Summary
upholding ordinance defining family as one or more related persons plus not more than two additional unrelated persons against state constitutional due process challenge
Summary of this case from Dvorak v. City of BloomingtonOpinion
No. S-95-958.
Filed July 3, 1997.
1. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Ordinances. The constitutionality of a statute or an ordinance is a question of law.
2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. With regard to questions of law, an appellate court is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the decision reached by the trial court.
3. Municipal Corporations: Ordinances: Zoning: Proof. To successfully challenge the validity of a zoning ordinance that does not affect a fundamental right or a suspect classification, a litigant must prove that the conditions imposed by the city in adopting the ordinance were unreasonable, discriminatory, or arbitrary, and that the regulation bears no relationship to the purpose or purposes sought to be accomplished by the ordinance.
4. Constitutional Law: Due Process: Statutes. In cases involving due process challenges under the Nebraska Constitution, when a fundamental right or suspect classification is not involved in the legislation, the legislative act is a valid exercise of the police power if the act is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
5. Constitutional Law: Ordinances: Presumptions: Proof: Appeal and Error. When passing on the constitutionality of an ordinance, an appellate court begins with a presumption of validity. The burden of demonstrating a constitutional defect rests with the challenger.
Petition for further review from the Nebraska Court of Appeals, Irwin, Sievers, and INBODY, Judges, on appeal thereto from the District Court for Lancaster County, DONALD E. ENDACOTT, Judge, on appeal thereto from the County Court for Lancaster County, James L. Foster, Judge. Judgment of Court of Appeals affirmed.
Peter W. Katt and Lisa K. Piscitelli, of Pierson, Fitchett, Hunzeker, Blake Loftis, for appellant.
Norman Langemach, Jr., Lincoln City Prosecutor, for appellee.
Lisa M. Line, of Brodkey, Cuddigan Peebles, for amicus curiae James D. Severa, M.D.
WHITE, C.J., CAPORALE, WRIGHT, CONNOLLY, GERRARD, STEPHAN, and McCORMACK, JJ.
Steven M. Champoux petitioned this court for further review of the Nebraska Court of Appeals' affirmance of his conviction for violating Lincoln Mun. Code § 27.03.220 (1994) by renting a residence located in an area zoned for single-family and two-family dwellings to more than three unrelated people. We affirm.
On February 7, 1994, a criminal complaint was filed in the county court for Lancaster County alleging that Champoux unlawfully "allow[ed] more than three unrelated persons to live in a building or premises . . . in violation of the use regulations for the R-2 Residential District. . . ." The R-2 Residential District is zoned for single-family and two-family dwellings. Section 27.03.220 defines a "family" as "[o]ne or more persons immediately related by blood, marriage, or adoption and living as a single housekeeping unit. . . . A family may include, in addition, not more than two persons who are unrelated. . . ."
On February 16, 1994, Champoux filed a motion to quash, arguing that § 27.03.220 was unreasonable and arbitrary, in violation of the due process clause of the Nebraska Constitution, and that § 27.03.220 violated his tenants' constitutional right of privacy. The county court overruled the motion, a trial was held on stipulated facts, and Champoux was found guilty and fined $25.
Champoux appealed to the district court for Lancaster County. The district court affirmed the county court's judgment, finding that the ordinance was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary and that the ordinance did not implicate the tenants' right of privacy.
Champoux then appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals, which also affirmed. See State v. Champoux, 5 Neb. App. 68, 555 N.W.2d 69 (1996). The Court of Appeals found that the definition of "family" in § 27.03.220 did not violate the due process clause of the Nebraska Constitution, because the ordinance and the city's legitimate objectives of promoting community values and a certain quality of living were rationally related, and that Champoux did not demonstrate a constitutional defect in the zoning ordinance. The Court of Appeals also found that the ordinance did not implicate any of the tenants' fundamental constitutional rights.
Champoux timely petitioned this court for further review. On appeal, Champoux alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in (1) applying an equal protection violation standard of review when determining whether § 27.03.220 could survive Champoux's due process challenges, (2) finding that Champoux failed to demonstrate a constitutional defect in § 27.03.220, and (3) finding that § 27.03.220 did not violate Champoux's due process rights under the Nebraska Constitution.
The constitutionality of a zoning ordinance which defines "family" as any number of related persons living together as a single housekeeping unit and not more than two additional unrelated persons is an issue of first impression.
The constitutionality of a statute or an ordinance is a question of law. Kuchar v. Krings, 248 Neb. 995, 540 N.W.2d 582 (1995); Village of Brady v. Melcher, 243 Neb. 728, 502 N.W.2d 458 (1993). With regard to questions of law, an appellate court is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the decision reached by the trial court. Kuchar, supra; Village of Brady, supra.
