Opinion
ID No. 0001008270
Date Submitted: June 17, 2002
Date Decided: August 30, 2002
Upon Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief: DENIED.
ORDER
Upon review of Movant Michael Chambers ("Defendant")'s Motion for Postconviction Relief and the record, it appears to the Court that:
1. Defendant filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 following a violation of probation hearing on January 16, 2002 that resulted in revocation of probation and a five year, three month sentence at Level V, the remainder of the sentence, after serving five years, suspended for 9 months at level IV to be served at work release center, hold at level V for level IV.
2. In support of his motion, Defendant alleges (a) violation of search and seizure rights, asserting that "I was given all my probation time for a case I haven't even been convicted of in federal court plus this search that took place was illegal under the constitution of the Fourth Amendment," (b) lack of evidence, stating that there is "no evidence that the case against me is favorable to prosecutor," (c) violation of Fourth Amendment rights, asserting that "4th Amendment protects any parolee or probationer that is charged with possession of illicit contraband. Fact that no fingerprints were found on either of the guns that I was given 5 years for."
3. The Delaware Supreme Court has held that in reviewing motions for postconviction relief, this Court must first determine whether a defendant's claims are procedurally barred prior to considering them on their merits. Rule 61(i)(4) provides for summary dismissal by the court "[i]f it plainly appears from the motion . . . and the record . . . that the movant is not entitled to relief, the judge may enter an order for its summary dismissal . . ."
Bailey v. State, Del. Supr., 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (1991); Flamer v. State, Del. Supr., 585 A.2d 736, 747 (1990).
This Court will not address Rule 61 claims that are conclusory and unsubstantiated. Pursuant to Rule 61(a), a motion for postconviction relief must be based on "a sufficient factual and legal basis." In addition, pursuant to Rule 61(b)(2), "[t]he motion shall specify all the grounds for relief which are available to movant . . ., and shall be set forth in summary form the facts supporting each of the grounds thus specified."
See Younger v State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 555 (1990); State v. Conlow, Del. Super., Cr.A. No. IN78-09-0985R1, Herlihy, J. (Oct. 5, 1990) at 5; State v. Gallo, Del. Super., Cr.A. No. IN87-03-0589-0594, Gebelein, J. (Sept. 2, 1988) at 10.
4. This is Defendant's first motion for postconviction relief and the Court has determined that no procedural bars listed in Rule 61 are applicable. Therefore, the Court may consider the merits of Defendant's application.
5. Defendant is essentially claiming that the charges that led to Defendant's revocation of probation on January 16, 2002 were not backed by sufficient evidence.
6. Revocation of probation is an "exercise of broad discretionary power" in Delaware. This includes a judge's discretion regarding issues of probation time asserted in Defendant's motion. If the violation is established, the court may continue or revoke the probation or suspension of sentence, and may require the probation violator to serve the sentence imposed, or may impose any sentence which might originally have been imposed. Also, proof sufficient to support criminal prosecution is not required to support a judge's discretionary order revoking probation.
Id.
See Brown v. State, Del.Super., 249 A.2d 269, 272 (1968).
7. As for Defendant's assertion that "no finger prints were found on either of the guns," Rules of evidence applicable in criminal trial need not be followed in proceeding for revocation of probation. In proceeding to revoke probation, evidence need not establish guilt of criminal offenses beyond reasonable doubt; all that is required is that the evidence be such as to reasonably satisfy the judge that conduct of probationer has not been as good as required by conditions of probation. The Court was reasonably satisfied with the evidence presented that petitioner had committed a criminal offense while on probation.
Id.
See Brown v. State, Del.Super., 249 A.2d 269, 272 (1968) (citing Manning v. United States (5 Cir., 1947) 161 F.2d 827).
For the above stated reasons, Defendant's motion for post-conviction relief is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.