Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-5396-14T1
03-23-2016
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAVID CONNOR CASTELLANI, Defendant-Respondent.
James P. McClain, Atlantic County Prosecutor, attorney for appellant (Courtney M. Cittadini, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). Reynolds & Scheffler, L.L.C., attorneys for respondent (Steven P. Scheffler, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Hoffman and Whipple. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County, Indictment No. 15-01-0160. James P. McClain, Atlantic County Prosecutor, attorney for appellant (Courtney M. Cittadini, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). Reynolds & Scheffler, L.L.C., attorneys for respondent (Steven P. Scheffler, on the brief). PER CURIAM
The State appeals a July 24, 2015 order admitting defendant into the pre-trial intervention program (PTI) over its objection. We affirm.
On June 15, 2013, officers from the Atlantic City Police Department responded to a call from the Tropicana Hotel and Casino (Tropicana) after defendant was ejected from the premises for disorderly conduct and creating a disturbance. Defendant, who was drunk and underage, had been at the Tropicana with several friends. He had been escorted out of the Tropicana by hotel security where he became combative and refused to leave. Defendant was given a summons for disorderly conduct and was advised again to leave. He threw the summons on the ground. When additional police arrived, defendant continued to argue with the officers, directing expletives and taunts towards them and disobeying their direction to leave the premises. After police warned defendant to leave the premises several times, defendant approached the officers in an aggressive manner. Defendant was then taken down by four or five officers who repeatedly struck him with fists, kicks, and batons while he resisted. Within one or two minutes, the police K-9 unit arrived and set a large police dog upon defendant. Defendant suffered injuries that required a four-day hospitalization, which required 200 stitches to his head, neck, and chest.
On January 20, 2015, defendant was indicted for third-degree aggravated assault upon a police officer, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(5)(a), third-degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29- 2a(3)(a), and inflicting harm and third-degree inflicting harm on a Law Enforcement Animal, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3.1. At a later time, defendant filed a civil suit against certain officers as a result of the incident.
The record is unclear as to the details of the pending civil suit.
On March 30, 2015, defendant entered a plea of not guilty and applied for PTI. On May 15, 2015 the Atlantic County PTI director recommended defendant for admission into the PTI program. The Atlantic County Prosecutor subsequently objected to the recommendation and rejected the application. Defendant appealed the denial to the Superior Court. Judge Michael Donio heard the application and granted defendant entry into PTI on July 24, 2015 after explaining his reasons on the record. This appeal followed.
On July 31, 2015, Judge Donio amplified his decision in writing pursuant to Rule 2:5-1(b).
The State makes the following argument on appeal:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING DEFENDANT INTO PTI OVER THE PROSECUTOR'S OBJECTION BECAUSE IT SUBSITUTED ITS OWN JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE PROSECUTOR.
We review the trial judge's decision to override the prosecutor's rejection of a PTI application de novo. We do so because "[i]ssues concerning the propriety of the prosecutor's consideration of a particular [PTI] factor are akin to 'questions of law[.]'" State v. Maddocks, 80 N.J. 98, 104 (1979). "Consequently, on such matters an appellate court is free to substitute its independent judgment for that of the trial court or the prosecutor should it deem either to have been in error." Id. at 105; see also Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) (explaining that a "trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.") (citations omitted).
"PTI is a 'diversionary program through which certain offenders are able to avoid criminal prosecution by receiving early rehabilitative services expected to deter future criminal behavior.'" State v. Roseman, 221 N.J. 611, 621 (2015) (quoting State v. Nwobu, 139 N.J. 236, 240 (1995)). The goal of PTI is to allow, in appropriate situations, defendants to avoid the potential stigma of a guilty conviction and the State to avoid "the full criminal justice mechanism of a trial." State v. Bell, 217 N.J. 336, 347-48 (2014).
PTI is governed by statute and court rule. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12 to -22; R. 3:28; Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Guidelines to R. 3:28 (2015). Deciding whether to permit a defendant to divert to PTI "is a quintessentially prosecutorial function." State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576, 582 (1996) (citing State v. Dalglish, 86 N.J. 503, 513 (1981)). "Prosecutorial discretion in this context is critical for two reasons. First, because it is the fundamental responsibility of the prosecutor to decide whom to prosecute, and second, because it is a primary purpose of PTI to augment, not diminish, a prosecutor's options." Nwobu, supra, 139 N.J. at 246 (quoting State v. Kraft, 265 N.J. Super. 106, 111-12 (App. Div. 1993)). Accordingly, "prosecutors are granted broad discretion to determine if a defendant should be diverted" to PTI instead of being prosecuted. State v. K.S., 220 N.J. 190, 199 (2015) (citing Wallace, supra, 146 N.J. at 582); see also State v. Negran, 178 N.J. 73, 82 (2003) (stating that courts must "allow prosecutors wide latitude in deciding whom to divert into the PTI program and whom to prosecute through a traditional trial.").