In his first assignment of error, Champoux alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in applying an equal protection violation standard of review when determining whether § 27.03.220 could survive Champoux's due process challenges. We disagree.
The Court of Appeals stated in its opinion that to successfully challenge the validity of a zoning ordinance that does not affect a fundamental right or a suspect classification, a litigant must prove that the conditions imposed by the city in adopting the ordinance were unreasonable, discriminatory, or arbitrary and that the regulation bears no relationship to the purpose or purposes sought to be accomplished by the ordinance. Champoux, supra. The Court of Appeals also stated, "`[C]lassifications appearing in social or economic legislation require only a rational relationship between the state's legitimate interest and the means selected to accomplish that end. The ends-means fit need not be perfect; it need only be rational.'" Id. at 72, 555 N.W.2d at 72 (quoting State v. Michalski, 221 Neb. 380, 377 N.W.2d 510 (1985)).
Champoux argues that Michalski involved a challenge to an ordinance on equal protection grounds and that the Court of Appeals' reliance on Michalski in determining the type of relationship that must exist between the regulation and its purposes resulted in an improper analysis of his underlying claims. Although Champoux is correct in stating that Michalski involved an equal protection challenge, we have held in numerous cases involving due process challenges under the Nebraska Constitution that when a fundamental right or suspect classification is not involved in the legislation, the legislative act is a valid exercise of the police power if the act is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. State ex rel. Dept. of Health v. Jeffrey, 247 Neb. 100, 525 N.W.2d 193 (1994); Robotham v. State, 241 Neb. 379, 488 N.W.2d 533 (1992); State v. Two IGT Video Poker Games, 237 Neb. 145, 465 N.W.2d 453 (1991). The standard of review employed by the Court of Appeals was identical to the standard we have utilized in other due process challenges. Thus, we find Champoux's first assignment of error to be without merit.
In his final two assignments of error, Champoux argues that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that he failed to demonstrate a constitutional defect in § 27.03.220 and in finding that § 27.03.220 did not violate Champoux's due process rights under the Nebraska Constitution. We disagree, and because we note that these two assignments of error are interrelated, we will discuss them together.
The constitutionality of a statute or an ordinance is a question of law. Village of Brady, supra. When passing on the constitutionality of an ordinance, this court begins with a presumption of validity. The burden of demonstrating a constitutional defect rests with the challenger. Village of Brady, supra; City of Lincoln v. ABC Books, Inc., 238 Neb. 378, 470 N.W.2d 760 (1991).
As noted above, to successfully challenge the validity of a zoning ordinance that does not affect a fundamental right or a suspect classification, a litigant must prove that the conditions imposed by the city in adopting the ordinance were unreasonable, discriminatory, or arbitrary and that the regulation bears no relationship to the purpose or purposes sought to be accomplished by the ordinance. Giger v. City of Omaha, 232 Neb. 676, 442 N.W.2d 182 (1989). Under the due process clause of the Nebraska Constitution, when a fundamental right or suspect classification is not involved in the legislation, the legislative act is a valid exercise of the police power if the act is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Jeffrey, supra; Robotham, supra; Two IGT Video Poker Games, supra.
The question of whether a statute which defines "family" as any number of related individuals living together as a single housekeeping unit and not more than two additional individuals who are unrelated violates the due process clause of the Nebraska Constitution is an issue of first impression. However, this same question has been addressed by both the U.S. Supreme Court and numerous other jurisdictions.
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2, 94 S. Ct. 1536, 39 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1974), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an ordinance which defined "family" as
"[o]ne or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit . . . . A number of persons but not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though not related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family."
The landlord in Village of Belle Terre rented a house to six unrelated students, and the landlord and three students sued, asking for an injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the ordinance and a declaration that the ordinance was unconstitutional and arguing that the ordinance violated multiple federal constitutional rights. The U.S. Supreme Court found that the ordinance did not affect any fundamental constitutional right and that it was a valid exercise of the police power to "lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people." 416 U.S. at 9. In response to Boraas' argument that the ordinance was arbitrary, the Court stated:
It is said, however, that if two unmarried people can constitute a "family," there is no reason why three or four may not. But every line drawn by a legislature leaves some out that might well have been included. That exercise of discretion, however, is a legislative, not a judicial, function.
