Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0421-11T2
06-13-2014
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. PAULA CASTORAN, Defendant-Appellant.
Fox Rothschild LLP, attorneys for appellant (Jack Plackter, of counsel and on the brief). James P McClain, Acting Atlantic County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Mario C. Formica, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Chief Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Kennedy and Guadagno.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County, Indictment No. 08-09-2230.
Fox Rothschild LLP, attorneys for appellant (Jack Plackter, of counsel and on the brief).
James P McClain, Acting Atlantic County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Mario C. Formica, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Chief Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals her conviction of the disorderly persons offense of obstructing the administration of law, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1, following a two-day bench trial in the Law Division. Defendant makes the following arguments in support of her appeal:
POINT I: THE LOWER COURT'S LEGAL CONCLUSIONS ARE CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED LAW.We have considered these arguments in light of the record and applicable law, and we affirm.
POINT II: THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL DID NOT ESTABLISH BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT APPELLANT "PURPOSELY" OBSTRUCTED, IMPAIRED, OR PERVERTED THE ADMINISTRATION OF LAW.
A. The Record Does Not Establish Beyond a Reasonable Doubt that Appellant Obstructed, Impaired, or Perverted the Administration of Law or Attempted to Prevent a Public Servant From Performing An Official Function.
B. The Record Does Not Establish Beyond a Reasonable Doubt that Appellant Acted With a Specific Purpose to Obstruct, Impair, or Pervert the Administration of Law.
C. The Record Does Not Establish Beyond a Reasonable Doubt that Appellant Committed an Independently Unlawful Act in Purposefully Obstructing the Administration of Law.
I.
We discern the facts from the record. In January 2008, defendant saw a news broadcast about a trial then being conducted in Atlantic County before a judge and jury captioned, State v. Christopher Blank. Blank was being tried on serious charges stemming from his discharge of a weapon at Egg Harbor police officers, and, according to Blank's lawyer, "the defense perspective was that the police were using unreasonable force to effectuate an arrest and thus [Blank] had a right to defend himself from that unreasonable force." Although she did not know Blank, defendant, perceiving herself as having been the victim of "police brutality" in the past, decided to "support" Blank by going to his trial. Her plan was "to stand behind [Blank] and let that [j]udge see that . . . I know what's going on."
Accordingly, on January 17, 2008, defendant entered the courtroom as a witness was testifying during Blank's trial, and sat behind Blank and his lawyer in a pew two or three rows behind the front pew. After a short period, defendant stood up, removed an outer garment, reached into her bag and pulled out a t-shirt which she then put on in view of the jury.
The t-shirt was inscribed with the words "ACPD Atlantic City's Finest Liars" on the front and "Police Brutality Victim, Atlantic City" on the back. Defendant remained standing for approximately two minutes, during which time she was "turning around" and bending over in a manner so that that both sides of the shirt were exposed to the jury.
Upon seeing defendant, the trial judge halted the trial and excused the jury from the courtroom. At a sidebar conference, Mark Roddy, Blank's attorney, asked the judge to remove defendant from the courtroom, and expressed concern that her presence after appearing in court "with a billboard on [her] back" might have "contaminated" the trial. Defendant was thereafter instructed to remove the t-shirt and leave the courtroom, and was later arrested and charged with obstructing the administration of law, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1.
The judge subsequently undertook a voir dire of the jury and two jurors acknowledged seeing defendant and her t-shirt. One juror concluded that the t-shirt "meant something because it referred to a police department" and the other juror determined that defendant was "trying to make a statement" about police brutality. Both jurors, however, stated that defendant's actions would not have an impact upon their impartiality or ability to reach a verdict, and the trial of Blank continued.
As noted earlier, defendant was tried on the obstruction charge over two days before Judge Albert Garofolo, who was not the judge presiding at the trial of Blank. During defendant's trial, the following individuals testified: Mr. Roddy, the assistant prosecutor for the Blank trial, a court officer, Blank, the two jurors who viewed defendant's actions during the trial on January 17, 2008, a character witness for defendant, and defendant. Following the testimony of witnesses, and closing statements, Judge Garofolo found defendant guilty and stated, in pertinent part,
[M]s. Castoran came into the courtroom during the trial, the witness was on the stand, the jury was in the box, and obviously did so with some aforethought, if not premeditation, and as a result of it being I think inescapably inferable that she brought with her the tee-shirt, the offending tee-shirt, and as she candidly admits, did not put it on before coming into the courtroom but chose to put it on in the courtroom.This appeal followed.
