"No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized." In State v. Tucker, 286 Or. 485, 490, 595 P.2d 1364 (1979), and State v. Carter/Dawson, 287 Or. 479, 485, 600 P.2d 873 (1979), the Supreme Court purported to consider pretext stops under both Article I, section 9, and the Fourth Amendment. However, in State v. Flores, 68 Or. App. 617, 625, 685 P.2d 999, rev den 298 Or. 151 (1984), we concluded that the Supreme Court would treat cases decided after State v. Florance, 270 Or. 169, 527 P.2d 1202 (1974), which adopted the federal rule regarding searches incident to arrest, and before State v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741, 653 P.2d 942 (1982), which required independent analysis of the same question under the Oregon Constitution, as interpreting the Fourth Amendment only. Because Tucker and Carter/Dawson fall into that category, they are not dispositive of the issue of pretext stops under the Oregon Constitution.

Sometimes the steps occur in a different sequence, invalidating the logic of the chain. See State v. Carter/Dawson, 287 Or. 479, 600 P.2d 873 (1979). It hardly needs demonstration that automobiles uniquely are where most persons confront routine law enforcement activity that may lead to a search and eventual prosecution for an unrelated possessory offense.

On review, the Supreme Court accepted that view. State v. Carter/Dawson, 287 Or. 479, 600 P.2d 873 (1979). We think that conclusion is dispositive here. Once the officer cleared the driver's license, the registration and the ownership of the automobile, he could do no more than write a citation for the traffic violation and send the defendant and his brother on their way.

On appeal, the defendant contended that the officer had unlawfully detained defendant after all matters concerning the initial stop had been "satisfactorily processed" and that the officer "examined the interior of his vehicle visually during this detention." He cited to the trial court State v. Carter/Dawson, 287 Or. 479, 600 P.2d 873 (1979), and State v. Wight, 48 Or. App. 731, 617 P.2d 928 (1980), in support of that contention. Because the defendant prevailed at the trial court level on this first issue, his other contentions raised at trial were not asserted in this appeal.

There was nothing articulated that he suspected the substance was contraband. However, as we stated in State v. Carter/Dawson, 34 Or. App. 21, 29, 578 P.2d 790 (1978), aff'd 287 Or. 479, 600 P.2d 873 (1979):State v. Carter/Dawson 34 Or. App. 21, 578 P.2d 790 (1978), aff'd 287 Or. 479, 600 P.2d 873 (1979), was a "stop" case in which we held that, because both this court and the Supreme Court had held that arrests and searches are to be judged by an objective standard of probable cause, an objective standard should also be applied to "stops."

” Defendant points out that “ ‘[t]raffic stops should be the minimum possible intrusion on Oregon motorists, and not an excuse to begin questioning, searching or investigating that is unrelated to the traffic reason for the stop.’ ” State v. Carter/Dawson, 287 Or. 479, 486, 600 P.2d 873 (1979) (quoting State v. Carter/Dawson, 34 Or.App. 21, 32, 578 P.2d 790 (1978)). Defendant makes a second, alternative argument.

Even if he had intended to cite him, Main's duty at that point was to write a citation and leave. State v. Carter/Dawson, 287 Or. 479, 600 P.2d 873 (1979). ORS 811.

In my opinion such a rule is not logical or desirable. In State v. Carter/Dawson, 287 Or. 479, 485, 600 P.2d 873 (1979), the Supreme Court held that an officer's motives are not relevant to the question of the validity of an otherwise justifiable traffic stop. To me, this is reasonable and realistic. Applying Carter/Dawson to the facts here, I conclude that the trial court erred in allowing defendant's motion to suppress.

ndard established in Whren under the North Carolina Constitution because "in general, police action related to probable cause should be judged in objective terms, not subjective terms"); State v. Oliver , 724 N.W.2d 114, 116 (N.D. 2006) (relying on Whren to determine "that [a] police officer’s subjective intentions in making a stop are not important as long as a traffic violation has occurred"); City of Dayton v. Erickson , 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 665 N.E.2d 1091, 1097–98 (1996) ("[W]here an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for ... a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid regardless of the officer’s underlying subjective intent or motivation for stopping the vehicle in question."); Dufries v. State , 133 P.3d 887, 889 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006) ("[W]here an officer has probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred, his subjective motivation for stopping the vehicle is irrelevant to the legality of the stop."); State v. Carter , 287 Or. 479, 600 P.2d 873, 875 (1979) (en banc) ("The officer’s motives for an otherwise justifiable traffic stop are, as we held in [State v. ] Tucker , [286 Or. 485, 595 P.2d 1364 (1979) ] not relevant to the question of its validity."); Commonwealth v. Chase , 599 Pa. 80, 960 A.2d 108, 120–21 (2008) (concluding that a state statute allowing police officers to initiate traffic stops based on reasonable suspicion of vehicle code violations did not offend the state constitution’s search and seizure provision); State v. Bjerke , 697 A.2d 1069, 1073 (R.I. 1997) (declining to depart from Whren under the Rhode Island Constitution because it would be "unprincipled and unwarranted"); State v. Vinson , 400 S.C. 347, 734 S.E.2d 182, 184 (Ct. App. 2012) (referring to Whren and indicating an officer’s subjective motivations play no role in search and seizure analysis); State v. Vineyard , 958 S.W.2d 730, 736 (Tenn. 1997) ("[W]e conclude that probable cause justifies a traffic stop under Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constit

, 71 [Minn Ct App. 1997]); Guerrero v. State ( 746 So.2d 940, 943 [Miss Ct App. 1999]); State v. Lane ( 937 S.W.2d 721, 723 [Mo 1997]); State v. Martinez ( 940 P.2d 1200, 1204 [NM Ct App. 1997]); Commonwealth v. Hoak ( 700 A.2d 1263, 1268 [Pa Super Ct 1997], affd by an evenly divided court 734 A.2d 1275 [Pa 1999]); State v. Trudeau ( 683 A.2d 725, 728 n 3 [Vt 1996]); State v. Rutzinski ( 623 N.W.2d 516, 520 [Wis 2001] [adoptingWhren objective standard under Wisconsin Constitution]); State v. Welch ( 873 P.2d 601 [Wyo 1994]). HAS WHREN ANALYSIS WITHOUT CITING WHRENBeauvois v. State ( 837 P.2d 1118, 1121-22 n 1 [Alaska Ct App. 1992]);State v. Bolosan ( 890 P.2d 673, 681 [Haw 1995][applying under Hawaii Constitution an objective standard later articulated by Whren]); Mitchell v. State ( 745 N.E.2d 775, 787 [Ind 2001] [adopting Whren standard under Indiana Constitution]); City of Dayton v. Erickson ( 665 N.E.2d 1091, 1092 [Ohio 1996] [adopting objective standard under Ohio Constitution]); State v. Carter ( 600 P.2d 873, 875 [Ore 1979]); State v. Lopez ( 873 P.2d 1127, 1140 [Utah 1994] [declining to depart from Whren's interpretation of Fourth Amendment in construing parallel provisions of Utah Constitution]); Glasco v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 137, 146 [Va 1996]). People v. Frank Robinson (No. 141)People v. Patrick J. Reynolds (No. 142)People v. Jerry Glenn (No. 143)