Opinion
No. CR 01-553550
August 30, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR REARGUMENT AND MOTION TO OPEN AND SET ASIDE JUDGMENT
On July 27, 2011, this court issued a memorandum of decision in which it dismissed the claims set forth by the defendant in a motion to correct an illegal sentence, two motions to open and set aside judgment and a pleading entitled "Bill in Equity." Concerning the motion to correct and motions to open, this court concluded that all of the defendant's claims had been ruled upon in prior proceedings and the doctrine of collateral estoppel therefore precluded their relitigation (with the exception of the second issue in the motion to correct, which this court determined it lacked jurisdiction to consider). Concerning the Bill in Equity, this court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the defendant's claim set forth therein. This court further determined, in the alternative, that even if it possessed jurisdiction to consider the Bill in Equity, the merits of the defendant's claim still could not be addressed pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
The defendant now seeks to reargue the above discussed motion to correct and motions to open. The defendant asserts that this court improperly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel because it was not specifically raised in the pleadings. What the defendant fails to acknowledge, however, is that it was in fact he who injected the issue of collateral estoppel into the case by addressing it in his brief in support of his original motion, and by "[a]ssuming arguendo" that his motion "may be barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel . . ."
Def's Brief, p. 3 n. 1.
Moreover, while this court is not unmindful of the general rule that res judicata and collateral estoppel must be specifically pleaded by the party seeking its benefit, this general rule may yield in certain circumstances. Tucker v. Pace Investments Associates, 32 Conn.App. 384, 391, cert. denied, 288 Conn. 906 (1993), cert. denied, CT Page 18375 510 U.S. 1196, 114 S.Ct. 1305, 127 L.Ed.2d 657 (1994); see also Lind-Larsen v. Bank of America, N.A., Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV 06 4005275 (October 24, 2008, Shaban, J.). Courts possess the inherent authority, if not the absolute duty, to implement res judicata and collateral estoppel to advance the important public policy of preventing the relitigation of a matter that a party already had an opportunity to litigate. See Tucker v. Pace Investments Associates, supra, 32 Conn.App. 389. "Res judicata [as well as collateral estoppel] . . . should be applied as necessary to promote [their] underlying purposes. These purposes are generally identified as being (1) to promote judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation; (2) to prevent inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system; and (3) to provide repose . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.; see also State v. Jones, 98 Conn.App. 695, 700-01 (2006), cert. denied, 281 Conn. 916 (2007).
As stated in this court's July 27, 2011, memorandum of decision, the crux of each of the defendant's claims in the motion to correct and motions to open has been addressed previously by the habeas court in two separate court proceedings. Moreover, the underlying theory that serves as a basis for all of the defendant's claims has been the subject of litigation in various forums at the trial court level. Even though the defendant, with his most recent motion to correct and motions to open, through modest legal maneuvering attempted to reassert these claims, he simply could not change their true nature "any more than one can make a bull a cow by giving it a female name." State v. Smith, 19 Conn.App. 646, 648 (1989), citing State v. Gooch, 186 Conn. 17, 18, 438 A.2d 867 (1982). Accordingly, this court determined, and continues to maintain, that the underlying purposes of collateral estoppel are so patently applicable to the defendant's case that to permit further litigation would frustrate the principles of efficiency and finality that serve as part of the foundation to the proper functioning of the judicial system. See State v. Osuch, 124 Conn.App. 572, 583, cert. denied, 299 Conn. 918 (2010). This court simply could not, and will not, allow the defendant to further exploit the judicial system in such a manner.
Carter v. Warden, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland at Rockville, Docket No. CV 04 4000182 (May 4, 2006, Fuger, J.), appeal dismissed, Carter v. Commissioner of Correction, 106 Conn.App. 464, cert. denied, 288 Conn. 906 (2008); Carter v. Warden, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland at Rockville, Docket No. CV 07 4002005 (January 22, 2010, Nazzaro, J.).
State v. Carter, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford at Hartford, Docket No. CR 01 553550 (April 28, 2005, Mulcahy, J.T.R.) (motion for new trial and judgment of acquittal); Carter v. Warden, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland at Rockville, Docket No. CV 04 4000182 (May 4, 2006, Fuger, J.) (first petition for writ of habeas corpus), appeal dismissed, Carter v. Commissioner of Correction, 106 Conn.App. 464, cert. denied, 288 Conn. 906 (2008); Carter v. Commissioner of Correction, 109 Conn.App. 300 (2008) (dismissing appeal from second petition for writ of habeas corpus); State v. Carter, Superior Court, judicial of Hartford at Hartford, Docket No. CR01 0553550 (July 8, 2008, Mulcahy, J.T.R.) (oral decision on motion to correct an illegal sentence), aff'd, CT Page 18377 122 Conn.App. 527 (2010) (per curiam), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 915 (2011); Carter v. Warden, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland at Rockville, Docket No. CV 07 4002005 (January 22, 2010, Nazzaro, J.) (third petition for writ of habeas corpus).
Finally, with regard to this court's ruling on the defendant's Bill in Equity, the defendant now moves that the judgment be opened and set aside on the ground that this court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the claim he sought to advance therein. The court, however, need not open its judgment to consider this jurisdictional issue because that ruling was itself specifically based on a determination that jurisdiction to consider the Bill in Equity was lacking. See page 9 of this court's July 27, 2011, memorandum of decision ("To begin, this court is unaware of any so-called `Bill of Equity' or similarly entitled pleading under our criminal statutes or rules of practice that would be available to a defendant seeking to vacate a criminal conviction or sentence. Absent such a foundation, this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the defendant's claim or to take any action upon his conviction and sentence"). While it is true that this court went on to conclude that the defendant's claim in any event would have been barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the first and primary basis of the dismissal related to the jurisdictional defect that the defendant only now appears to recognize.
While it is odd that the defendant now argues that this court lacked jurisdiction to consider the Bill in Equity that he himself had filed, he contends that the Bill in Equity, a civil pleading, was filed with the criminal court by mistake. Mot. to Open and Set Aside J., p. 1 n. 1.
This alternative conclusion was, inadvertently, the only one referenced in the concluding section of this court's memorandum of decision. See page 10 of this court's July 27, 2011, memorandum of decision.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the defendant's motion to reargue and motion to open and set aside the judgment are denied.