; State v. Pulley, No. M2000-02609-CCA-R3CD, 2001 WL 1597740, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2001) (explaining in the context of the Deceptive Business Practices Statute that “[a]lthough unrelated to the provisions of the criminal code, we adopt the definition of ‘business’ as provided by Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-4-702 which affords a fair import of the term ‘business’ and which gives proper effect to the legislative intent”); see also State v. Cawood, No. E2000-02478-CCA-R3CD, 2002 WL 264621, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 25, 2002), vacated on other grounds, 134 S.W.3d 159 (Tenn. 2004) (applying the Business Tax Act definition of “business” to conclude that the defendant could not be guilty of patronizing prostitution in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-514(b)(1)). The Court briefly notes the important principles to keep in mind when interpreting a statute in Tennessee:

Royston is not entitled to relief on these claims. For this argument, Royston relies on State v. F. Chris Cawood, No. E2000-02478-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 264621 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Feb. 25, 2002) (finding insufficient evidence of prostitution based on definition of "business"), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. Sept. 9, 2002).