Opinion
A-1-CA-39051
05-25-2022
STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Respondent-Appellee, v. GASPAR RENE OLIVAS CASTAÑEDA, Petitioner-Appellant.
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General Cole P. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General for Appellee The Law Office of Scott M. Davidson, Ph.D. Scott M. Davidson for Appellant
Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LUNA COUNTY Jarod K. Hofacket, District Judge
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General Cole P. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General for Appellee
The Law Office of Scott M. Davidson, Ph.D. Scott M. Davidson for Appellant
MEMORANDUM OPINION
ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge
{¶1}Petitioner Gaspar Rene Olivas Castañeda appeals the district court's order denying his motion to vacate his conviction for possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. See NMSA 1978, § 30-31-22(A)(1)(a) (1980, amended 2021). The district court concluded that the motion, which was filed in 2019, was not "filed within a reasonable time after the completion of [Petitioner's] sentence" in 1988. Rule 5-803(C) NMRA. For the sake of completeness, the court also addressed the merits of Petitioner's motion, rejecting his claim that he was not informed, before he pleaded guilty, that one of the essential elements of the offense was knowledge that he possessed a controlled substance. Unpersuaded that the district court ruled erroneously on timeliness, we affirm without addressing the court's ruling on the merits.
DISCUSSION
{¶2} Petitioner argues that the district court erred by concluding that his motion was untimely under Rule 5-803(C). We conclude that the district court ruled correctly based on the evidence and arguments presented to it. {3} Rule 5-803(C) requires that post-conviction challenges like Petitioner's "be filed within a reasonable time after the completion of the petitioner's sentence, unless the court finds good cause, excusable neglect, or extraordinary circumstances beyond the control of the petitioner that justify filing the petition beyond that time." We review the meaning of the language of the rule de novo, and we review the district court's application of the rule to the facts of the case for abuse of discretion. McGarrh v. State, ___NMCA___, ¶ 9, ___P.3d ___(No. A-1-CA-39044, Apr. 26, 2022).
{4} Although the State argued that Petitioner's motion was untimely in the district court and prevailed on that issue, the State does not defend the district court's timeliness ruling on appeal. Instead, echoing an argument made by Petitioner, the State now contends that "precedent interpreting Rule 1-060(B) NMRA and the common law writ of coram nobis eliminated any restrictions on the time for challenging the validity of a conviction as void." We are not bound by the State's concessions as a general matter, State v. Palmer, 1998-NMCA-052, ¶ 12, 125 N.M. 86, 957 P.2d 71, and we reject this one because it is contrary to the plain language of Rule 5-803(C), which explicitly imposes a timeliness requirement, as this Court has recently explained. McGarrh, ___NMCA-, ___ ¶¶ 9-10. The district court correctly concluded that Rule 5-803(C) requires challenges to be filed within a reasonable time after the completion of a sentence, unless one of the listed exceptions applies.
In the district court, Petitioner responded to the State's argument that his motion was untimely by contending that there is no time limit. Petitioner's briefing on appeal is less than clear on this point. To the extent that Petitioner seeks to present this argument, we reject it for the reasons stated in this opinion.
{¶5} Because Petitioner does not argue on appeal and did not argue in the district court that any of the exceptions justified the timing of his motion, the dispositive issue is narrow: whether the district court erred by concluding that the motion was not filed within a reasonable time after he completed his sentence. The district court did not err, in our view. The court concluded that Petitioner completed his sentence in 1988, when the court entered an order dismissing the charge and discharging him from probation, but that Petitioner did not file his motion until 2019: a delay of thirty-one years. Petitioner does not argue that thirty-one years is a reasonable time. He instead argues that the delay was not thirty-one years because the clock did not start ticking in 1988. Specifically, Petitioner contends that "there was no completion of his sentence, because he received a deferred sentence," and that the clock started to tick in 2014 when he learned of the immigration consequences of his conviction. We disagree. The district court correctly concluded that Petitioner completed his sentence in 1988, when the period of deferment ended and the court entered the order dismissing the charge. At that time, Petitioner had, as a matter of law, "satisfied his criminal liability for the crime." NMSA 1978, § 31-20-9 (1977). Because the 1988 order marked the completion of Petitioner's sentence for purposes of Rule 5-803(C), the clock began to tick in 1988, not at any subsequent point in time.
{6} Finally, we address Petitioner's assertion that the district court did not consider the statement in the committee commentary to Rule 5-803 that "[p]etitions may often be filed late under this rule because of the development of serious unforeseen collateral consequences which are beyond the control of the petitioner, such as deportation." This statement is a comment on the Rule 5-803(C) exception that allows district courts to consider petitions that are filed late-i.e., after a reasonable time has passed-because of "extraordinary circumstances beyond the control of the petitioner that justify filing the petition beyond that time," or perhaps the exception for "good cause." Petitioner did not point this comment out to the district court, and he did not ask the district court to apply any Rule 5-803(C) exception, so the issue is not preserved. On appeal, Petitioner has not developed an argument under any Rule 5-803(C) exception, much less argued that we should review any such argument despite the lack of preservation under, for example, the doctrine of fundamental error. See Rule 12-321(B) NMRA. We therefore decline to address the merits of the issue. See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 70, 309 P.3d 53 (recognizing that ruling on inadequately briefed issues would require courts to develop parties' arguments for them, creating a "substantial risk of error").
{¶7}In sum, the arguments presented by Petitioner do not persuade us that the district court erred by ruling that his motion was untimely. We therefore affirm the order denying his motion.
CONCLUSION
{8} We affirm.
{9} IT IS SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR: JENNIFER L. ATTREP, Judge SHAMMARA H. HENDERSON, Judge