Opinion
2 CA-CR 2024-0087
12-20-2024
The State of Arizona, Appellee, v. Paul Dayne Chamberlain, Appellant.
Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General Alice M. Jones, Deputy Solicitor General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals By Christine Davis, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix Counsel for Appellee James Fullin, Pima County Legal Defender By Robb P. Holmes, Assistant Legal Defender, Tucson Counsel for Appellant
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County No. CR20222417001 The Honorable James E. Marner, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General Alice M. Jones, Deputy Solicitor General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals By Christine Davis, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix Counsel for Appellee
James Fullin, Pima County Legal Defender By Robb P. Holmes, Assistant Legal Defender, Tucson Counsel for Appellant
Presiding Judge Gard authored the decision of the Court, in which Chief Judge Staring and Judge Eckerstrom concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
GARD, Presiding Judge:
¶1 Paul Chamberlain appeals his conviction and sentence for resisting arrest, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 In June 2022, Deputy Scott of the Pima County Sheriff's Department responded to a report from T.S. that his neighbor "Paul," later identified as Chamberlain, had come to his house with a knife and threatened to kill him and his family. While speaking to T.S., Scott heard yelling coming from Chamberlain's front yard, where Chamberlain had been talking to another deputy. Scott went to investigate the commotion and encountered Chamberlain in a "highly agitated" state. Chamberlain admitted having had an encounter with T.S. but would not discuss the specifics. He also possessed an elongated lighter that resembled a knife. Chamberlain accused the deputies of being federal agents impersonating deputies, and he did not appear to be "in a clear state of mind."
Generally, "[i]n reviewing the denial of a defendant's motion to suppress, we consider only 'evidence presented at the suppression hearing and view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court's ruling.'" State v. Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. 299, ¶ 3 (2016) (quoting State v. Hausner, 230 Ariz. 60, ¶ 23 (2012)). We accordingly derive our factual recitation from that hearing. We note that Chamberlain renewed his motion to suppress after the close of evidence at trial, and the trial court found no good cause to reconsider the pretrial ruling. Although Chamberlain cites the trial testimony in his factual statement, he directs us to nothing in that testimony that calls into question the court's prior decision; in fact, he appears to agree that we should review only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.
¶3 Deputy Scott decided to detain Chamberlain while he continued to investigate T.S.'s allegations. He asked Chamberlain for his full name, but Chamberlain refused to provide it. Scott warned Chamberlain that he would be arrested if he did not provide his name, but Chamberlain still refused. Scott then advised Chamberlain he was under arrest and instructed him to place his hands behind his back. Chamberlain instead advanced toward Scott, leading to a brief struggle.
¶4 A grand jury indicted Chamberlain for one count of aggravated assault on a peace officer and one count of resisting arrest. In his motion to suppress, Chamberlain argued the deputies had detained him without reasonable suspicion and asked the trial court to suppress all evidence flowing from the purportedly illegal detention as fruit of the poisonous tree. The court denied the motion. The court observed that, when the deputies had contacted Chamberlain to investigate T.S.'s allegations, he possessed an object that could have been mistaken for a knife. The court found that Chamberlain had been agitated when speaking to the deputies and that he had indicated there was some sort of confrontation. These facts, the court concluded, amounted to reasonable suspicion for Chamberlain's continued detention while the deputies investigated whether he had threatened T.S. And because Chamberlain had been detained based on reasonable suspicion, the court determined there was probable cause to arrest him once he refused to provide his name. See A.R.S. § 13-2412.
¶5 Following a two-day trial, a jury found Chamberlain guilty of resisting arrest but could not reach a verdict on aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Chamberlain to a mitigated term of four months' imprisonment. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A)(1).
On the state's motion, the trial court later dismissed the aggravated assault count.
Discussion
¶6 Chamberlain appears to agree his detention was initially valid. He argues, however, that Deputy Scott's request for his name exceeded the detention's scope and purpose, transforming it into an unconstitutional seizure under the federal and state constitutions. He maintains that the evidence supporting his resisting-arrest conviction should have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree, as it flowed directly from his illegal detention. Whether reasonable suspicion exists to justify an investigatory detention is a mixed question of fact and law. See State v. Evans, 237 Ariz. 231, ¶ 6 (2015); State v. Majalca, 251 Ariz. 325, ¶ 11 (App. 2021). We therefore "review the trial court's factual findings . . . for an abuse of discretion, but we review its ultimate legal determination de novo." Evans, 237 Ariz. 231, ¶ 6. The trial court did not err by denying the motion to suppress here.
The state does not dispute Chamberlain's assumption that he was detained during his entire conversation with the deputies. We assume the same for this decision's purposes.
¶7 The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend IV. Outside the context of warrantless home searches, the Arizona Constitution provides coterminous protection. See Ariz. Const. art. II, § 8; State v. Mixton, 250 Ariz. 282, ¶ 32 (2021); State v. Hernandez, 244 Ariz. 1, ¶ 23 (2018). An officer may constitutionally detain a person for investigative purposes based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Evans, 237 Ariz. 231, ¶ 7; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968). "In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, officers and courts reviewing their actions take into account 'the totality of the circumstances-the whole picture' of what occurred at the scene." Evans, 237 Ariz. 231, ¶ 8 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). "From 'that whole picture' the officers must derive 'a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.'" Id. (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18).
¶8 "By definition, reasonable suspicion is something short of probable cause." State v. Woods, 236 Ariz. 527, ¶ 11 (App. 2015) (quoting State v. O'Meara, 198 Ariz. 294, ¶ 10 (2000)). "Although a mere 'unparticularized suspicion or hunch' does not establish reasonable suspicion, consideration 'must be given . . . to the specific reasonable inferences [that an officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.'" Evans, 237 Ariz. 231, ¶ 8 (alteration in Evans) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). And when an officer has lawfully detained a person based on reasonable suspicion, that person must comply with the officer's request that he provide his true full name. See § 13-2412(A) (making it unlawful for a person, after receiving adequate warnings, "to fail or refuse to state the person's true full name on request of a peace officer who has lawfully detained the person based on reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime"). The person's refusal to do so is a class two misdemeanor. § 13-2412(B).
¶9 Here, deputies contacted Chamberlain to investigate whether he had threatened T.S. with a knife. Chamberlain admitted he had had some sort of encounter with T.S. He also possessed an object that could have been mistaken for a knife, he appeared agitated, and he made statements suggesting he was not "in a clear state of mind." Under the totality of the circumstances, these facts amounted to "a particularized and objective basis for suspecting [Chamberlain] of criminal activity" and warranted his continued detention for further investigation. Evans, 237 Ariz. 231, ¶ 8 (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18). And because the deputies had reasonable suspicion to detain Chamberlain, § 13-2412 required him to divulge his true full name in response to Deputy Scott's request for that information.
¶10 Chamberlain's argument that there was no reasonable suspicion to request his name because his "actual identity was not at issue" is not persuasive. "A state law requiring a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a valid Terry stop is consistent with Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures," and an officer may arrest a person for violating such a law so long as the identification request is "reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop." Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 188 (2004). And in general, "questions concerning a suspect's identity are a routine and accepted part of many Terry stops" and serve "important government interests." Id. at 186.
¶11 Here, Deputy Scott's questions were reasonably related to the reasons for Chamberlain's detention. Scott requested Chamberlain's name while investigating allegations that a person named "Paul" had threatened T.S. with bodily harm. Obtaining Chamberlain's identity would not only have allowed the deputies to confirm or rule out his identity as "Paul," but, as the state notes, would have also enabled them to check his prior record, assess his threat level, and plan their investigation accordingly. See id. (recognizing that "[k]nowledge of identity may inform an officer that a suspect is wanted for another offense or has a record of violence of mental disorder" or, on the other hand, "may help clear a suspect and allow the police to concentrate their efforts elsewhere."). Chamberlain's identity was unquestionably relevant to the reasons for which he was detained, and Scott's request, made in the midst of his ongoing investigation, was "a commonsense inquiry, not an effort to obtain an arrest for failure to identify after a Terry stop yielded insufficient evidence." Id. at 189. The trial court did not err by denying the motion to suppress.
Disposition
¶12 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Chamberlain's conviction and sentence.