(1) An offer to plead guilty on terms is inadmissible in evidence. Kercheval v. United States, 71 L.Ed. 657; State v. Meyers, 99 Mo. 107; People v. Boyd, 227 P. 783; State v. LaRose, 52 A. 943; Sanders v. State, 148 Ala. 603; Wilson v. State, 73 Ala. 527; State v. Kring, 74 Mo. 612; State v. Kring, 71 Mo. 551; Dean v. State, 161 S.W. 974; Commonwealth v. Lannin, 13 Allen (Mass.) 563; People v. Cignorak, 110 N.Y. 23; State v. Stephens, 71 Mo. 535; Heath v. State, 214 P. 1091; People v. Steinmetz, 240 N.Y. 411 (dis. opinion); White v. State, 51 Ga. 285; Heim v. United States, 47 App. D.C. 485; People v. Ryan, 82 Cal. 617; State v. Carta, 90 Conn. 79 (dis. opinion). (2) The alleged offer to plead guilty was inadmissible because involuntary and its repetition was unnecessary and prejudicial.
Held that this instruction was correct. The case of State v. Carta, 90 Conn. 79, distinguished. Submitted on briefs October 29th, 1920
When the fact was established that the admission had been made by the accused, the admission was not before the jury as testimony by him establishing the truth of all or any part of the allegations of the information, but the fact that he had made it was before them, and was relevant as being inconsistent with his claim to the jury that he did not obtain any money under false pretenses from the complaining witnesses and was not guilty. ( State v. Carta, 90 Conn. 79 [ 96 A. 411].) The defendant's own admission, voluntarily made, was clearly competent evidence against him.
When the fact was established that the admission had been made by the accused, the admission was not before the jury as testimony by him establishing the truth of all or any part of the allegations of the information, but the fact that he had made it was before them, and was relevant as being inconsistent with his claim to the jury that he did not obtain any money under false pretenses from the complaining witnesses and was not guilty. ( State v. Carta, 90 Conn. 79 [ 96 A. 411].) The defendant's own admission, voluntarily made, was clearly competent evidence against him.
When the fact was established that the admission had been made by the accused, the admission was not before the jury as testimony by him establishing the truth of all or any part of the allegations of the information, but the fact that he had made it was before them, and was relevant as being inconsistent with his claim to the jury that he did not obtain any money under false pretenses from the complaining witnesses and was not guilty. ( State v. Carta, 90 Conn. 79 [L.R.A. 1916E, 634, 96 A. 411].) The defendant's own admission, voluntarily made, was clearly competent evidence against him.
[12] When the fact was established that the admission had been made by the accused, the admission was not before the jury as testimony by him establishing the truth of all or any part of the allegations of the information, but the fact that he had made it was before them, and was relevant as being inconsistent with his claim to the jury that he did not obtain any money under false pretenses from the complaining witnesses and was not guilty. ( State v. Carta, 90 Conn. 79 [ 96 A. 411].) The defendant's own admission, voluntarily made, was clearly competent evidence against him. [13] That he made the admission in court can detract nothing from its relevancy or its competency.
273 U.S. 685. In support of the rulings below, the United States cites Commonwealth v. Ervine, 8 Dana (Ky.) 30; People v. Jacobs, 165 A.D. 721; State v. Carta, 90 Conn. 79; People v. Boyd, 67 Cal.App. 292, 302; and People v. Steinmetz, 240 N.Y. 411. The arguments for admissibility to be gleaned from these cases are that the introduction of the withdrawn plea shows conduct inconsistent with the claim of innocence at the trial; that the plea is a statement of guilt having the same effect as if made out of court; that it is received on the principle which permits a confession of the accused in a lower court to be shown against him at his trial in the higher court; that it is not received as conclusive, and, like an extra-judicial confession, it is not sufficient without other evidence of the corpus delicti.
The federal rule forbids the introduction of a withdrawn plea of guilty, Kercheval v. United States, 1927, 274 U.S. 220, 47 S.Ct. 582, 71 L.Ed. 1009, and so do most states. E. g., Ely v. Haugh, Iowa, 1969, 172 N.W.2d 144; State v. Joyner, 1955, 228 La. 927, 84 So.2d 462; People v. Street, 1939, 288 Mich. 406, 284 N.W. 926; State v. Reardon, 1955, 245 Minn. 509, 73 N.W.2d 192; People v. Spitaleri, 1961, 9 N.Y.2d 168, 212 N.Y.S.2d 53, 173 N.E.2d 35. Contra: State v. Carta, 1916, 90 Conn. 79, 96 A. 411; State v. Nichols, 1949, 167 Kan. 565, 207 P.2d 469 (dictum); State v. Weekly, Wash., 1952, 41 Wn.2d 727, 252 P.2d 246. The Massachusetts cases, e. g., Commonwealth v. Devlin, 1957, 335 Mass. 555, 573, 141 N.E.2d 269, deal with pleas to the maximum offense, and so do not reach the question of compromise.
While the decisions of the state courts are not uniform, there is creditable authority that a plea of guilty, although subsequently withdrawn with the permission of the court and replaced by a plea of not guilty, may nevertheless be given in evidence by the state upon the trial of the case to the jury, not as a judicial confession, which dispenses with further proof of the corpus delicti, but merely as a fact or circumstance at variance with the claim of innocence, upon the truth of which the jury are to pass. State v. Carta, 90 Conn. 79, 96 A. 411, L.R.A. 1916E, 634; People v. Jacobs, 165 App. Div. 721, 151 N.Y.S. 522. And it has been held that a voluntary offer by the accused before trial to plead guilty on terms to the offense charged is competent as his admission. 16 C.J. ยง 1254; Com. v. Callahan, 108 Mass. 421. Compare Kirk v. State, 56 Tex.Crim. R., 120 S.W. 436.
Before we set forth the defendant's argument, it will be helpful briefly to review the evolution of the corpus delicti rule in Connecticut.Although our cases contain earlier references to the rule; see, e.g., State v. Carta , 90 Conn. 79, 83, 96 A. 411 (1916) ; the corpus delicti rule was first fully articulated in 1933. See State v. La Louche , 116 Conn. 691, 166 A. 252 (1933), overruled in part by State v. Tillman , 152 Conn. 15, 20, 202 A.2d 494 (1964).