The question which arises is whether predisposition is to be determined by reference to a universal hypothetical person, or to a particular defendant and his predisposition to commit the particular crime. [14-17] Prior to the enactment of RSA 626:5, this court, in State v. Campbell, 110 N.H. 238, 241, 265 A.2d 11, 14 (1970), stated that when the defense of entrapment is raised but the evidence "support[s] a finding that the defendant was ready to commit the crime . . .," the conviction will be upheld. (Emphasis added.)

The defendant also claims that the actions of the officers constituted entrapment. He maintains that the trial court erred in refusing to submit this issue to the jury to be determined as a question of fact after instructing them on the legal elements which constitute entrapment. The nature of the defense of entrapment, the two main views in regard to it, and under what circumstances it is an issue for the jury, have been discussed fairly recently by this court in State v. Groulx, 106 N.H. 44, 203 A.2d 641 (1964), and State v. Campbell, 110 N.H. 238, 265 A.2d 11 (1970), and by the United States Supreme Court more recently in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973). In summary the general purpose of the defense is to prevent a defendant from being convicted of a crime manufactured by law enforcement officers.

Ordinarily entrapment is a question of fact for the jury to determine. State v. Campbell, 110 N.H. 238, 265 A.2d 11 (1970). "The court can find entrapment as a matter of law only where the undisputed testimony and required inferences compel a finding that the defendant was lured by the officers into an action he was not predisposed to take."

State v. Groulx, 106 N.H. 44, 47, 203 A.2d 641 (1964) (quotation omitted). We also examine the defendant's “own conduct and predisposition,” Little, 121 N.H. at 772 (quotation omitted), to determine whether he was “ready to commit the crime” and the police only furnished him an opportunity to do so, State v. Campbell, 110 N.H. 238, 241, 265 A.2d 11 (1970).

RSA 626:7, I(b). This court will find voluntary renunciation, as a matter of law, however, only where the undisputed testimony and required inferences compel a finding that the defendant renounced his criminal purpose. See State v. Campbell, 110 N.H. 238, 241, 265 A.2d 11, 14 (1970) (standard employed to determine affirmative defense of entrapment as a matter of law). In the case at bar, the evidence compelled no such finding.

Ordinarily, the issue of whether a defendant has been entrapped is a question of fact which must be resolved by the jury. State v. Stanley, supra, State v. Campbell, 110 N.H. 238, 265 A.2d 11 (1970). It is only when the undisputed evidence discloses that an accused was induced to engage in criminal conduct that he was not predisposed to commit that we can hold as a matter of law that he was entrapped.

Entrapment is "the inducement of one to commit a crime not contemplated by him, for the mere purpose of instituting a criminal prosecution against him." 21 Am. Jur.2d. Criminal Law 143; State v. Campbell, 110 N.H. 238, 265 A.2d 11. See R. Perkins, Criminal Law 1031 et seq. (2d ed.).

Plaintiff contends that the trial court "in the statement accompanying the disposition of sentence, a statement made available for publication immediately thereafter, . . . made a reconsideration of sentence and stay of sentence virtually meaningless." We have examined the transcripts involving the sentence, the motion to reconsider sentence, the motion to stay sentence pending appeal and also the rehearing on these motions and cannot say that the motion was frivolous since bail and a stay of sentence could have been allowed as was done in State v. Campbell, 110 N.H. 238, 265 A.2d 11 (1970). However the record reveals that the plaintiff was not an occasional violator of the drug laws even though he had no other prior record.

The doctrine is well-recognized and established both in the federal and most state courts. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932); State v. Campbell, 110 N.H. 238, 265 A.2d 11 (1970); Perkins, Criminal Law, chap. 10, sec. 9 at 1031 (2d ed. 1969); Am. Law Institute, Model Penal Code § 2.10 (Tent. draft.

See State v. Moquin, 105 N.H. 9, 13, 191 A.2d 541, 544-45 (1963). Cf. Hubley v. Goodwin, 90 N.H. 54, 56, 4 A.2d 665, 667 (1939); State v. Thomson, 110 N.H. 190, 263 A.2d 675 (1970); State v. Campbell, 110 N.H. 238, 265 A.2d 11 (1970). The statute extending by three days the period within which a defendant may appeal a conviction (RSA 599:1-a (supp.)