This court consistently has followed Aquino in subsequent cases. The defendant in State v. Chavarro, 130 Conn.App. 12, 21 A.3d 541 (2011), a Colombian national, was granted permission to live in the United States until June 22, 1998. He remained in the country past this date illegally.
State v. Aquino, supra, 279 Conn. at 298, 901 A.2d 1194 ; see State v. Jerzy G., supra, 162 Conn.App. at 161–64, 130 A.3d 303 (following rule of Aquino ); Paulino v. Commissioner of Correction, 155 Conn.App. 154, 162–63, 109 A.3d 516 (same), cert. denied, 317 Conn. 912, 116 A.3d 310 (2015) ; Quiroga v. Commissioner of Correction, 149 Conn.App. 168, 173, 87 A.3d 1171 (same), cert. denied, 311 Conn. 950, 91 A.3d 462 (2014) ; State v. Chavarro, 130 Conn.App. 12, 17–18, 21 A.3d 541 (2011) (same); but see St. Juste v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 155 Conn.App. at 174, 109 A.3d 523 (petitioner must prove both that underlying conviction was exclusive basis for deportation and that petitioner would be permitted reentry in absence of underlying conviction). “If [the deportation] was not the result of his guilty plea alone, then this court can grant no practical relief and any decision rendered by this court would be purely advisory.”
There is no evidence in the record as to the reason for his deportation. If it was not the result of his guilty plea alone, then this court can grant no practical relief and any decision rendered by this court would be purely advisory.... We conclude, therefore, that the appeal must be dismissed on the ground that the defendant has failed to establish that his claim is not moot.” (Citations omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 298–99, 901 A.2d 1194; see also State v. Chavarro, 130 Conn.App. 12, 17–18, 21 A.3d 541 (2011) (court held that defendant's appeal was moot because he “failed to establish that his deportation was the result of his guilty plea alone” [internal quotation marks omitted] ). The present case is similar to Quiroga.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Chavarro, 130 Conn.App. 12, 16, 21 A.3d 541 (2011). Importantly, “[u]nder the collateral consequences doctrine, this court may retain jurisdiction and consider a claim that otherwise has been rendered moot when a litigant shows that there is a reasonable possibility that prejudicial collateral consequences will occur.... Accordingly, the litigant must establish these consequences by more than mere conjecture, but need not demonstrate that these consequences are more probable than not.... Where there is no direct practical relief available from the reversal of the judgment ... the collateral consequences doctrine acts as a surrogate, calling for a determination whether a decision in the case can afford the litigant some practical relief in the future.
We recognize that some Appellate Court cases understandably have construed Aquino to require the challenged decision to be the reason, and the only reason, for the deportation. See Quiroga v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, at 173–74, 87 A.3d 1171 ; State v. Chavarro, 130 Conn.App. 12, 18–19, 21 A.3d 541 (2011). Because that limited view renders that case inconsistent with a substantial body of case law, we opt for the construction that renders Aquino consistent with our mootness jurisprudence.
Id., at 298, 901 A.2d 1194. Our appellate courts have adhered to that precedent on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Quiroga v. Commissioner of Correction , 149 Conn.App. 168, 174, 87 A.3d 1171 (observing that " Aquino requires proof that the larceny plea was the exclusive basis of the petitioner's deportation, rather than a primary or likely one"), cert. denied, 311 Conn. 950, 91 A.3d 462 (2014) ; State v. Chavarro , 130 Conn.App. 12, 17–18, 21 A.3d 541 (2011) (appeal moot because defendant failed to establish that his deportation was result of guilty plea alone). The record reflects, and the respondent does not dispute, that the petitioner's removal was based solely on his guilty plea to larceny in the second degree, as the immigration court found that conviction to be both an aggravated felony under federal immigration law and one of two crimes involving moral turpitude.