Other states have also addressed the issue of whether zoning ordinances similar to the one in the instant case violated their state constitutions' due process clauses. Those states that uphold such zoning ordinances do so based on the reasoning that an ordinance which defines "family" as an unlimited number of related individuals or a certain number of unrelated individuals is related to a legitimate governmental interest in controlling population density or protecting certain family values. See, City of Brookings v. Winker, 554 N.W.2d 827 (S.D. 1996) (finding that zoning ordinance requiring that no more than three unrelated individuals live together did not violate state constitution's due process clause because, under particular facts of case, ordinance bore real and substantial relation to town's attempt to regulate population density); Dinan v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 220 Conn. 61, 595 A.2d 864 (1991) (holding that zoning ordinance which excluded any group of unrelated individuals from living together as single housekeeping unit was not violative of state constitution's due process clause because city was statutorily authorized to define "family" and ordinance was rationally related to objective of controlling population density); City of Ladue v. Horn, 720 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. App. 1986) (finding that city ordinance limiting definition of family to only related individuals living together did not violate state constitution's due process clause because ordinance bore substantial relation to public health, morals, and welfare of city and its governmental interest in marriage and preserving integrity of biological or legal family); Stegeman v. Ann Arbor, 213 Mich. App. 487, 540 N.W.2d 724 (1995) (finding that ordinance which prohibited more than six unrelated individuals from living together in single-family home did not violate state constitution's due process clause).
Those states which have struck down ordinances similar to the one at issue in this case have done so generally because the ordinances preclude functional families from living together. See, Delta Charter Twp. v. Dinolfo, 419 Mich. 253, 351 N.W.2d 831 (1984) (finding that ordinance which limited occupation of single-family residences to any number of related individuals and not more than one other unrelated person violated state constitution's due process clause because it was not rationally related to governmental objectives in that ordinance precluded functional family from living together); Borough of Glassboro v. Vallorosi, 117 N.J. 421, 568 A.2d 888 (1990) (stating that New Jersey has repeatedly invalidated zoning ordinances intended to cure or prevent antisocial conduct in dwelling situations and stating that municipalities can appropriately deal with overcrowding or congestion by ordinance provisions that limit occupancy based on reasonable relationship to available sleeping and bathroom facilities or requiring minimum amount of habitable floor area per occupant); Baer v. Town of Brookhaven, 73 N.Y.2d 942, 537 N.E.2d 619, 540 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1989) (finding invalid on state due process grounds ordinance which limited family to include no more than four unrelated individuals because differentiation between unrelated persons who were functionally equivalent to family and related persons was not reasonably related to legitimate zoning purpose).
In the present case, the Nebraska Legislature has given the city of Lincoln the power to pass zoning ordinances "to promote the public health, safety, and general welfare . . . with consideration having been given to the character of the various parts of the area zoned. . . ." Neb. Rev. Stat. § 15-902 (Reissue 1991). The city of Lincoln, in accordance with this statutory authority, passed a zoning ordinance which defined "family" as "[o]ne or more persons immediately related by blood, marriage, or adoption and living as a single housekeeping unit . . . . A family may include, in addition, not more than two persons who are unrelated . . . ." The city's stated reason for so limiting this definition of family is to preserve the "sanctity of the family, quiet neighborhoods, low population, few motor vehicles, and low transiency." Brief for appellee at 17.
While Champoux agrees that these are legitimate governmental objectives, Champoux argues that Lincoln's zoning ordinance is not rationally related to those purposes. Champoux suggests that the limitation of not more than two unrelated individuals is an arbitrary limitation in that five unrelated individuals living together may make less noise, be more permanent, and create fewer parking problems than seven related individuals living together.
However, we find persuasive the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 94 S. Ct. 1536, 39 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1974), as well as the decisions of those state courts which have upheld similar zoning ordinances in the face of due process challenges. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted:
"When a legal distinction is determined . . . a point has to be fixed or a line has to be drawn, or gradually picked out by successive decisions, to mark where the change takes place. Looked at by itself without regard to the necessity behind it the line or point seems arbitrary. It might as well or nearly as well be a little more to one side or the other. But when it is seen that a line or point there must be, and that there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature must be accepted unless we can say that it is very wide of any reasonable mark."
Village of Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 8 n.5 (quoting Louisville Gas Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 41, 48 S. Ct. 423, 72 L. Ed. 770 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). In this case, the city of Lincoln enacted a zoning ordinance clearly within the ambit of its police power and defined "family" in a way that is rationally related to its legitimate objectives of preserving the sanctity of the family, quiet neighborhoods, low population, few motor vehicles, and low transiency. While Champoux posits a variety of ways in which the city of Lincoln could have chosen to effectuate its objectives, his arguments do not demonstrate any constitutional defect in § 27.03.220, and we find that he has not met his burden of demonstrating that the definition of "family" in this ordinance is not rationally related to the city's legitimate objectives. Accordingly, we find that § 27.03.220 did not violate Champoux's due process rights under the Nebraska Constitution. Therefore, we determine that Champoux's last two assignments of error are also without merit.
Because we hold that the Court of Appeals applied the correct standard of review, that Champoux did not demonstrate a constitutional defect in § 27.03.220, and that § 27.03.220 did not violate Champoux's due process rights under the Nebraska Constitution, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.