Also, it illustrates the treating physician's testimony concerning the injuries to Victim. See State v. Carlton, 83 N.M. 644, 648, 495 P.2d 1091, 1095 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 83 N.M. 631, 495 P.2d 1078 (1972). All three Defendants argue that the photograph was impermissibly proffered to arouse prejudices and passions in the jury and that the photograph had little probative value compared to the prejudice it aroused.

Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 875 (1973).See United States v. Kunkel, 417 F.2d 299 (9th Cir. 1969); State v. Oldham, 92 Idaho 124, 438 P.2d 275 (1968); People v. Trent, 85 Ill.App.2d 157, 228 N.E.2d 535 (1967); State v. McCarty, 199 Kan. 116, 427 P.2d 616 (1967); Lamot v. State, 2 Md. App. 378, 234 A.2d 615 (1967); State v. Forney, 181 Neb. 757, 150 N.W.2d 915 (1967); adhered to State v. Forney, 182 Neb. 802, 157 N.W.2d 403 (1968); State v. Carlton, 83 N.M. 644, 495 P.2d 1091 (N.M.App. 1972). In both United States v. Legato and United States v. Canseco this court was faced with a consent search when Miranda warnings had been given prior to the consent.

They are often more accurate than any description by words, and give a clearer comprehension of the physical facts than can be obtained from the testimony of witnesses." Id. at 139, 860 P.2d at 781 (quoting State v. Carlton, 83 N.M. 644, 648, 495 P.2d 1091, 1095 (Ct.App. 1972)). The Court of Appeals in Pettigrew also found the photograph to be "relevant because it depicts the extent of Victim's injuries and because it makes more probable than not the potential of great bodily harm, which is an element of aggravated battery."

1981); State v. McGhee, 280 N.W.2d 436, 441-42 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039 (1980); State v. Sherwood, 139 N.J. Super. 201, 203-05, 353 A.2d 137, 139-40 (1976); Crafton v. State, 545 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Tenn.App. 1976); State v. Harbaugh, 132 Vt. 569, 577-78, 326 A.2d 821, 826 (1974); State v. Cobbs, 164 Conn. 402, 416-19, 324, 244, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 861 (1973); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 374 Mass. 203, 371 N.E.2d 755, 777 (1978); People v. Hooper, 50 Mich. App. 186. 195-96, 212 N.W.2d 786, 790 (1973); State v. Carlton, 83 N.M. 644, 654, 495 P.2d 1091, 1101 (1972); Katzensky v. State, 228 Ga. 6, 8, 183 S.E.2d 749, 751 (1971); State v. Harper, 465 S.W.2d 547, 548-49 (Mo. 1971); Green v. State, 45 Ala. App. 549, 551-52, 233 So.2d 243, 246 (1970). See also, 1 Wayne R. LaFave and Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 6.8(d) (1984), which states, "Similarly, while the Miranda Court recognized that a defendant has a right to stop answering questions at any time, this right was not included within the mandated warnings and thus lower courts have concluded that such a warning is not necessary."

Vialpando further states that an offer to admonish, even if declined, is generally a sufficient basis to uphold the denial of a mistrial motion. Id. at 297, 599 P.2d at 1094 (citing State v. Carlton, 83 N.M. 644, 495 P.2d 1091 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 83 N.M. 631, 495 P.2d 1078 (1972)). See also State v. Beach, 102 N.M. 642, 699 P.2d 115 (1985) (premature admission of evidence cured with admonition).

It is not a prerequisite to uphold the validity of a consent to search without a warrant that a defendant first be accorded the rights set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). State v. Ruud; State v. Carlton, 83 N.M. 644, 495 P.2d 1091 (Ct.App. 1972). Neither is a consent to search rendered involuntary by a failure to advise defendant of his right to refuse a request to search without a search warrant.

Such evidence constitutes visual explanations of a witness' testimony and as corroboration of that testimony. State v. Carlton, 83 N.M. 644, 495 P.2d 1091 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 83 N.M. 631, 495 P.2d 1078 (1972). We find that the photograph was reasonably relevant to the issue of the identification of Platt's body.

