Opinion
No. 110,411.
2014-11-26
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Kyle S. CATON, Appellant.
Appeal from Shawnee District Court; John E. Sanders, Judge.Jonathan B. Phelps, of Phelps–Chartered, of Topeka, for appellant.Jodi Litfin, assistant district attorney, Chadwick J. Taylor, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Appeal from Shawnee District Court; John E. Sanders, Judge.
Jonathan B. Phelps, of Phelps–Chartered, of Topeka, for appellant. Jodi Litfin, assistant district attorney, Chadwick J. Taylor, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before STANDRIDGE, P.J., ATCHESON, J., and BURGESS, S.J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Kyle S. Caton appeals his conviction for misdemeanor domestic battery arising from a fracas he had with his sister Kelly in October 2012 at their father's house. The Shawnee County District Court convicted Caton in a bench trial the following July. Caton's arguments revolve around his claim of self-defense. We find the arguments unavailing and affirm.
Caton and Kelly, both young adults, testified at trial. Caton lived at the house with various family members, including an infant nephew. Kelly no longer lived there but had come over to babysit at the request of her sister, the child's mother. Caton and Kelly got into a verbal disagreement about how she was attending to the baby. They wound up on the front porch. A neighbor saw Kelly pushing Caton and Caton attempting to block Kelly from going back into the house. According to the neighbor, each punched and was otherwise struggling or wrestling with the other. A Shawnee County Sheriff's deputy responded to a call about the disturbance. He observed some red marks and swelling on Kelly's face. At trial, Caton testified that he had placed Kelly in a headlock after she bit him. He also testified he pushed her out on the porch after she refused to leave the house as he requested.
The district court found Caton guilty of domestic battery in violation of K.S.A.2013 Supp. 21–5414, imposed a sentence of 30 days in jail, and placed him on unsupervised probation with conditions for 90 days.
On appeal, Caton contends he was entitled to claim self-defense immunity under K.S.A.2013 Supp. 21–5231. He did not assert that immunity in the district court before trial. The Kansas Supreme Court has held that a defendant must invoke the statutory immunity conferred in K.S.A.2013 Supp. 21–5231 (formerly K.S.A. 21–3219) before trial. State v. Jones, 298 Kan. 324, 334, 311 P.3d 1125 (2013). Any right to the immunity is lost if defendant first raises the issue during or after trial. 298 Kan. at 334. Based on the holding in Jones, we reject Caton's point.
Caton next contends the evidence was insufficient to convict insofar as he was lawfully defending himself or attempting to evict Kelly from the house. He also questions whether the district court considered self-defense in rendering its judgment.
In reviewing a sufficiency challenge, we construe the evidence in a light most favorable to the party prevailing below, here the State, and in support of the conviction. An appellate court will neither reweigh the evidence generally nor make credibility determinations specifically. State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 509, 525, 324 P.3d 1078 (2014); State v. Pham, 281 Kan. 1227, 1252, 136 P.3d 919 (2006). The issue for review is simply whether a rational factfinder could have declared the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 710, 245 P.3d 1030 (2011).
Here, the State charged Caton with alternative forms of domestic battery under K.S.A.2013 Supp. 21–5414, requiring proof that Caton either caused physical contact with Kelly in a rude, insulting, or angry manner or knowingly caused bodily harm to her. Taken in the best light for the State, the evidence supports both alternatives. The neighbor's testimony shows shoving and fisticuffs—physical contact—Caton used to keep Kelly from reentering the house. That conduct reasonably could be construed as rude and angry under the circumstances, satisfying the first alternative ground for the charge. And the undisputed evidence showed Kelly to have some, though comparatively minor, physical injuries. That's sufficient to satisfy the second alternative ground.
Caton says he should have been found not guilty based on self-defense, K.S.A.2013 Supp. 21–5222(a), or use of force in defense of a dwelling, K.S.A.2013 Supp. 21–5223(a). In assessing the testimony and other evidence, the district court concluded that the facts established a “mutual combat” situation between Caton and Kelly, particularly on the front porch, as described by the neighbor. The evidence supports that characterization of their conflict, especially at that point. Mutual combatants typically cannot claim self-defense. See State v. Barnes, 263 Kan. 249, 266, 948 P.2d 627 (1997) (homicide prosecution); State v. Walker, 28 Kan.App.2d 700, 704, 20 P.3d 1269 (firearms offense), rev. denied 271 Kan. 1041 (2001); Comment, Standing Your Ground in Kansas, 82 UMKC L.Rev. 847, 866 (2014) (Under Kansas law, “a determination of mutual combat cuts off the entire self-defense analysis[.]”). The district court acted as a reasonable factfinder in concluding the circumstances were inconsistent with Caton's suggestion of self-defense. Caton's complementary suggestion that he applied lawful physical force to remove Kelly from the house is similarly unpersuasive given the mutual combat.
Caton also contends the district court failed to consider self-defense or defense of a dwelling at all as possible defenses to the charge. The record indicates otherwise. We observe that both the State and Caton waived opening statements and closing arguments, so the defenses were not specifically highlighted in counsels' presentations. But the district court's analysis of the evidence as demonstrating mutual combat—a circumstance the district court correctly characterized as precluding “a defense to domestic battery” and other crimes—necessarily encompassed rejection of self-defense or defense of a dwelling.
The district court wasn't obligated to serially enumerate and discard potential affirmative defenses in rendering its ruling. State v. Kendall, 300 Kan. ––––, 331 P.3d 763, 773 (2014) (district court need not make findings of fact and specific conclusions of law in bench trial of criminal case; it may render the equivalent of a general jury verdict); State v. Scott, 201 Kan. 134, 137, 439 P.2d 78 (1968). Moreover, Caton did not ask the district court to make more detailed findings or to specifically address those defenses. See State v. Gaither, 283 Kan. 671, 685–86, 156 P.3d 602 (2007) (when party fails to object to lack of findings by district court, appellate court presumes district court made those findings sufficient to support ruling).
We, therefore, reject Caton's second point on appeal.
Affirmed.