It is well-settled that a trial court cannot grant a mistrial after the jury renders its verdict. State v. Sumlin , 281 Ga. 183, 184 (1), 637 S.E.2d 36 (2006) ; State v. Chapman , 322 Ga. App. 82, 83, 744 S.E.2d 77 (2013). But, OCGA § 5-5-40 (h) authorizes the trial court to sua sponte grant a new trial within 30 days from entry of the judgment.
And under Georgia law, we construe orders "according to their substance and function and not merely by nomenclature." State v. Chapman , 322 Ga.App. 82, 83, 744 S.E.2d 77 (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Forest City Gun Club v. Chatham County , 280 Ga.App. 219, 220, 633 S.E.2d 623 (2006).
See OCGA § 5-6-38 (a) ("A notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the appealable decision or judgment complained of; but when a motion for new trial ... has been filed, the notice shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order granting, overruling, or otherwise finally disposing of the motion") (emphasis supplied). See also State v. Chapman , 322 Ga. App. 82, 83, 744 S.E.2d 77 (2013) ("Pleadings, motions, and orders are construed according to their substance and function and not merely by nomenclature") (citation and punctuation omitted); Doe v. State , 347 Ga. App. 246, 251 (1), 819 S.E.2d 58 (2018) (arrestee's pleading, styled as "renewed motion for reconsideration" of motion to seal criminal records was, in substance, a second motion to seal his criminal records, such that notice of appeal was timely filed from the order denying it). So this appeal need not be dismissed under Cook v. State , 313 Ga. 471, 870 S.E.2d 758 (2022).
We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence under OCGA § 24-4-414 (a), including the weighing of the OCGA § 24-4-403 factors, for abuse of discretion. Jackson , 342 Ga.App. at 691, 805 S.E.2d 457 ; State v. Chapman , 322 Ga. App. 82, 86, 744 S.E.2d 77 (2013). The trial court did not abuse his discretion in admitting, for the purpose of proving intent, the evidence that Boyd had engaged in sexual intercourse with two other victims who were around the same age as V. B. Boyd pled not guilty and testified at trial that V. B.’s account of the crimes was not true.
Although the trial court purported to dismiss Jones' motion for new trial, that order was substantively a denial of the motion, and we therefore treat it as such. See State v. Chapman , 322 Ga.App. 82, 83, 744 S.E.2d 77 (2013) (“orders are construed according to their substance and function and not merely by nomenclature”) (citations and punctuation omitted) (treating a mistrial granted following a jury verdict as the grant of a motion for a new trial). On appeal, Jones contends that the trial court erred in denying his new trial motion without conducting a hearing.
Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, 440, 499 S.E.2d 630 (1998). See State v. Chapman, 322 Ga.App. 82, 83, 744 S.E.2d 77 (2013) (“Pleadings, motions, and orders are construed according to their substance and function and not merely by nomenclature.”) (citations and punctuation omitted).