A driver's knowledge of barment is not an element of a section 321.561 offense. State v. Carmer, 465 N.W.2d 303, 304 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). However, the recent case of State v. Green, 722 N.W.2d 650 (Iowa 2006), holds that, where the DOT is required to give notice, failure to prove the DOT mailed the notice precludes a driver's conviction for driving while suspended or barred.
FED. R. EVID. 609(a). In State v. Carmer, 465 N.W.2d 303 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990), the Iowa Court of Appeals held that knowledge of barred license status is not an element of the offense of driving while barred. Carmer, 465 N.W.2d at 304.
Danielson argues the State presented insufficient evidence to support his convictions because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt he received official notice informing him of the beginning and ending dates of his license suspension or the need to file proof of financial responsibility. Moreover, Danielson asks this court to overturn our holding in State v. Carmer, 465 N.W.2d 303 (Iowa Ct.App. 1990), by adding a knowledge element to the driving while license suspended offense. We find the State produced substantial evidence to convict Danielson of driving while under suspension and failure to file proof of financial responsibility in violation of Iowa Code sections 321J.21 and 321A.32 respectively.
However, the State is not required to prove knowledge on the part of the defendant. State v. Carmer , 465 N.W.2d 303, 304 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (holding section 321.561 does not require knowledge as an element of the offense of driving while barred). Moreover, "[a] person’s refusal to accept or a claim of failure to receive a notice of ... bar mailed by first class mail to the person’s last known address shall not be a defense to a charge of driving while ... barred."
We join those jurisdictions that do not require criminal intent or knowledge for a conviction for driving with a suspended license. See People v. Morrison, 149 Ill. App.3d 282, 284, 500 N.E.2d 442 (1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 915, 107 S.Ct. 3187, 96 L.Ed.2d 675 (1987) (elements of driving while driver's license is revoked are act of driving motor vehicle and fact that driver's license was revoked); State v. Carmer, 465 N.W.2d 303, 304 (Iowa App. 1990) (knowledge is not element of driving while license is suspended); State v. Jones, 231 Kan. 366, 368, 644 P.2d 464 (1982) (for conviction of misdemeanor of driving with suspended license, state must send copy of order of suspension but need not prove actual receipt of notice or actual knowledge of suspension; nonreceipt may be mitigating factor at sentencing); State v. Pickering, 432 So.2d 1067, 1071 (La.App. 1983) (scienter not required for conviction for driving without license; state need only demonstrate that defendant drove vehicle on highway without proper license); State v. Coady, 412 N.W.2d 39, 41 (Minn.App. 1987) (offense of driving after license revocation does not require actual receipt of notice); State v. Grotzky, 222 Neb. 39, 42, 382 N.W.2d 20 (1986) (felony of operating motor vehicle after license revoked does not require intent); State v. Buttrey, 293 Or. 575, 582-84, 651 P.2d 1075 (1982) (defendant sentenced to one year imprisonment for driving with suspended license;
Our case law suggests the crime of driving while barred has only two elements: (1) defendant's license has been barred and (2) defendant operated a motor vehicle while his license was barred. See State v. Carmer, 465 N.W.2d 303, 304 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (comparing elements of driving while barred to elements of driving while revoked); see also State v. Harmon, No. 17-0353, 2018 WL 739314, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2018) (discussing State v. Williams, No. 16-0894, 2017 WL 3524729, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2017), where the majority and dissent agreed the crime had only two elements but disagreed whether the first element required the State to prove the DOT properly mailed notice of the barment to the defendant). Williams is currently pending on further review to our supreme court.
On the second element, the State did not have to show Johns actually knew his license was barred. See State v. Carmer, 465 N.W.2d 303, 304 (Iowa Ct.App.1990). But the State was required to offer evidence that the DOT actually mailed the notice of his barred status to his last known address.
There is no requirement that the State prove a defendant had knowledge the license was barred. State v. Carmer, 465 N.W.2d 303, 304 (Iowa Ct.App.1990). The Iowa Supreme Court, however, has determined the State must show the IDOT gave notice to the person their driver's license was barred.
A driver's knowledge of barment is not an element of a section 321.561 offense. State v. Carmer, 465 N.W.2d 303, 304 (Iowa Ct.App. 1990). However, the recent case of State v. Green, 722 N.W.2d 650 (Iowa 2006), holds that, where the DOT is required to give notice, failure to prove the DOT mailed the notice precludes a driver's conviction for driving while suspended or barred.
The State is not required to prove the defendant had knowledge of the revocation. See State v. Carmer, 465 N.W.2d 303, 304 (Iowa Ct.App. 1990). Furthermore, in a criminal prosecution, the State is not required to retry the elements of the administrative revocation proceedings.