"[T]he scope of review is severely limited." Negran, supra, 178 N.J. at 82. Reviewing courts must accord the prosecutor "extreme deference." Nwobu, supra, 139 N.J. at 246 (quoting Kraft, supra, 265 N.J. Super. at 111-12). To overturn a prosecutor's rejection, a defendant must "clearly and convincingly establish that the prosecutor's decision constitutes a patent and gross abuse of discretion." State v. Watkins, 390 N.J. Super. 302, 305-06 (App. Div. 2007), aff'd, 193 N.J. 507 (2008) (citations omitted). "[I]nterference by reviewing courts is reserved for those cases where needed to check the most egregious examples of injustice and unfairness." State v. Lee, 437 N.J. Super. 555, 563 (App. Div. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), certif. denied, 222 N.J. 18 (2015). We apply the same standard of review as the Law Division. See State v. Waters, 439 N.J. Super. 215, 226 (App. Div. 2015).
However, in Roseman, supra, our Supreme Court clearly explains that, regardless of the relevant statutory presumptions, "[e]ligibility for PTI is broad enough to include all defendants who demonstrate sufficient effort to effect necessary behavioral change and show that future criminal behavior will not occur." Pressler & Verneiro, supra, Guideline 2 on R. 3:28, at 1167. When a statutory presumption against PTI applies, a criminal defendant can show that PTI is nonetheless warranted through "facts or materials demonstrating the defendant's amenability to the rehabilitation process." Ibid. To overcome the statutory presumption against PTI, the defendant must "show compelling reasons justifying . . . admission, and establish that a decision against enrollment would be arbitrary and unreasonable." Ibid. Presumptions against PTI reflect an assumption that certain defendants "have committed crimes that are, by their very nature, serious or heinous and with respect to which the benefits of diversion are presumptively unavailable." Watkins, supra, 193 N.J. at 523. Accordingly, our Supreme Court has stated that overcoming these presumptions requires showing "something extraordinary or unusual" about the defendant's background. Nwobu, supra, 139 N.J. at 252-53.
In determining whether "extraordinary and unusual" circumstances exist, a fact-sensitive analysis requiring the consideration of "idiosyncratic" circumstances is required. These circumstances must demonstrate that "denial of PTI has resulted in a serious injustice." Ibid. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In order to show a patent and gross abuse of discretion has occurred in the context of a prosecutor's denial of a PTI application, defendant must first show that the prosecutor's determination (a) did not take into account all relevant factors; (b) was based upon irrelevant or inappropriate factors; or (c) constituted a clear error in judgment. Defendant must also make a showing that the prosecutorial error will "clearly subvert the goals underlying Pretrial Intervention." Id. at 247 (citing State v. Bender, 80 N.J. 84, 93 (1979)).
Here, Judge Donio found a patent and gross abuse of discretion on the prosecutor's part because of his "reli[ance] on irrelevant, inappropriate factors in fashioning a denial of PTI while overlooking and not stressing the positive factors of this defendant." In particular, the trial judge found the prosecutor overlooked and discounted defendant's intoxication on the night of the incident in assessing defendant's amenability to rehabilitation, as well as positive factors in defendant's life. However, primary bases for the trial court's finding of a patent and gross abuse of discretion, were the prosecutor's assertion that defendant's civil suit against the police and media interviews demonstrated a lack of remorse and the desire of the complainant/victim, a police officer, not to forego prosecution. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(4), (14). The State argues that these determinations were error because the trial judge substituted his own judgment for that of the prosecutor. We disagree.
The State also argues that the trial court erred in "intimating" that the State conditioned an offer of acceptance into PTI upon a guilty plea. We note there was extensive discussion of the issue at oral argument of defendant's motion, but the trial judge did not explicitly find as such. We therefore decline to discuss this issue as part of this analysis. --------
The record demonstrates that the officer identified in the indictment as the victim expressed to the prosecutor his desire that the case not be diverted through the PTI process. In State v. Hoffman, 399 N.J. Super. 207, 216 (App. Div. 2008), we held that a victim's status as a police officer does not eviscerate N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(4), which requires prosecutors to consider "[t]he desire of the complainant or victim to forego prosecution." Indeed, a prosecutor has the prerogative to view a potentially dangerous situation, such as this, as a serious matter and to weigh the victims' wishes accordingly. We discerned no legislative intention to discount assault upon police officers as though it were something to be expected. But the victim's status as a police officer should not have ended the inquiry by the prosecutor, who was aware that the victim had a stake in the outcome of the civil suit. Indeed, as acknowledged by the prosecutor, the State itself had a stake in the outcome of the suit.
In the same vein, the prosecutor relied upon defendant's filing of the civil suit as a demonstration of such a lack of remorse to render any pretrial intervention ineffective. The prosecutor's refusal to discount or even consider the motivation of the officer in withholding consent for defendant's admission into PTI, coupled with his reliance upon the filing of the civil suit as a demonstration of defendant's lack of remorse was irrelevant, inappropriate, and a patent and gross abuse of discretion. We accordingly discern no error in the trial judge's determination.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION