Since those instructions were withdrawn we need consider only the final instruction, upon which the jury is presumed to have relied. State v. Cobb, 199 Conn. 322, 329, 507 A.2d 457 (1986); State v. Cavros, 196 Conn. 519, 528, 494 A.2d 550, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 904, 106 S.Ct. 233, 88 L.Ed.2d 232 (1985); Willametz v. Guida-Seibert Dairy Co., 157 Conn. 295, 301, 254 A.2d 473 (1968). That supplemental charge is set forth in the footnote.
In noting that a trial court has wide discretion in passing on motions for mistrial, we have said that `"[t]he general principle is that a mistrial should be granted only as a result of some occurrence upon the trial of such a character that it is apparent to the court that because of it a party cannot have a fair trial and the whole proceedings are vitiated." State v. Brigandi, supra, 543; State v. Cavros, 196 Conn. 519, 526, 494 A.2d 550, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 904, 106 S.Ct. 233, 88 L.Ed.2d 232 (1985); State v. Marra, 195 Conn. 421, 436, 489 A.2d 350 (1985)." State v. Rodriguez, supra, 326-27.
In noting that a trial court has wide discretion in passing on motions for mistrial, we have said that "`[t]he general principle is that a mistrial should be granted only as a result of some occurrence upon the trial of such a character that it is apparent to the court that because of it a party cannot have a fair trial . . . and the whole proceedings are vitiated.'" State v. Brigandi, supra, 543; State v. Cavros, 196 Conn. 519, 526, 494 A.2d 550, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 904, 106 S.Ct. 233, 88 L.Ed.2d 232 (1985); State v. Marra, 195 Conn. 421, 436, 489 A.2d 350 (1985). In our analysis of this case, we first point out that the core impartiality of a jury in a criminal trial presents an unusual problem where a "sitting juror" is called upon to be, and becomes, a witness in the very proceeding that he and his fellow jurors were carefully selected to decide.
State v. Bailey, supra, 338. "[W]e consider the supplemental charge together with the allegedly erroneous original comment in determining prejudicial impact . . . ." State v. Cavros, 196 Conn. 519, 528, 494 A.2d 550, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 904, 106 S.Ct. 233, 88 L.Ed.2d 232 (1985). The record indicates that the trial court recalled the jury from its deliberations and expressly ordered the jurors to disregard that aspect of General Statutes 53-21 relating to placing the victim in a situation where her health or morals may be injured or impaired. "[A]bsent a fair indication to the contrary, we presume that these instructions were followed."
The jury is presumed to follow the instructions given by the trial court. State v. Cavros, 196 Conn. 519, 528, 494 A.2d 550, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 904, 106 S.Ct. 233, 88 L.Ed.2d 232 (1985). In this case, the jury did not reach the question of cohabitation as an affirmative defense to 53a-70 because it found the defendant guilty of violating 53a-70b.
A charge is not to be critically dissected for purposes of discovering possible inaccuracies; State v. Davis, 198 Conn. 680, 686, 504 A.2d 1372 (1986); State v. Reddick, 197 Conn. 115, 132, 496 A.2d 466 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1067, 106 S.Ct. 822, 88 L.Ed.2d 795 (1986); but rather, the initial charge and any supplemental charge are to be read as a whole. State v. Cavros, 196 Conn. 519, 528, 494 A.2d 550, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 904, 106 S.Ct. 233, 88 L.Ed.2d 232 (1985); State v. Topciu, 183 Conn. 1, 6, 483 A.2d 803 (1981). "`"The ultimate test of a court's instructions is whether, taken as a whole, they fairly and adequately present the case to a jury in such a way that injustice is not done to either party under the established rules of law.
Any possible prejudice stemming from the portion of the question that the jury did hear was cured by the prompt curative instruction and the further instruction given by the judge in his final charge. State v. Cavros, 196 Conn. 519, 528, 494 A.2d 550, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 904, 106 S.Ct. 233, 88 L.Ed.2d 232 (1985); State v. Gasparro, 194 Conn. 96, 111, 480 A.2d 509 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828, 106 S.Ct. 90, 88 L.Ed.2d 74 (1985); State v. Falcone, 191 Conn. 12, 25, 463 A.2d 558 (1983). In view of these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial.
Jurors are presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to follow the court's instructions. State v. Rouleau, 204 Conn. 240, 254, 528 A.2d 343 (1987); State v. Cavros, 196 Conn. 519, 528, 494 A.2d 550, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 904, 106 S.Ct. 233, 88 L.Ed.2d 232 (1985). Thus, in this case, as in Asherman, the jury's use of the dictionary definition of proximate cause did not prejudice the plaintiff.
Where, as here, supplemental instructions are reviewed those must be considered together with the original instructions. State v. Cavros, 196 Conn. 519, 528, 494 A.2d 550, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 904, 106 S.Ct. 233, 88 L.Ed.2d 232 (1985). The test to be applied to any part of the charge is whether the charge, when taken as a whole, presents the case to the jury fairly and accurately, such that no injustice will be done.
Absent a fair indication to the contrary, we presume that the jury followed the court's instruction. State v. Cavros, 196 Conn. 519, 528, 494 A.2d 550, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 904, 106 S.Ct. 233, 88 L.Ed.2d 232 (1985). In this case, the foreman of the jury said specifically that the four jurors had not discussed any of the evidence.