"State v. Cobbs, Conn.Supr., 164 Conn. 402, 324 A.2d 234 at 244 (1973) citing Green v. State, Ala.App., 45 Ala. App. 549, 233 So.2d 243 (1970); People v. Smith, Mich.App., 30 Mich. App. 34, 186 N.W.2d 61 (1971); State v. Carlton, N.M.App., 83 N.M. 644, 495 P.2d 1091 (1972). See also State v. Sherwood, N.J.Super., 139 N.J.Super. 201, 353 A.2d 137 (1976).

A vast majority of the jurisdictions which have addressed this issue have reached a conclusion similar to that reached here. United States v. DiGiacomo, 579 F.2d 1211, 1214 (10th Cir. 1978) (finding the omission not to be error per se but a factor to be considered in determining the voluntariness of the subsequent statements); Mock v. Rose, 472 F.2d 619, 622 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 971, 93 S.Ct. 2165, 36 L.Ed.2d 693 (1973); Green v. State, 45 Ala. App. 549, 551-52, 233 So.2d 243 (1970); State v. Cobbs, 164 Conn. 402, 416-19, 324 A.2d 234, 244, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 861, 94 S.Ct. 77, 38 L.Ed.2d 112 (1973); Katzensky v. State, 228 Ga. 6, 8, 183 S.E.2d 749, 751 (1971); People v. Washington, 115 Ill. App.2d 318, 328, 253 N.E.2d 677, 682 (1969); People v. Hooper, 50 Mich. App. 186, 195-96, 212 N.W.2d 786, 790 (1973); State v. Harper, 465 S.W.2d 547, 548-49 (Mo. 1971); State v. Sherwood, 139 N.J. Super. 201, 203-05, 353 A.2d 137, 139-40 (1976); State v. Carlton, 83 N.M. 644, 654, 495 P.2d 1091, 1101 (1972); State v. Parker, 44 Ohio St.2d 172, 177, 339 N.E.2d 648, 652 (1975) (considered only as a factor toward voluntariness determination); Commonwealth v. Alston, 456 Pa. 128, 135, 317 A.2d 241, 245 (1974); Crafton v. State, 545 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Tenn.App. 1976); State v. Harbaugh, 132 Vt. 569, 577-78, 326 A.2d 821, 826 (1974). Jurisdictions which have reached a contrary conclusion include North Carolina and Wisconsin.

The Eighth Circuit upheld use of defendant's statement); Biddy v. Diamond, 5 Cir., 516 F.2d 118 (proper warnings given December 15, defendant requested an attorney. 12 days later, in absence of counsel, warnings held not stale where in response to police inquiry, she stated she remembered her rights as previously explained); Maguire v. United States, 9 Cir., 396 F.2d 327 (3 day lapse between warning and later interrogation upheld); Tucker v. United States, 8 Cir., 375 F.2d 363 (1 1/2 day lapse upheld); Johnson v. State, 56 Ala. App. 583, 324 So.2d 298 (3 day interval upheld); Reaves v. State, Tenn.Cr.App., 523 S.W.2d 218 (1 day lapse upheld); Moten v. State, 231 Ga. 642, 203 S.E.2d 527 (2 day lapse upheld); State v. Carlton, 83 N.M. 644, 495 P.2d 1091 (1 day lapse upheld); State v. Gilreath, 107 Ariz. 318, 487 P.2d 385 (subsequent interrogations which took place 12 and 36 hours after warnings given upheld); State v. Rowe, 77 Wn.2d 955, 468 P.2d 1000 (2 day interval upheld); State v. Blanchey, 75 Wn.2d 926, 454 P.2d 841 (4 day interval upheld — defendant said he was aware of warnings); State v. Magee, 52 N.J. 352, 245 A.2d 339 (2 1/2 day interval upheld). In his brief defendant relies on Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313, as support for his assignment of error.