejected will, and, while technically an action at law, on account of its possessing certain equitable features it was held that it was properly brought in the names of certain members of the church suing in their own behalf and that of other members." Section 507.010 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.
There is no question but what, in the equitable action at bar, E. J. Cull, Allen Yandell and Otis Graham, members of the Northside Church of God, could bring the action in question, in their own behalf and in behalf of the other members. This action should not have been brought in the name of the State of Missouri, or in the name of the Northside Church of God as shown in the caption of plaintiffs' petition. An action can only be brought in the name of the State when provided for by statute. Section 507.010 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.
We, likewise, hold that injunction is the proper remedy in this case because, under the facts, the civil rights of plaintiffs are involved. We held in Trett v. Lambeth, Mo.App., 195 S.W.2d 524, that injunction is a proper remedy to settle rights of two discordant factions of a church organization in the respect to use and control of church property. See authorities cited therein.
There is no contention made by the defendants that the plaintiffs were not proper parties. We have held that under the law members of a voluntary religious organization, where their civil or property rights are involved, can bring an action in equity for themselves and in behalf of the other members of such organization to protect their rights.
Plaintiffs' cause of action is based upon the theory that their civil or property rights are being interfered with by the defendants in that the defendants, through acting trustees, have locked the doors of the church property and forbidden its use for religious worship and have and are now advertising said church real estate for sale.
Plaintiffs' rights must be determined by a legal construction of the trust created in the conveyance from Martha E. Laurie to The Church of God, with T. M. Harmon, John Newville and M. E. Laurie, trustees and their successors in trust. The warranty deed, mentioned in plaintiffs' petition, contains that trust but plaintiffs did not plead it. Therefore, we are in no position, from the mere consideration of plaintiffs' petition, to determine whether or not the property in question is being lawfully handled by the alleged trustees and whether the defendants, or any of them, are violating the terms of the trust.
The petition states that plaintiffs, to the best of their knowledge and ability, have kept fellowship and doctrinal unity with the General Ministerial Assembly of the Church of God, which meets annually at Anderson, Indiana. But there is no pleading which shows that that is necessary for the proper conducting of the trust. It was incumbent upon plaintiffs to plead the trust in this case and to plead facts which show that defendants are violating that trust. We think that the petition fails to so state such facts.
In Ervin v. Davis, 355 Mo. 951, 199 S.W.2d 366, 369, the Court states the law:
"In considering a trust deed it is the primary duty of the court to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the trustor. * * * The fundamental rule of being guided by the intention of the trustor also governs in determining who are the parties and beneficiaries of the trust, and the facts and circumstances surrounding the parties may be considered in finding out the real parties and beneficiaries."
If plaintiffs had pleaded the terms of the deed, which constituted the trust, we could then have determined and enforced the intentions of the trustor, but this petition does not plead any facts from which we can determine the intentions of the trustor and the rights of the parties and beneficiaries of the trust. For that reason we must hold the petition fails to state a cause of action. Krause v. Jeannette Inv. Co., 333 Mo. 509, 62 S.W.2d 890.
We must agree with defendants that the allegations in plaintiffs' petition, that they have complied with the mandates as set out in the warranty deed without alleging what the mandates of the trust are, merely state conclusions of law. State v. Watson, Mo.Sup., 92 S.W.2d 103, and cases cited therein.
It is true that the warranty deed, containing the terms of the trust, is filed with the transcript and the pleaders undoubtedly could have pleaded the terms of the trust so that we could determine whether or not there had been any violations by the acts of defendants, but the pleaders have not done so, and, since we are bound by the well-pleaded facts in the petition in determining the sufficiency thereof, we must hold that the petition states no cause of action.
Affirmed.
VANDEVENTER, P. J., and BLAIR, J., concur.