Opinion
No. 5-444 / 04-1317
Filed June 29, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cedar County, Charles H. Pelton and David H. Sivright, Jr., Judges.
Raymond Carpenter appeals his conviction for operating while intoxicated. AFFIRMED.
David Scieszinski, Wilton, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Richard J. Bennett, Assistant Attorney General, and Lee W. Beine, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
The sole issue in this criminal appeal is the propriety of a district court ruling on a motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
At 3:30 a.m. one morning, the Cedar County Sheriff received a call about two suspicious vehicles parked at a rural intersection. Deputy Sheriff Orville Randolph was dispatched to the location. He lived near the intersection and testified the area was "routinely" the location of "mailbox vandalisms" and "street sign vandalisms."
On seeing the vehicles, Deputy Randolph pulled into the center of the road. Raymond Carpenter, one of the drivers, veered around Randolph's vehicle and proceeded away at speeds approaching ninety miles per hour. He was eventually stopped. Randolph determined he was intoxicated.
The State charged Carpenter with eluding a marked police vehicle and operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. See Iowa Code §§ 321.279(3)(b), 321J.2 (2003). Carpenter moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that the officer lacked "probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop [his] vehicle for violating criminal law," as guaranteed by article 1, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. The district court denied the motion following a hearing. A jury subsequently found Carpenter not guilty of eluding and guilty of operating while intoxicated. The court imposed sentence and Carpenter appealed.
II. Suppression Ruling
Article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution, addressing the reasonableness of warrantless searches and seizures, has been deemed "identical in scope, import, and purpose" to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 640-41 (Iowa 2002). Both permit an officer to "stop an individual or vehicle for investigatory purposes based on a reasonable suspicion that a criminal act has occurred or is occurring." Id. at 641 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968)). This standard is distinct from the probable cause standard for a stop. Id. at 642 (stating evidence justifying the stop under reasonable suspicion standard "need not rise to the level of probable cause"). A traffic violation will support the separate probable cause standard. State v. Aderholdt, 545 N.W.2d 559, 562 (Iowa 1996).
Based on our de novo review of the record we fully concur in the following assessment by the district court:
Officer Randolph had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot based upon the citizen calls of suspicious activity, the 3:30 a.m. time, the rural remote place, and a place of routine mailbox and street sign vandalism. Subsequent to the attempted stop there was probable cause to stop the vehicle for offenses committed by the driver in the view of the officer.
We recognize there is evidence to suggest that the Sheriff received only one citizen call rather than two and evidence disputing Deputy Randolph's account of precisely when he activated his lights. Given of the other enumerated facts, this evidence does not detract from a determination that reasonable suspicion for the stop existed. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d at 646 (noting time of day, location, and knowledge of prior criminal activity at location all factors considered in determining existence of reasonable suspicion for stop). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Carpenter's motion to suppress and his judgment and sentence for operating while intoxicated.