He knew of no understanding between Federal Express and the DEA for the disposal of contraband." Id. Contrast this case with State v. Carter, 267 N.W.2d 385, 386 (Iowa 1978), where the court held that off-duty police officers who conducted a search were not private individuals because "[t]he men were police officers, they were in uniform, they carried sidearms. The record shows arrests were made by these guards as Des Moines police officers.
That police officer's off-duty employment was part of the police department's "secondary hiring program," wherein the police department selected the officers and the police officer's first duty was to the department, not the bank. Id. See also State v. Carter, 267 N.W.2d 385, 386 (Iowa 1978) (holding that off-duty police officers who conducted a search were not private individuals because "[t]he men were police officers, they were in uniform, they carried sidearms. The record shows arrests were made by these guards as Des Moines police officers.
In rendering its decision, the trial court in the present matter adopted the reasoning of an opinion from the State of Iowa where the "clear and convincing standard" was applied. (See State v. Carter (Iowa 1978), 267 N.W.2d 385, 386.) It is evident, therefore, that the trial court in the present matter erred when it applied a standard of proof which was higher than the preponderance of the evidence standard. • 2, 3 Moreover, private action is not subject to the exclusionary rule of the fourth amendment because there would be no deterrent effect to punish this type of individual action.
I may add that courts dealing with similarly intrusive searches at public events have also come to this conclusion. See, e.g. Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134 (M.D.N.C. 1977); Collier v. Miller, 414 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.Tex. 1976); Stroeber v. Commission Veteran's Auditorium, 453 F. Supp. 926 (S.D. Iowa 1977); Jacobsen v. City of Seattle, 98 Wn.2d 668, 658 P.2d 653 (1983); State v. Carter, 267 N.W.2d 385 (Iowa 1978); Nakamoto v. Fasi, 64 Haw. 17, 635 P.2d 946 (1981). Second, even assuming arguendo that warrantless police searches of all Derby patrons are legal, Officer Heavrin's search of Mr. Jeffers' prescription bottle can still not be justified on this broad basis.
See Bolinske v. North Dakota State Fair Ass'n, 522 N.W.2d 426, 430-32 (N.D. 1994). It is also relevant under Fourth Amendment principles that the Fair is held at government-owned entertainment facilities, with security being provided by on-or-off-duty law enforcement officers. See Jacobsen v. City of Seattle, 98 Wn.2d 668, 658 P.2d 658. 656 (1983) (suspicionless searches imposed as condition of entry to rock music concerts invalidated by court); State v. Carter, 267 N.W.2d 385, 386-87 (Iowa 1978) (same); compare Gallagher "Neil Young Freedom Concert", 49 F.3d 1442, 1446-47 (10th Cir. 1995) (no state action, and therefore no civil-rights claim for unlawful search. where rock concert was held at government-owned facility but facility was rented to private entity that sponsored event, and searches were performed by private company). It is clear the Fair's right to exclude is not coextensive with that of a private property owner.
Id. In contrast, we considered whether off-duty police officers were acting as government agents in State v. Carter , 267 N.W.2d 385 (Iowa 1978). In that case, Veterans Auditorium employed approximately twenty-five off-duty Des Moines police officers to serve as security guards during events.
ish voluntary consent in the context of a “knock and talk” under the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution without an independent discussion of the Iowa Constitution); State v. Horton, 625 N.W.2d 362, 364 (Iowa 2001) (stating that search was not supported by consent under Schneckloth without discussing state constitution); State v. Manna, 534 N.W.2d 642, 643–44 (Iowa 1995) (discussing only the Fourth Amendment in determining whether the consent was voluntary); State v. Oakley, 469 N.W.2d 681, 683 (Iowa 1991) (same); State v. Myer, 441 N.W.2d 762, 765–66 (Iowa 1989) (same); State v. Folkens, 281 N.W.2d 1, 3–4 (Iowa 1979) (same); State v. Ege, 274 N.W.2d 350, 353 (Iowa 1979) (discussing Schneckloth without reference to article I, section 8); State v. Jones, 274 N.W.2d 273, 275–76 (Iowa 1979) (mentioning in passing article I, section 8 and citing, without analysis, Schneckloth for the proposition that valid consent is an exception to the warrant requirement); State v. Carter, 267 N.W.2d 385, 385 (Iowa 1978) (stating sole issue was constitutionality of consent search under Fourth Amendment); State v. Bakker, 262 N.W.2d 538, 546–47 (Iowa 1978) (discussing consent in context of Fourth Amendment only); Bettuo v. Pelton, 260 N.W.2d 423, 425–27 (Iowa 1977) (same); State v. Ahern, 227 N.W.2d 164, 165–67 (Iowa 1975) (mentioning only Fourth Amendment in applying Schneckloth ). In Reinders, however, we did consider claims brought under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution in a search and seizure case involving consent.
Brief for appellee at 20-21, quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 137 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1997). See, Wilkinson v. Forst, 832 F.2d 1330 (2d Cir. 1987); Gaioni, supra note 49; Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134 (D.C.N.C. 1977); Jacobsen v. Seattle, 98 Wash. 2d 668, 658 P.2d 653 (1983); State v. Carter, 267 N.W.2d 385 (Iowa 1978); State v. Iaccarino, 767 So. 2d 470 (Fla. App. 2000). (b) Smith Did Not Consent to Search of His Pocket
Defendants do not claim the searches are "stop and frisk searches" ( Terry v. Ohio, supra) or that the plaintiffs consented to be searched. See State v. Carter, 267 N.W.2d 385 (Iowa 1978). They do claim a new exception for rock concerts asserting that warrantless searches at rock concerts are analogous to those at courthouses and at airports.
We agree with the State that, while a patient has an expectation of privacy in their belongings brought into the emergency room, no such expectation of privacy exists in the trauma center locale, which is under the exclusive control of the hospital staff. Lomax cites State v. Carter, 267 N.W.2d 385, 386 (Iowa 1978), for the proposition that when a private citizen engages with the government, the protections of the Fourth Amendment still apply. In oral argument, Carter was referenced to support the assertion that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy even in public spaces.