Now that conduct in and of itself, in my view, was calculated to draw attention to herself because you're sitting in the courtroom if you're in the jury box, if you're sitting on the bench, people are sitting in the pews, very, in most circumstances, very quietly and orderly, while the business of the court is conducted.
Anything that would distract the eye or the ear from that is hyperbolized. I know from my own sitting here anything that just, any movement whether, or sound, easily draws the attention of everyone, and a person standing, removing her jacket, and doing the rather bizarre thing of putting on an article of clothing requiring that it be placed over the head, then once that's accomplished then the arms through the sleeves and so forth, it's not just an ordinary thing that one would see from the audience in a jury trial in a courtroom.
So in my view that was done with some flourish, with some introduction if you will, some way of getting the attention of the people who likely would see it.
. . . .
The jury, in my view, was more apt to see what she was wearing on this shirt in the place where Ms. Castoran chose to sit, which of course was in line with her support for the defendant because it was behind the defendant.
. . . The ability and likelihood that the jury would see it and she had to have known the jury would see it, is inescapable, it's compelled by the conduct of Ms. Castoran on that day and her purpose is so palpable as to be self evident.
. . . .
[T]his trial was disturbed substantially and dramatically. The jury was abruptly discharged. There was a to-do, a buzz in the courtroom. It was interrupted. The witness who was on the stand and being questioned by Mr. Talasnik, that came to an abrupt end and the Court was thereafter consumed with preventing further damage, ascertaining whether there had been any, conducting a voir dire of two of the jurors.
It had the clear capacity to distract, and even exacerbate what harmful effect or taint Ms. Castoran's actions may have had by driving home to the jury this issue of what occurred of necessity to protect everyone's rights, but it in so doing had the capacity to further spread the taint if there had been any to begin with.
There can be no question about this jury trial was seriously interrupted. I don't know how long it took but I'm guessing it easily took upwards of an hour. So that element of this charge, although it need only be an attempt to do so, but clearly there was a disruption, an impairment, a perversion of this governmental function.
The only question remains whether Ms. Castoran, whether it was her purpose to do so. Based upon my comments previously, for me it is inescapable that she accomplished her intended purpose of disrupting of perverting or impairing the trial of Christopher Blank and I therefore find her guilty.
II.
Upon examination of a court's verdict in a non-jury case, the standard of review for determining if the State satisfied its burden is not whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, but rather "whether there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the judge's determination." State ex rel. R.V., 280 N.J. Super. 118, 121 (App. Div. 1995). Moreover, we are obliged to "give deference to those findings of the trial judge which are substantially influenced by [the] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)).
Guided by this standard, we affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Garofolo. We add only the following. The evidence at trial, with the exception of the t-shirt, was entirely testimonial, and, in material part, was consistent with the facts presented by defendant. Defendant argues that the inferences Judge Garofolo drew from the evidence respecting her state of mind are erroneous. This argument is without merit. A state of mind is rarely susceptible to direct proof, but must ordinarily be inferred from the facts. See State v. Moll, 206 N.J. Super. 257, 260 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 103 N.J. 498 (1986). Here, the facts supporting the inferences drawn by Judge Garofolo are supported by substantial, credible evidence and thus are binding on appeal. State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544, 565 (2011); Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998).
N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) provides, in pertinent part:
A person commits an offense if he purposely obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function or prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from lawfully performing an official function by means of flight, intimidation, force, violence, or physical interference or obstacle, or by means of any independently unlawful act.The "independently unlawful act" under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) include those acts which violate other statutes, State v. Kent, 173 N.J. Super. 215, 222 (App. Div. 1980), and need not be the subject of an independent, formal charge. See, e.g.. State v. Perlstein, 206 N.J. Super. 246, 252-53 (App. Div. 1985). Here, the "independently unlawful act" was defendant's effort to improperly influence the jury in State v. Blank. See N.J.S.A. 2C:29-8 ("Any person who, directly or indirectly, corrupts, influences or attempts to corrupt or influence a jury or juror to be more favorable to the one side than to the other by promises, persuasions, entreaties, threats, letters, money, entertainment or other sinister means . . . is guilty of a crime.")
The evidence at trial, as well as the inferences that can be drawn from that evidence, clearly support defendant's conviction. The remainder of defendant's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION