Opinion
No. COA11–1142.
2012-07-3
STATE of North Carolina v. Ryan Edward CASLER, Defendant.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by I. Faison Hicks, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State. Amos Granger Tyndall, P.A., by Amos G. Tyndall, for defendant-appellant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 4 March 2011 by Judge Marvin K. Blount in Onslow County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 June 2012. Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by I. Faison Hicks, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State. Amos Granger Tyndall, P.A., by Amos G. Tyndall, for defendant-appellant.
MARTIN, Chief Judge.
Defendant Ryan Edward Casler appeals from judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of first-degree murder. We find no error in his trial.
The State's evidence at trial tended to show that on the evening of 18 January 2008, defendant and his wife attended a get-together at Tiffany and Gavin Foster's mobile home in the Gatlin Mobile Home Park in Hubert, North Carolina. During the course of the evening, defendant and the other guests drank alcohol and played drinking games. After midnight, two more men joined the party and brought marijuana into the house. One of these men was Joseph Wells. Although the marijuana belonged to Wells, he initially attributed it to defendant before later admitting it was his and apologizing to Ms. Foster. At some point, defendant and another man decided to go to the store. Wells asked to go with them, but defendant said no. This angered Wells, who then made a vulgar remark about defendant's wife and the other women at the party.
When defendant returned to the Foster's home, he and a few other men offered to take Wells home. Defendant was intoxicated at the time, but apparently in control of his faculties; in contrast, Wells, who was also intoxicated, was stumbling and staggering. While in the car, Wells and defendant argued over the music playing. Eventually, the driver pulled over in a remote rural area, nowhere near Wells' home, and Wells and defendant exited the car. They began to fight and, at some point, Wells cried out that he had been stabbed. The driver held Wells down while defendant stabbed him repeatedly. At the sight of another vehicle, defendant and the other men hurried back to the car and drove off, leaving Wells.
In the hours that followed, defendant admitted to numerous witnesses that he stabbed Wells. He also threatened several of the parties involved to dissuade them from telling anyone what had happened. The next day, police found Wells' body on the side of the road. There were approximately thirty stab wounds on his body. Defendant's knife was found in the woods nearby. Defendant was ultimately charged with first-degree murder. He pled not guilty and offered no defense; however, he admitted through counsel several times at trial that he had stabbed Wells multiple times.
During the jury charge conference, the court discussed with the prosecutors and defense counsel where to place the instruction on voluntary intoxication. The court indicated it would likely place the voluntary intoxication instruction in the body of the first-degree murder charge, after the third element, intent. Defense counsel stated, “Your Honor, we consent—I believe we consent—I believe that [sic] a fair way of doing it.” The State agreed, but also suggested that it could be placed after the fifth element, deliberation, to which defense counsel stated, “Judge, I think they're exactly right, based on having done this so many times with them. And in other courts, we've put it right there.” The court concluded that it was going to give the voluntary intoxication instruction and noted that “it's just a matter of where it's located in this specific instruction.”
The court ultimately read the voluntary intoxication instruction between the third and fourth elements of first-degree murder, after intent and before premeditation. Defendant failed to object to the placement of the voluntary intoxication instruction or to ask for any corrections or additions to be made before the jury retired. The court gave the jury a written copy of the jury instructions for use in its deliberations. The jury returned a verdict convicting defendant of first-degree murder.
_________________________
In his sole argument on appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by reading the jury instruction for the defense of voluntary intoxication between the elements of intent and premeditation of the first-degree murder instruction, rather than after the element of deliberation. Defendant argues the trial court's placement of the voluntary intoxication instruction undermined its impact and confused the jury.
“A party may not make any portion of the jury charge or omission therefrom the basis of an issue presented on appeal unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly that to which objection is made and the grounds of the objection ....“ N.C.R.App. P. 10(a)(2); see also State v. McNeil, 350 N.C. 657, 691, 518 S.E.2d 486, 507 (1999), cert. denied,529 U.S. 1024, 146 L.Ed.2d 321 (2000). Defendant may, nevertheless, challenge jury instructions on appeal by “specifically and distinctly” contending that the instructions amount to plain error. N.C.R.App. P. 10(a)(4); see also State v. Goss, 361 N.C. 610, 622, 651 S.E.2d 867, 875 (2007), cert. denied,555 U.S. 835, 172 L.Ed.2d 58 (2008).
Defendant does not assert, and the record on appeal does not reveal, that he objected to the trial court's instructions. Under these circumstances, for this Court to consider defendant's argument on appeal, defendant is required to show plain error. State v. Wilkinson, 344 N.C. 198, 213, 474 S.E.2d 375, 383 (1996). Here, defendant does not allege that the trial court's instructions amounted to plain error. Because defendant participated in the charge conference wherein the instruction was crafted and he communicated that he was satisfied with the instruction being read after the third or fifth element, any error in the instruction was invited error, and we decline to address defendant's argument further. See State v. Yang, 174 N.C.App. 755, 760, 622 S.E.2d 632, 635 (2005), supersedeas denied and disc. review denied,360 N.C. 296, 628 S.E.2d 12 (2006) (finding that defendant invited error by telling the court, “I have nothing to add, Your Honor,” and helping to craft the attempted voluntary manslaughter instruction during the charge conference).
No error. Judges ELMORE and HUNTER, JR. concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).