State v. Chambers

Full title: STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LORIE L. CHAMBERS…

Court: Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eleventh District, Lake

Date published: Dec 29, 2023

2023 Ohio 4859 (Ohio Ct. App. 2023)

Opinion

2023-L-075

12-29-2023

STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LORIE L. CHAMBERS, Defendant-Appellant.

Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Teri R. Daniel, Assistant Prosecutor, (For Plaintiff-Appellee). Eric M. Levy, (For Defendant-Appellant).

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.

Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas Trial Court No. 2021 CR 000503

Judgment: Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded

Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Teri R. Daniel, Assistant Prosecutor, (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Eric M. Levy, (For Defendant-Appellant).

OPINION

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.

{¶1} Appellant, Lorie L. Chambers, appeals her sentence following her guilty pleas to two felony charges. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

{¶2} In 2019, Chambers and two others were involved in a string of credit card thefts from employees working at northern Ohio businesses. After obtaining the employees' credit cards, Chambers and her accomplices used the credit cards at other businesses to purchase gift cards.

{¶3} On November 17, 2019, Chambers was arrested related to complaints filed in the Rocky River Municipal Court regarding the 2019 credit card thefts. That case was bound over to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. Ultimately, on March 19, 2020, Chambers pleaded guilty to several charges in the Cuyahoga County case and was sentenced to two years of community control. It is undisputed that Chambers remained in pretrial confinement at all times from the date of her arrest through her sentencing in the Cuyahoga County case.

{¶4} While the Cuyahoga County case was pending, on November 20, 2019, Chambers was charged in two cases in the Mentor Municipal Court relating to the 2019 credit card thefts.

{¶5} In the present case, on April 13, 2021, Chambers was charged in a 21 -count indictment with numerous felony offenses related to the 2019 credit card thefts. At the time of her indictment, Chambers was incarcerated at a facility in the state of New York. Following her indictment in the present case, the two cases in Mentor Municipal Court were dismissed.

{¶6} During the proceedings in the present case, Chambers filed a motion to dismiss, from which this court has drawn the undisputed information relative to the Cuyahoga County and Mentor Municipal Court cases set forth above. Prior to a ruling on her motion, pursuant to a plea agreement, Chambers pleaded guilty to one count of identity fraud, a third-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2913.49(B)(2), and one count of counterfeiting, a third-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2913.30(B)(4), and waived a presentence investigation. The trial court accepted the pleas and proceeded directly to sentencing. The court and counsel then discussed the prison sentence that Chambers was serving in New York. Defense counsel indicated that Chambers was serving an indefinite sentence of two to four years in the New York matter, and the state indicated that the New York sentence was imposed on a grand larceny conviction. The state argued for consecutive service of the present sentences, both with each other and with the New York sentence, and Chambers asked the court to order all sentences to be served concurrently. The trial court sentenced Chambers to 36 months of imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently to each other but consecutively to the sentence imposed in her New York case. The court further ordered that Chambers receive one day of jail-time credit.

{¶7} In Chambers' first assigned error, she maintains:

The trial court erred and imposed a sentence contrary to law where it imposed a prison sentence consecutive to a prison sentence being served out of the state of New York pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) which does not provide an exception to the general rule that sentences be served concurrently applicable to out of state sentences and if R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) were applicable the consecutive sentence is contrary to law and not supported by the record where the trial court failed to find all R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) factors and failed to determine and consider the aggregate prison sentence ordered.

{¶8} R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) governs our review of felony sentences and provides:

The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of this section shall review the record, including the findings underlying the sentence or modification given by the sentencing court.

The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing. The appellate court's standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. The appellate court may take any action authorized by this division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:

(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court's findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant; (b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

{¶9} Here, Chambers maintains that the court erred in ordering her concurrent sentences in the present case be served consecutively to her New York sentence. In support, Chambers first relies on R.C. 2929.41(A), which provides:

Except as provided in division (B) of this section, division (C) of section 2929.14, or division (D) or (E) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code, a prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment shall be served concurrently with any other prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court of this state, another state, or the United States. Except as provided in division (B)(3) of this section, a jail term or sentence of imprisonment for misdemeanor shall be served concurrently with a prison term or sentence of imprisonment for felony served in a state or federal correctional institution.

{¶10} Accordingly, felony sentences are to be served concurrently unless a statutory exception applies. The exceptions listed in R.C. 2929.41(A) are those provided for in R.C. 2929.41(B), R.C. 2929.14(C), R.C. 2971.03(D), and R.C. 2971.03(E). Here, in the sentencing entry, the court specifically relied on the R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) exception.

{¶11} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) provides that separate prison terms for multiple offenses may be ordered to be served consecutively if the court finds it is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender; that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public; and if the court also finds any of the factors in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c) are present.

{¶12} Chambers argues that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive service under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). However, as set forth above, R.C. 2929.14(C) is not the sole exception to concurrent service. As relevant here, R.C. 2929.41(A) also excepts R.C. 2929.41(B) from its provisions. R.C. 2929.41(B)(2) provides:

If a court of this state imposes a prison term upon the offender for the commission of a felony and a court of another state or the United States also has imposed a prison term upon the offender for the commission of a felony, the court of this state may order that the offender serve the prison term it imposes consecutively to any prison term imposed upon the offender by the court of another state or the United States.

See also State v. Warren, 2018-Ohio-4757, 124 N.E.3d 433, ¶ 16-19 (1st Dist.) (R.C. 2929.41(B)(2) permits, but does not mandate, a trial court to order consecutive service under the circumstances therein described).

{¶13} In its brief, the state relies on the R.C. 2929.41(B)(2) exception, as Chambers was serving a prison term for a felony conviction in New York at the time of sentencing. Accordingly, the state maintains that we need not address whether consecutive service was proper under R.C. 2929.14(C).

{¶14} In her reply brief, Chambers argues that, because the trial court specifically relied on R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and never referenced R.C. 2929.41(B)(2), we should not review this matter under the latter statute. Further, Chambers maintains that the trial court did not make the factual findings required for consecutive service under R.C. 2929.41 (B)(2), and the state provided no evidence indicating that the New York sentence was imposed for a felony.

{¶15} However, as stated above, Chambers' counsel recognized at sentencing that she was serving two to four years of imprisonment on a conviction in New York, and she did not dispute the state's assertion that her conviction in New York was for grand larceny. The New York Penal Code classifies grand larceny offenses as felonies, and the length and nature of the New York sentence is consistent with the felony sentencing provisions in that state. N.Y.Penal Code 155.30, et seq. (classifying grand larceny offenses as felonies); N.Y.Penal Code 70.00 (providing that the minimum of an indeterminate felony sentence resulting in imprisonment shall be at least one year); N.Y.Penal Code 70.15 (providing that the maximum sentence for a misdemeanor conviction is a definite sentence of not more than 364 days). Therefore, regardless of the trial court's or the state's reliance on R.C. 2929.14(C) at sentencing, consecutive service with a sentence imposed for an out-of-state felony is authorized under R.C. 2929.41(B). See R.C. 2929.41(A). See also State v. Lozier, 101 Ohio St.3d 161, 2004-Ohio-732, 803 N.E.2d 770, ¶ 46 (reviewing court does not reverse a correct judgment regardless of the propriety of the lower court's reasons provided in support of the judgment). Consequently, the consecutive nature of Chamber's sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law, and we need not address Chambers' arguments to the extent that she maintains that the trial court failed to fully comply with R.C. 2929.14(C).

{¶16} Accordingly, Chambers' first assigned error lacks merit.

{¶17} In Chambers' second assigned error, she contends:

{¶18} "Chambers was entitled to receive credit for time served towards her sentence for time spent in jail in Cuyahoga County, Ohio on the same and related facts, offenses, and course of conduct as indicted."

{¶19} Chambers maintains, and the state agrees, that Chambers was held in pretrial detention in Cuyahoga County on charges stemming from her offenses committed in both Lake County and Cuyahoga County. The state concedes that Chambers is entitled to jail-time credit for this pretrial detention in the present case, and we agree.

{¶20} R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i) provides, in relevant part:

Subject to division (B)(3) of this section, if the sentencing court determines at the sentencing hearing that a prison term is necessary or required, the court shall * * * [determine, notify the offender of, and include in the sentencing entry the total number of days, including the sentencing date but excluding conveyance time, that the offender has been confined for any reason arising out of the offense for which the offender is being sentenced and by which the department of rehabilitation and correction must reduce the definite prison term imposed on the offender as the offender's stated prison term * * * The court's calculation shall not include the number of days, if any, that the offender served in the custody of the department of rehabilitation and correction arising out of any prior offense for which the prisoner was convicted and sentenced.

See also R.C. 2967.191.

{¶21} "It is well settled that a 'defendant may accrue jail time credit in multiple cases at the same time, if he or she is held in pretrial confinement in multiple cases simultaneously.'" State v. Steinmetz, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2019-CA-40, 2020-Ohio-1145, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Breneman, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2015-CA-16, 2016-Ohio-597, ¶ 26. "Whether jail-time credit accrues simultaneously when a defendant is in pretrial confinement on multiple cases ordinarily depends on whether he receives concurrent or consecutive sentences." Steinmetz at ¶ 11. Where the sentences are to run concurrently, the defendant receives jail-time credit in both cases; however, where the sentences are to run consecutively, the defendant receives jail-time credit for only one such case. However, this general rule is unworkable in situations where the offender is sentenced to community control in one of the multiple cases, and there is no other pending term of imprisonment "to make the sentence consecutive to." Id. at ¶ 15. Nonetheless, the rationale underlying the general rule is that the defendant is due credit for pretrial confinement to reduce the overall length of the sentence imposed on the charge for which she was held. Id. at ¶ 12. Applying this rationale in the present case, Chambers has not yet received jail-time credit for the period that she was detained on the Cuyahoga County and Lake County cases simultaneously, as she was sentenced to community control in the Cuyahoga County case. Chambers maintains that she is entitled to 123 days of jail-time credit, and the state agrees.

{¶22} Based on the foregoing, Chambers' second assigned error has merit.

{¶23} Therefore, the judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case is remanded to the trial court to issue an amended sentencing entry, which shall attribute 123 days of jail-time credit to Chambers as of the date of sentencing.

JOHN J. EKLUND, P.J., ROBERT J PATTON, J., concur.