Opinion
2014-UP-272
06-30-2014
The State, Respondent, v. Frederick R. Chappell, Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2012-212745
Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Christina J. Catoe, both of Columbia; and Solicitor William W. Wilkins, III, of Greenville, for Respondent.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Submitted May 1, 2014
Appeal From Greenville County D. Garrison Hill, Circuit Court Judge
Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Christina J. Catoe, both of Columbia; and Solicitor William W. Wilkins, III, of Greenville, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM
Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Douglas, 369 S.C. 424, 429, 632 S.E.2d 845, 847-48 (2006) ("The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling will not be disturbed in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion accompanied by probable prejudice."); State v. Weaverling, 337 S.C. 460, 474-75, 523 S.E.2d 787, 794 (Ct. App. 1999) ("Expert testimony concerning common behavioral characteristics of sexual assault victims and the range of responses to sexual assault encountered by experts is admissible . . . . Such testimony is relevant and helpful in explaining to the jury the typical behavior patterns of adolescent victims of sexual assault."); id. at 475, 523 S.E.2d at 794 ("There is no requirement the sexual assault victim be personally interviewed or examined by the expert before the expert can give behavior evidence testimony.").
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
Chappell's contention that the expert's testimony was improper because it constituted improper vouching for the victim is not preserved for our review. See State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693-94 (2003) (noting "[i]ssues not raised and ruled upon in the trial court will not be considered on appeal" and "[a] party may not argue one ground and trial and an alternate ground on appeal").
AFFIRMED.
FEW, C. J, and SHORT and GEATHERS, JJ, concur.